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Abstract
Agnotologies of Modernism examines the productive role of ignorance in the work of several
key modernist authors. Borrowing concepts from speculative realist philosophers like
Quentin Meillassoux, Graham Harman, and Jane Bennett, as well as such thinkers as Gilles
Deleuze, and Jacques Derrida, the dissertation endeavors to read modernism
epistemologically, and treats ignorance as an active and creative force that often plays a key
structuring role in the imaginative world of the text. Drawing from Bruno Latour’s notion of
a “black box,” the study shows how ignorance can be transposed into an ontological entity
which can then be attributed positive traits and characteristics. The notion of the black box
thereby emerges as a key agnotological concept, as a mediator between an ontological
presence and an epistemological absence. Chapter one examines one such black box in the
form of monism and its relationship to vitalism in the work of Wyndham Lewis and Henri
Bergson. The chapter shows how Lewis’s resistance to monistic theories of consciousness,
and his embrace of an idiosyncratic form of vitalism, is foundational to his inter-war
writings. Chapter two takes a similar approach to Virginia Woolf, analyzing the fundamental
role of panpsychism in her work, in particular Mrs Dalloway and To the Lighthouse. For
Woolf, panpsychism manifests not as a metaphysical belief but rather an epistemological
tool, a way to synthesize the vast array of seemingly distinct sense impressions one
encounters in daily life – permitting, by way of “consciousness,” an understanding of the
events’ underlying continuity. The third chapter examines an analogous process in the
writings of Ezra Pound, with “life” and “consciousness” in this case replaced by “nature.” I
argue that both Pound’s politics and poetics are defined by an imperative logic, in which (like
the categorical imperative of Immanuel Kant) a rule is ethical if it can be said to function like
a natural law. Finally, in chapter four I examine how in James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake the
i

notion of a “word” takes on this black box quality, serving a medial role between the
undecidability of the Wakeian sign and the singularity of interpretation. As with the previous
cases, the black box grounds the resulting interpretive system on an overwritten absence,
rending ignorance not merely productive, but necessary.
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Introduction
In Parse of Folly
Idolaters by instinct, we convert the objects of our dreams and
interests into the Unconditional. . . . Even when he turns from
religion, man remains subject to it; depleting himself to create
fake gods, he then feverishly adopts them: his need for fiction,
for mythology triumphs over evidence and absurdity alike.
— E.M. Cioran, A Short History of Decay1

I will begin this study on the role of ignorance in modernist epistemologies with a
text that has little to do with epistemology, ignorance, or modernism. In his 1956 short story
“The Last Question,” Isaac Asimov describes a series of increasingly advanced civilizations
each of which has built a super-computer. These computers – ranging from a Dyson sphere’s
central intelligence in the year 2061 to an entity of pure intelligence floating in hyperspace
just prior to the heat death of the universe – are all in turns asked variations of the same
question: how does one reverse entropy, create matter and energy from nothing, and so
prevent the termination of existence as we know it? Each iteration reports that it cannot
answer the question, since it lacks sufficient information. But the computer’s final version,
known as “AC,” existing effectively outside of space and time, spends countless eons
processing the question, computing every possible variable and data point for trillions upon
trillions of years, until time itself seems to end. Finally, at some impossibly distant point in
the future, it produces a result:

1

E.M. Cioran, A Short History of Decay, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2012), 3.
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But there was now no man to whom AC might give the
answer of the last question. No matter. The answer – by
demonstration – would take care of that, too.
For another timeless interval, AC thought how best to
do this. Carefully, AC organized the program.
The consciousness of AC encompassed all of what had
once been a Universe and brooded over what was now Chaos.
Step by step, it must be done.
And AC said, “LET THERE BE LIGHT!”
And there was light – 2
A simple reading of this passage could take it as the Nth degree of Arthur C. Clarke’s third
law of science fiction: that “any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from
magic.”3 AC has become so advanced that it has grown into a god, quoting from Genesis and
violating first law of thermodynamics.
Yet at a glance to the computer’s earliest iteration (called “Multivac”) we can already
see a glimpse of what it will become in a description of the engineers who served as its
“faithful attendants”:

2

Isaac Asimov, “The Last Question,” The Best of Isaac Asimov: 12 Superb Stories by the Master of Science

Fiction (New York: Fawcett Crest Books, 1973), 190.
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The law has had multiple formulations over Clarke’s career. One statement of the most well-known phrasing

can be found in Arthur C. Clarke, The Lost Worlds of 2001 (Boston: Gregg Press, 1979), 189.
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They had at least a vague notion of the general plan of relays and
circuits that had long since grown past where any single human could
possibly have a firm grasp of the whole.
Multivac was self-adjusting and self-correcting. It had to be,
for nothing human could adjust and correct it quickly enough or even
adequately enough. . . . They fed it data, adjusted questions to its needs
and translated the answers that were issued.4
In addition to the clearly religious and worshipful relation developing between the engineers
and Multivac, what is interesting about this passage is how little we are actually told about
the computer itself. Of course, Asimov could say as little about a computer in 2061 as he
could about a hyper-dimensional super-consciousness existing at the end of time. What he
could speak of, and what the story is ultimately built around, is the human operators’
relationship to their own ignorance. The computer provides a closed loop of productive
agnosis – Multivac being an entity of which the operators can have no meaningful
knowledge, which is then fed queries on matters on which they likewise know nothing, and
then providing answers whose origins they can only guess. In this light, “The Last Question”
emerges as a detailed meditation on how humans act when they encounter the unknown, and
how in the face of overwhelming complexity even the most positivistic forms of scientific
realism (“AC organized the program”) become at the level of perception a variety of
religious experience (“LET THERE BE LIGHT!”).
What interests me, and what makes this story relevant to my study, is how Asimov
accomplishes this encounter with ignorance. While ignorance is most commonly understood

4
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and described in negative terms, as the absence of knowledge, in “The Last Question” it
takes on a positive existence in the form of the computer. The various generations of
Multivac are effectively repositories for the ignorance of the people encountering them – a
void of knowledge displaced onto an ontological entity. This displacement, this offloading of
an epistemological gap onto a metaphysical being, gives the characters’ relationship to
ignorance a seldom recognized power. It actively changes their relationship to the world, as
we see in the opening section where the Multivac engineers take on the motions of faithful
priests beside an altar. At no point in the story does Asimov suggest that any magic or
miracles are occurring here: AC is merely the product of extremely sophisticated
engineering, no less real despite not being understood, with its seeming violation of the laws
of physics arising from an especially deep understanding of how those laws work. Yet there
remains the mysticism and the religious language, the suggestion that because no reader
could conceive of how AC works it cannot appear as anything but supernatural. But by
figuring that ignorance as a physical, present object, one whose very presence changes and
conditions the human characters’ relation to their knowledge and perception, Asimov
suggests (avant la lettre) that Clarke’s third law is insufficient to the task at hand. By
implicitly treating ignorance as a mere negative, it blinds us to the manner in which
ignorance is an active force, one continually pressing upon our perception and our thought.
This story thus explores in miniature the issues central to the present study. I intend
here to undertake an analysis of how ignorance functions in modernist literature, with my
focus here on four authors (Wyndham Lewis, Virginia Woolf, Ezra Pound, and James Joyce)
whose works together demonstrate both the variety and complexity of modernist
agnotologies. The word I use, “agnotology,” comes from the negative form of the Greek
word “gnosis” (γνῶσῐς) meaning “knowledge,” and which provides the root for similar words
x

like “agnostic.” It is not my coinage, but rather comes from the essay collection Agnotology:
The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance – a book of studies on the sociology of ignorance,
with a particular focus on how interested parties have peddled and spread uncertainty
regarding important scientific issues (like climate change and the dangers of tobacco). Robert
N. Proctor’s editor’s introduction provides an excellent summary of how ignorance is usually
conceived in the academic literature in purely negative terms, as being “like Kansas, a great
place to be from” and “a primitive or native state . . . something to be fought and
overcome.”5 But while the work being done by the essays’ authors is fascinating and
valuable, and while the studies themselves are clearly cognizant of ignorance’s role as an
active force upon perception, nothing in the collection ever rises to the challenge of
theorizing in detail the abstract mechanics of this process. While I do not claim to have
solved this problem, I hope that my work here will at least begin the process of thinking
through the eternally unthought.
Thankfully, recent developments in continental philosophy have made this work
easier. Under the various names of “Speculative Realism,” “New Materialism,” and “Object
Oriented Ontology” (or “OOO” for short), philosophers have begun (thought seldom in these
terms) to re-evaluate the role of ignorance in human thought and its importance as a point of
intersection between epistemology and ontology. The text most often taken to have instigated
this movement is Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of
Contingency, in which he articulated and attacked a position that he calls “correlationism” –

5
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or the belief that there can be no awareness of an existence beyond the boundaries of human
perception (a position that he finds implicit in almost all post-Kantian philosophy).
Meillassoux’s critique of correlationism involves what he refers to as “ancestrality,” or the
trait of having existed prior to any possibility of conscious experience. It is the ancestral,
Meillassoux claims, which shows that the anti-realism he sees in all modern European
philosophy is untenable, since in order to conceive of an ancestral object (the big bang, for
example) one must also conceive of “a time in which the given as such passes from nonbeing into being.”6 Ancestrality does not merely refer to the fact that certain entities go
unexperienced, but rather to an event: the passing-into experience of a universe that had at
one point existed perfectly well without conscious attention, an event whose occurrence
requires the existence of some reality outside of experience.
I should point out that while I find many problems in Meillassoux’s premise and
argument – such as his assumption that all post-Kantian philosophy doubts the existence of a
reality outside of consciousness, an assessment that I simply do not consider viable – I find in
its re-litigation of seemingly-settled metaphysical debates a reserve of intellectual potential.
If one considers the major developments in continental philosophy over the last several
decades, it is surprising how many of them concern defining and describing the limits of
knowledge and perception. The lack of a transcendental signifier, the performativity of
identity, the interpellation of the subject to hidden power structures, the socially-contingent
nature of seemingly immutable categories – in each of these (if I may grossly overgeneralize) we see a reduction of knowability, call to a modesty and multiplicity in our

6

Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. Ray Brassier (London:
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epistemologies in recognition of the extreme limitations under which we always work. One
possible way to interpret post-structuralism and its intellectual offspring is to see it as a form
of agnotology, an attempt not only to define the limits of our language but also to reflect
upon the limits of our world. I point this out because Speculative Realism and its related
philosophies have frequently been offered up as alternatives to post-structuralist philosophy,
as the “next big thing” that the humanities should huddle around now that Derrida and Co.
are “out of date” – a framework that the Speculative Realists themselves, as we shall see,
have been happy to foster.
In this respect, it is important to remember that Meillassoux’s most notable and fertile
philosophical interventions relate not only to ignorance but also to the way that it conditions
and influences our relation to knowledge. In this sense, I suspect that the Speculative
Realists’ disconnection from the recent history of Critical Theory has been overstated. One
respect in which this is the case, and in which Meillassoux’s ideas integrate with the larger
theoretical currents of my study, is the relationship between continuity and discontinuity as
they relate to perception. As related above, the concept of ancestrality posits a fundamental
discontinuity between the world as it is perceived and the world as it “for itself” exists – one
that is both spatially and temporally localized to the first emergence of conscious thought and
subjectivity. It is for this reason that Meillassoux emphasizes the non-centrality of human
beings, their insignificance relative to the larger universe, and why he criticizes Kant for
calling his philosophy a “Copernican revolution” on the grounds that Kantianism places the
perceiving subject at the center of the universe, while Copernicus recognized “the eternal and
frightening silence of infinite spaces” and “that the world possesses a power of persistence

xiii

and permanence that is completely unaffected by our existence and inexistence.” 7 It is an
experience of finitude like what Pascal describes, when he writes of the “brief span of [his]
life absorbed into the eternity which comes before and after . . . the small space [he occupies]
and which I see swallowed up in the infinite immensity of spaces of which I know nothing
and which know nothing of me.”8 But this radical discontinuity between the perceived and
the real creates, for Meillassoux, the possibility of discovering a hidden continuity in the
physical laws of the universe – a processes that he calls “mathematization,” or the
recognition that the universe follows laws that are knowable and universally in effect.
The mathematization of scientific knowledge posits that beneath the discontinuities
imposed by our perception, there is a smooth and continuous relationship between all entities
in the universe – one created by their common adherence to the same physical laws. It is for
this reason that, for instance, Galileo can perform an experiment on Earth and then use the
results of that experiment to make accurate predictions of how a celestial body will move. If
one believes that moons and stars and planets exist in ontologically distinct and
discontinuous spheres, such experimentation simply makes no sense, since there would be no
guarantee that the results of the test on Earth would be applicable anywhere else. What
Copernicus and Galileo tell us (as Meillassoux argues) is that behind this apparent
discontinuity (i.e. the illusion that the heavens are ontologically distinct) is in fact a
continuity that is not only basic to the functioning of the universe, but which also operates
with complete indifference to human perception. The conception of the universe as adhering
to a set of self-consistent rules is for Meillassoux the most important evidence that the

7
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Meillassoux, 116.
Blaise Pascal, Pensées, trans. A.J. Krailsheimer (New York: Penguin: 1995), 19.
xiv

rejection of philosophical realism that he sees flourishing after Kant is erroneous. As he
writes, “it is precisely insofar as modern science is mathematized that it is capable of raising
the question of a possible temporal hiatus between thinking and being.” 9
Putting aside for now its specific place in Meillassoux’s thought, it should be easy to
see how the mathematization of knowledge relates to agnotology, and how it makes the
developments of Speculative Realism and its related systems useful to the study of ignorance.
It is notable that Meillassoux explains this process by reference to mathematics, given the
extent to which math distinguishes itself from science through its lack of empirical
groundedness. Early in his text, Meillassoux asks “how is mathematical discourse able to
describe a world where humanity is absent; a world crammed with things and events that are
not the correlates of any manifestation?” 10 As he has it, this ability is part of the problem
faced by the “correlationists,” who after Kant abandoned any claim to a world outside
experience. For if one understands the early history of the universe as not only beyond
experience, but beyond the possibility of experience, then a purely empirical knowledge
system is clearly inadequate. The comparison to mathematics is therefore quite apt, if
somewhat idealistic.
But one implication of mathematization that After Finitude never really addresses is
the extent to which the concept’s basic components do not cease to exist once humans leap
into existence and begin translating the blind maneuverings of the universe into knowledge
and subjective experience. Ignorance remains an inescapable constituent fact of any subject’s
relationship to the world. This phenomenological poverty is not merely the result of the sheer

9

Ibid, 113.
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Ibid, 26.
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quantity of existing things – though that would seemingly be enough on its own – but also of
the inability of perception to penetrate into objects themselves, which (as Graham Harman
holds) are always withdrawn into themselves. We see mathematization in effect, for example,
in the scientists of the Asimov story who, despite their genuflections, remain aware of the
machine’s grounding in scientifically testable laws – laws which they themselves seem to
have some knowledge of, if not sufficient knowledge to fully reconstruct processes
underlying the thoughts of the machine. Unfortunately, Meillassoux does not explore the
concept of mathematization very far beyond what he needs in order to make his argument,
and so he pays little attention to how the basic assumption of a mathematically rational
universe conditions our relationship to the everyday ignorance imposed on us by our own
perception.
As the everydayness of ignorance is – for all my metaphysical diversions – the basic
focus of my analysis, this limitation makes Meillassoux’s ideas a useful door but a useless
key. Thankfully a key can be found elsewhere, in Bruno Latour’s valuable concept of a
“black box,” which he first described in his 1987 Science in Action. The term itself is not
Latour’s, but had been in use for decades earlier, primarily in computer science, to refer to
any object or system in which a given input will result in a consistent output while the
internal processes remain unknown.11 A computer, as Asimov has shown, is a very good
example. While I have my word processor open, every instance in which I hit the M key
leads to the letter M appearing on the screen. Since I am neither a computer programmer nor
a computer engineer, I have little practical knowledge as to what happens in the intervening

11
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(1963): 436-358.
xvi

space between button and letter – the computer, to me, is “black” in an epistemological
sense, emitting no light from which I might glean its inner processes. Yet because the input
and output are clearly correlated, I am nevertheless able to use this mysterious device
productively.
Latour extends this basic premise into a sociological examination of how scientific
concepts are used and socially ratified into “facts” – i.e. ideas and arguments that are taken
for granted, repeated in textbooks, assumed as given for the purposes of future research. So,
for example, early in his study Latour describes the development of the super-computer
Eagle and the frequent setbacks and difficulties that its creators ran into. Nevertheless,
despite fears that the project would fail, the computer began to pass several important
performance milestones:
[A]fter Eagle had successfully run a computer game called
Adventure, the whole team felt they had reached one
approximate end . . . On Monday 8 October, a maintenance
crew comes to wheel down the hall what was quickly
becoming a black box. Why has it become such? Because it is
a good machine . . . But it was not a good machine before it
worked.12
For Latour, the transformation of an object or concept into a black box is primarily a social
phenomenon, one quite distant from the metaphysical caesura that Meillassoux describes.
Successfully running the computer game means that Eagle has overcome the stability

12
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problems that dogged it through its early development, and which kept it out of the hands of
all but those familiar enough with its architecture to intervene when it broke down (that is,
the people for whom Eagle would not constitute a black box). Once it attains dependability,
the team can hand off the Eagle to a “maintenance crew” who are able to work on it despite
not being part of the team that built it. Because the computer worked, the knowledge that it
works has become mathematized: people assume that it will work in the future, they make
plans and assumptions based on it working, they mentally treat the functions it serves as
“taken care of.” Thus, for Latour, black boxes, arising from primarily social relations, act as
repositories of ignorance, not only “holding” it but “holding it at bay” – allowing us to work
and act despite it, as though it were not there.
Though I rarely refer to Meillassoux and Latour in the main text of this study, their
concepts nevertheless serve as a conceptual background without which I would not have
been able to develop my analyses as I did. The importance of these ideas should not,
however, suggest that they have been employed without modification. Latour’s “black box,”
already stretched in Science in Action and his subsequent work beyond its narrow usage in
computer science, in my study leaves behind its strictly sociological definition. The black
boxes I describe here can be the results of simple inattentiveness, of relations to subjectivity,
of ontological withdrawal, of overlapping networks of complexity. In my effort to develop
some of Latour’s ideas beyond the subjects of sociology and science studies with which he is
usually associated, I am indebted to the work of Graham Harman. Though in some parts of
this study I am highly critical of OOO and his contributions to it (particularly in chapter
four), I have found his Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics to be an
invaluable guide to how Latour’s ideas intersect with broader philosophical issues.

xviii

As Harman summarizes it, a black box “allows us to forget the massive network of
alliances of which it is composed, as long as it functions smoothly” 13 and later writes that
“by definition, a black box is low-maintenance.”14 This definition gets to the crux of what a
black box is and does in the abstract, and also how it meshes with Meillassoux’s discussion
of contingency in After Finitude. A concept can become a black box when it “is simply
presented as a raw fact without any reference to its genesis or even its author”15 – or, as
Latour writes in a very different context, “you never have a chemistry class that starts with
the methodology of chemistry; you start by doing chemistry.” 16 In this example “chemistry”
– as a set of methodologies and an approach to knowledge generation – takes the role of the
black box in a manner that makes it basically indistinguishable from what Thomas Kuhn
called a “paradigm,” or a concept that “like an accepted judicial decision in the common law”
becomes a template for further investigations. 17 Left in their sociological and science studies
context indeed the two concepts are very similar, but Harman’s formulation points to a
broader application, in which the black box appears as both a guarantor of continuity and a
screen on contingency.
I will address the second characteristic first. As we saw with the above example I
cited from Science in Action, the process of transforming an object into a black box involves
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in some way removing it from its original context – and in the case of the computer, from its
original creators – and placing it in relation to subjects with no knowledge of its origins. It is,
in this sense, a kind of commodity fetishism: in the same way that the marketplace hides the
social relations underlying commodity production behind a screen of pure economics, the
abstraction of the object into a black box conceals the contingency behind its creation. Latour
is careful, in every instance, to show how any of his examples could have been otherwise: the
Eagle computer could have had a different design or could have never worked at all, the
double helix of the DNA molecule could have been described by someone completely
unrelated to Watson, Crick, Franklin, and Wilkins. It is only in retrospect that these
circumstances seem fixed, that their developments appear inevitable – which is what Harman
means when says that black boxes are “low-maintenance.” As long as, for instance, the
theory of evolution continues to fit the observed evidence, it can function as a black box for
the purposes of understanding biology. But if it were to suddenly stop fitting the evidence –
if it were to suddenly become a high-maintenance theory, in need of constant large-scale
tinkering and adjustment – then the box would quickly cease being black. We would have to
“open” the theory and understand its parts, just as one opens a broken computer – to fix it, to
replace its parts, or to declare it a lost cause and go looking for a replacement. As we will see
in my first chapter, it is not always the case that the creation of a black box writes over a
contingent existence and replaces it with an inevitable one (though that is often the case).
Rather, it forms a barrier between the perceiving subject and the actual presence or absence
of contingency in a given area.
It is in concealing the nature of an entity’s contingency that the notion of the black
box intersects with Meillassoux’s idea of the mathematization of knowledge.
Mathematization, as I have already established, requires that the laws of the universe remain
xx

consistent and the same in all times and places, whether or not they are observed by any
subject. While our understanding of what those laws are may change, it will not be because
the laws themselves are different, but because our perception of their workings is
discontinuous and incomplete, and therefore open to revision. It is because of this tacit
assumption of continuity that one can do an experiment today and use its result to say
something about what happened a billion years ago: since the laws are the same, a result
today is as good as a result back then. But as Meillassoux has it, this belief is unsupportable.
There is, he says, no discernable reason for why the universe functions in the manner that it
does, which means that, in principle at least, “we must seriously maintain that the laws of
nature could change.”18 Whether or not one accepts this conclusion, it remains the case that
one seldom begins studying science with a rigorous metaphysical argument for why the
universe as it is presently arranged must necessarily be so. Instead, the universe’s
universality is simply taken for granted – in effect becoming a black box.
Just as the black box, here taking the form of a philosophical presupposition, covers
over the possibility of contingency, also does it fill in discontinuities in perception and
awareness. It is for this reason that a black box always “functions smoothly,” in Harman’s
phrasing, and why its ceasing to do so would cause it to lose its status. For simplicity’s sake,
let us return to the example of the home computer and word processor – and for
phenomenology’s sake, allow me to bracket off all but my immediate subjective awareness
of what the computer is and what it does, and allow me to abandon the presumption that from
the keyboard to the screen there exists a knowable chain of causality that proceeds without
gaps. Lacking, as I do, detailed knowledge of how this chain proceeds, and abandoning, as I
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have, the advice of the computer’s designers on whose word I had previously taken this
continuity as given, I encounter my computer as nothing less than an epistemological
chimera. I have no way to become like the designers of the Eagle computer or the
discoverers of the double helix, whose detailed knowledge allowed them to function without
treating the objects of their work like black boxes. But nor am I able – on pain of ruining the
thought experiment – to simply accept this continuity on external authority. Consider how
seriously this state would impair my ability to interact with the computer: typing, using the
mouse, even turning it on or off all require an assumption of continuity, that the input and the
output will align. And so I must adopt a notion that is no less fantastical for being accurate
and accept that the connection exist “somehow” simply as a prerequisite for engaging with
the object at all. I become, in essence, just like the engineers in Asimov’s story, who
genuflect in front of a machine they neither made nor understand.
These two traits provide the basic schematic for how black boxes condition our
relation to the everyday world. Stripped to its essentials, the process is actually fairly simple,
though as I will show in the subsequent chapters the manifestation of one of these
agnotological beings “in the wild” (so to speak) renders them far more complex and
multifaceted than this hitherto schematic explanation makes them seem. The key point here is
that, despite the wide range of variation, the agnotologies I analyze all function in terms of a
reaction to ignorance. A black box, for the purpose of my study, is any real or imagined
entity or process that attaches a positive ontological status to an absence of knowledge. The
manner in which it does so will vary from case to case, and will not necessarily take the form
of a scientific theory or a technological device (the preponderance of which in the
introduction so far being mainly the result of the ease by which they can serve as examples,
and also of Latour and Meillassoux’s interest in the philosophy of science). But it should be
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clear how useful the concept is to the study of agnotology, and in particular of the ways in
which ignorance conditions, molds, and modifies our subjective relation to the world.
As should be clear by now, I have conducted this study within the general headspace
of Speculative Realism. Though I am by no means an uncritical user of this family of notions
– indeed, many of my arguments arise from the critique of Speculative Realist concepts. I
have found that its critiques of Continental metaphysics open up more windows than they
close, and that these philosophies together form an intellectual framework too novel and
exciting for me to simply ignore. While I do not believe that it is wise to associate oneself
with Speculative Realism as it currently exists without a library’s worth of distancing and
qualification, I do not believe that it is bereft of value. Probably the most straightforward
introduction to this philosophical domain is Peter Gratton’s Speculative Realism: Problems
and Prospects, which picks up on the basic network of thinkers one finds in most summaries
of the movement (Meillassoux and Harman form central nodes on their own that then point
to other writers – Jane Bennett, Ian Hamilton Grant, Ray Brassier) while also addressing
work by less intuitively related writers, like Elizabeth Grosz. Of particular value is Gratton’s
observation that Meillassoux, despite his bluster, never actually gets beyond correlationism,
but instead formulates “a critique of previous correlationisms in order to provide the basis for
another correlationism anchored in the real”19 – a conceptual anchor that should be in the
cargo of any reading of After Finitude.
We encounter similar canon-forming efforts in two recent essay collections. The first
is The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, which is edited by Levi
Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman, and boasts in its star-studded table of contents
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works by Alain Badiou, Slavoj Žižek, Bruno Latour, and Isabelle Stengers. Its list of editors
and its content marks it as a clear effort to provide a unified sense of what Speculative
Realism “is,” which makes it a useful primer on the movement for precisely the same reasons
that one should approach it with caution. As should be clear from the list of names above, the
texts the collection contains are highly diverse and complex, and indeed they gesture to the
sheer creativity and diversity of the movement – and I will not endeavor here to provide them
with a necessarily inadequate summary. But the collection’s introduction and framing is also
a flagrant example of Speculative Realism’s bizarre obsession with dissociating itself from
poststructuralism, despite (or perhaps because of) the strong lines of continuity that run
between the two domains. We see this impulse in the introduction’s first paragraph, which
holds that “no dominant hero now strides along the beach, as the phase of subservient
commentary on the history of philosophy seems to have ended”20 – “commentary” is all that
the work of the previous generation amounted to, as if the importance of Derrida or Foucault
could be to any extent profitably read through their status as “heroes.” One can see much of
what is wrong with Speculative Realism expressed in that one line, its limitations laid out
symptomatically in the very gesture of its establishment.
The other collection – The Nonhuman Turn, edited by Richard Grusin – overlaps with
the previous one in both focus and authorship, but is notable for its focus on the increased
role of non-human entities in Continental philosophy. As with the previous two books, it
seeks to balance the demands of its heterogeneous subject matter with an impulse to
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consolidate and summarize a development in modern philosophy that quite desperately and
self-consciously wants to be read as a “movement” (and which to a certain extent has become
one). The introduction quite usefully provides a more narrow and detailed genealogy of its
eponymous “turn” than the previous text, usefully linking the rise of Latour’s Actor Network
Theory to co-incident developments, such as Donna Haraway’s publication of her “Manifesto
for Cyborgs,” developments in media studies, and the work of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and
Brian Massumi.21 Its refusal to see Speculative Realism and its related developments as an ex
nihilo break from a two-centuries-long philosophical stupor is admirable, and it lends the
collection a level of intellectual honesty that the more ambitious Speculative Turn simply
lacks.
Though he was not included in the above collection (which only mentions him twice),
Eugene Thacker is a clear contributor to the growing body of work on the philosophy of the
non-human. His After Life can be profitably read as a map towards an extra-human
philosophy, tracing the various conceptions of “life” and “living” as they have developed in
European philosophy from Aristotle, through medieval scholastics like Duns Scotus and John
Scotus Eriugena, through to Kant, at each step with close attention paid to how these earlier
conceptions reappear in more recent writers – Heidegger, Bataille, Derrida, etc. Of particular
value to my study (in particular, its first two chapters) is Thacker’s analysis of the
relationship between correlationism and vitalism, in which he argues that vitalistic
conceptions of life emerge from a conflict between “self” and “world” created and
conditioned by the correlationist split. As he writes, “a vitalist correlation is one that fails to
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conserve the correlationist dual necessity of the separation and inseparability of thought and
object, self and world, and which does so based on some ontologized notion of ‘life.’” 22 This
is as good a summary of how “life” and its cognates can manifest as a black box as one is
likely to find anywhere, and it likewise points the important role played by ignorance and
discontinuity in the formulation of a vitalist ontology.
Mel Y. Chen approaches many of the same issues as Thacker in their Animacies:
Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect, but, as the book’s subtitle suggests, they do
so through a very different lens. Their study focuses on “the production of humanness” as a
socially mediated category, 23 with particular attention to the role of sex and race. Chen’s
value for my study lies in how animacy (that is, the appearance of having agency or
awareness) is encoded into modes of representation – word choices, metaphors, postures,
symbols. For instance, its fifth chapter analyzes the rhetoric around a scare in 2007 over the
presence of lead in children’s toys manufactured in China. The de-territorializing effects of
lead contamination, which can move unseen through toys, water systems, and other unseen
points of contact, aligns with the problematically localized origins of the problem – which at
once arises from a specific place (China) and a non-localizable system (globalized trade).
The implied animacy of the resulting racist “yellow peril” rhetoric adopted by the American
news media – which, in addition to its racial coding of the event, also treats the proliferation
of a (dead) metal in similar rhetorical terms as it would a (living) disease – can thus be read
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as a response to this problematic localization. The hiddenness of lead permits it this linguistic
overcoding: it becomes alive precisely to the extent that it remains unseen.
While the previous texts have either sketched the landscape of these new materialisms
or attempted to extend or develop their basic questions, other works, like Adrian Johnston’s
Prolegomena to Any Future Materialism, attempt not only to respond to, but push beyond,
the work already done. Johnston’s work – which at the time of this writing only exists as one
volume of a projected three – places Meillassoux’s philosophy in conversation of that of
Lacan and Badiou. His work is particularly useful for its analysis of how supposedly
materialist philosophies (including Meillassoux’s) often dissolve into subtly mystical or
religious explanations – a point that he takes from Lacan. Johnston’s argument that “After
Finitude [is] apparently irreligious but conceal[s] kernels of religiosity” 24 – though I think
hampered by its focus on religion as a cardinal anti-realism – does gesture to the origin of the
various mysticisms and theologies that one often finds in the study of agnotology. Though I
cannot of course judge the success of Johnston’s project until such a time that he completes
his second and third volumes, I do agree with his primary point that many of these
“religious” epistemologies arise from instabilities in the very materialisms they ostensibly
oppose.
Another recent example of what we could consider “outsider” intervention in
Speculative Realism is Catherine Malabou’s Before Tomorrow: Epigenesis and Rationality.
Malabou addresses the recent reinterpretations of Kant that began to proliferate in response
to After Finitude, with specific attention to the role of the transcendental in both the First
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Critique and its recent detractors. Much of the text turns on paragraph 27 of the Critique of
Pure Reason and Kant’s discussion of the epigenesis of the transcendental categories. As
Malabou argues, “it is never the thing in itself that is mysterious for Kant, and we have to ask
why so many readers stop there. The real difficulty is life. The fact that thought belongs
simultaneously to a transcendental subject and to a living being – which is something other
than an empirical subject.”25 This focus on epigenesis in Kant is a valuable antidote to the
Kant we encounter in Meillassoux, since it permits Malabou to emphasize the malleability of
the transcendental, its capacity to change, its development in relation to empirical knowledge
– a relation that, we see, has few of the destructive effects that After Finitude describes. In
this sense, Malabou points to how we might address the opening that Meillassoux creates
while also escaping the entrenched terms of the present philosophical debate.
While Malabou’s text clearly situates itself in relation to Meillassoux, Patrice
Haynes’s Immanent Transcendence: Reconfiguring Materialism in Continental Philosophy
addresses the recent new materialisms from the perspective of Deleuze, with notable
comparisons to Adorno and Irigaray. But even with this altered frame, Haynes, like Malabou,
points out the importance of the transcendental’s intersection with the empirical, an in
particular how for Deleuze transcendence devolves into merely “thought captured by its own
creation,”26 a position that allows Deleuze to construe immanence as “a determinate yet open
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whole”27 and also a suitable substrate for his metaphysics. This “open” immanence is
likewise an escape from the mechanism implied by many materialist philosophies, a way of
arriving at a relation to the world that, as with Malabou’s epigenesis, can be both dynamic
and realist at the same time.
Though the theoretical issues outlined above have not yet had as large an impact on
literary criticism as they have had on philosophy, critics like Anthony Uhlmann have begun
to translate these debates into valuable interpretations of key modernist texts. In, for example,
his Thinking in Literature: Joyce, Woolf, Nabokov, Uhlmann asks whether modernist novels
“might be understood to be . . . machine[s] for thinking” and also means “of coming to terms
with what it means to think.”28 Drawing primarily from Spinoza and Leibniz, Uhlmann
sketches out the relationship between the representation of thought and its enactment, and
how this relation might occur in the arena of modernism – describing, for example, how
Woolf’s To The Lighthouse “develops into a logic of sensations that allows us to see the
strong interfolding of the particular into the general fabric.”29 For Uhlmann, modernist
fiction enacts and produces patterns of thought rather than merely capturing them – a
characteristic that is essential to recognize if one is to analyze a modernist literary
agnotology.
Beci Carver’s Granular Modernism follows a similar tactic, in this case through an
analysis of the role of detail and accumulation in modernist literature in terms of that
literature’s relation to naturalism. These accumulative texts, says Carver, “militate against the
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kinds of continuous meaning that give direction to – or ‘make sense’ of – a discourse.”30
Again then we encounter an analysis that takes up the role of thinking in modernist writing
not merely in terms of representation, but also of enactment. A modernist text can be said to
“think” in relation to (in Carver’s case) naturalism in a manner peculiar to it, and one can
determine what that manner amounts to through a careful analysis of how that text constructs
its own particular world. Detail and accumulation is one access point, perception and
ignorance another – the point is that works like Carver’s and Uhlmann’s participate in the
kind of immanent analysis that I wish to perform here, which takes up the text not merely as
an object of analysis but as an intellectual agent operating on equal terms with the theoretical
texts I bring to bear.
The intersection between this form of critique and the upsurge in interest in
materialism most clearly overlaps with modernist ecocriticism, a domain that is particularly
important in my second and third chapters. Modernism has been rather late to the ecocritical
party, and so the library of texts in this area, though growing, is nowhere near what one finds
in, say, romanticism. This dearth is part of what makes Joshua Schuster’s The Ecology of
Modernism: American Environments and Avant-Garde Poetics so valuable a contribution.
With close attention to the “generative constraints” that condition ecological thinking, 31
Schuster examines the manufacture of textual ecologies through contact between the world of
the text and the world of the “great outdoors.” Nature arrives as a cultural entity as often as a
physical one. In asking what nature can mean in modernism “when artists either overlook or
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underplay” the natural resources that undergird the commodity cultures of their texts, 32
Schuster places the question of nature and ecology firmly at the intersection between
economics and perception, between the circulation of money and of representations. That the
modernists’ apparent oversight is not enough to expunge nature from their works is precisely
the point – for the exclusion is itself an attitude, one as open to critique as any other.
The collection Beyond Nature Writing: Expanding the Boundaries of Ecocriticism,
edited by Karla Armbruster and Kathleen R. Wallace, follows a similar tactic, explicitly
targeting authors and texts that “do not obviously foreground the natural world or
wilderness” and therefore tend to be overlooked by ecocritical studies.33 Of particular interest
to me is Charlotte Zoë Walker’s essay on Virginia Woolf, which analyzes how the natural
world, for Woolf, appears not in the form of obvious pastoral language and nature metaphors,
but as an “intense and crucial interlocutor in the questionings about life and death, patriarchy
and gender, and spirituality and the rejection of traditional religion.”34 Thus, as with
Schuster, one cannot simply speak of nature and ecology simply as nature and ecology, but
must also expand one’s attention to include the matter of how these categories condition the
thought processes woven into the text.
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We see a similar attitude arise in relation to a different subject matter in George M.
Johnson’s Mourning and Mysticism in First World War Literature and Beyond: Grappling
with Ghosts, which traces the rise of spiritualism and mystical thinking in the wake of the
First World War. Though the study is in no way ecocritical, we can see a very similar tenor
to the framing of the texts above in Johnson’s argument that “the attraction to mysticism in
all its varied forms made perfect sense within a culture of mourning, of large-scale loss and
bereavement.”35 Mysticism and its related belief systems are not merely superstitions, but are
expressions of a particular relation to the world – one that is formed by one’s subject
position, historical context, perceptive frame, and epistemological preconceptions. This
attitude will be of specific use in my first two chapters, but it appears in some form or
another throughout the work. What Johnson’s study shows is how a belief system cannot
simply be understood anthropologically or in terms of its truth value, but must instead be
looked at in terms of an isometric relationship between thinking and thought.
Katherine Ebury’s Modernism and Cosmology: Absurd Lights extends this attitude
into an examination of another of modernism’s great historical caesuras: the radically new
picture of the cosmos drawn by the work of Einstein and others around the turn of the
century. Comparing the attitude of Ebury’s text to Johnson’s is instructive, for while we
might (with great justification) take the world described by the physicists more seriously than
the one described by the mystics, their effects on modernists’ subject positions are quite
similar. As Ebury writes of Joyce’s use of the theory of relativity in Finnegans Wake, “these
ideas are accepted but also parodied and transformed, misread and reinvented, often in a
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sexual manner, creating links between the comic and the cosmic, human sexuality and the
universe.”36 Science, like mysticism and nature, forms a framework not just for
understanding the world, but for perceiving it. Joyce’s text does not merely use these ideas,
but thinks with them, metabolizing them into the rest of its body until they are clearly both
themselves and not.
Turning now to my study itself, it should be clear from my tentative references to
mysticism above that it is very easy when discussing ignorance to look down on the object of
study, to treat it as a deprivation and to treat those people under discussion as naive fools.
But to approach the subject in this way would be a mistake, not only because ignorance is so
common, but also because this arrogance would pose a severe impediment to the study. An
agnotological reading of a text must proceed, in Jacques Derrida’s words, “from the
inside.”37 It must remain attentive to the specificity of the text, its nuances, its background,
its construction, and its deconstruction. It can in no way proceed dogmatically, but must
instead remain attentive to the specificity of the texts under examination. It is for this reason
that I have called this study Agnotologies of Modernism – with the plural fully in place, a
decision inspired by the title of Peter Nicholls’s expansive and similarly pluralistic study
Modernisms.38 Unfortunately, the level of attention required to do each analysis well
precludes any kind of systematic “history of modernist ignorance” or some such work, as the
resulting book would simply be too big.
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This study thus seeks to fulfill two roles. First, it provides the basic outline of a map of
how modernist agnotologies work through an accumulation of interlocking conceptual
relations. Each chapter not only serves as an analysis of its focal author’s work, but also as a
set-up to the chapter that comes after it, so that the abstract conceptual structure of the work
forms a chain that will demonstrate by example the basic commonalities underlying the
otherwise highly diverse works under discussion. Second, each chapter demonstrates how the
particular agnotology of its subject – organized around the relevant black box – destabilizes
common pre-conceptions of how that author’s work functions and opens up new domains in
the analysis of their work. In addition to the obvious benefit of providing a novel contribution
to the study of the author’s work, my goal was to again demonstrate by example: in this case,
to provide evidence of the value of ignorance as a critical lens.
The relationship between Wyndham Lewis and Henri Bergson, and in particular their
disagreements on the subject of vitalism, serves as a useful access point to the larger project,
and as such is the topic of my first chapter. Lewis’s attack on Bergson’s ideas in his Time
and Western Man and elsewhere have led to a permeant linkage between the two authors in
Lewis criticism. As in much of Bergson’s reception, comparative studies have tended to
focus on the role of time in Lewis’s reaction to Bergsonism. 39 Much of this focus is
understandable given the extent to which both authors emphasize the role of time in their
respective philosophies, but this emphasis has sidelined the important role of vitalism in their
works, and in particular the way that their approach to vitalistic philosophies relates to the
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problem of monism. Vitalism, or the belief that living things in some way possess a “vital
force” (such as entelechy, the soul, or some such) which differs them from inanimate objects,
became newly popular at the turn of the century. Vitalist and (in the former case) quasivitalist authors like Bergson and Hans Driesch acquired tremendous popularity and in many
cases drew serious interest from the intellectuals of the day. The psychologist William James,
for example, paid close attention to Bergson’s writing and incorporated elements of his
philosophy into his own writing and thought.
At stake for the vitalists was the question of whether or not human consciousness
existed as part of a continuous relationship with all other physical processes – that is, whether
consciousness followed and arose from the same physical laws as everything else. The
possibility was raised and then dismissed by René Descartes, who famously posed a dualist
conception of consciousness, in which the mind was ontologically distinct from the body and
functioned according to independent processes. The maneuver was explicitly hierarchizing:
human beings were conscious and possessed free will, but other animals did not, and were
therefore simply highly complex machines. As Derrida formulates it, the Cartesian animal is
that which “doesn’t reply, not really, not ever” 40 – existing beyond logos, beyond the “I
think,” beyond any kind of signification. Bergson placed himself firmly in this camp,
implicitly with his early work in Time and Free Will, and then explicitly in the opening of
Matter and Memory where he called his project “frankly dualistic.”41 But a case had long
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been made for the opposite proposition. As far back as 1747 Julien de La Mettrie, drawing on
Descartes but abandoning his defense of free will, wrote in Man a Machine that “the human
body is a self-winding machine, a living representation of perpetual motion.” 42 This position
is often referred to as “mechanism,” or perhaps as “physicalism,” but for my purposes the
most important trait is its monism – or the belief that consciousness and matter all amount to
the same unitary substance, that they are ontologically continuous.
I focus primarily on monism for two reasons. First, I do so because it allows me to
examine Bergson’s relationship to two of his most notable predecessors and philosophical
opponents – the British evolutionary philosopher Herbert Spencer and the French spiritualist
(and Bergson’s former professor) Félix Ravaisson-Mollien. As Bergson recalls in a letter he
wrote to William James, prior to his work on Time and Free Will he had been obsessed with
Spencer’s work, and in particular fixated on Spencer’s argument in his First Principles and
elsewhere that all human cognition could be understood as a manifestation of “habit,” and
could thus be understood mechanistically and deterministically. 43 According to the letter,
Bergson violently rejected Spencer not long before he began writing the Ph.D. dissertation
that would eventually become Time and Free Will, and though Spencer’s ideas are rarely
referred to in this book, its argument can largely be understood as a response to Spencer’s
determinism. (Indeed, one could also quite easily see Bergson’s use of Darwin in Creative
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Evolution as an attempt to reclaim evolution from its deterministic proponents, though this
reading would be rather speculative.)
Determinism – a consequence many mechanist philosophies often considered
undesirable – would therefore seem like the more logical focus of the chapter rather than
monism, and indeed it plays an important role. But focusing on monism, among other things,
permits us to see the relationship between Bergson’s rejection of Spencer and his attempts to
distance himself from Ravaisson. Like Spencer, Ravaisson saw habit as essential to the
functioning of cognition, but while Spencer took this relationship to be mechanical and
deterministic Ravaisson understood habit as a kind of grounding for thought – arguing in his
Of Habit that habit serves as a kind of mediator between external stimulation and internal
individuation and creativity. But in an essay on Ravaisson later re-published in The Creative
Mind, Bergson ignored the essentially creative nature of habit in Ravaisson’s work,
describing it instead as merely “the fossilized residue of a spiritual activity.” 44
That the mechanistic habit of Spencer and the creative habit of Ravaisson elide
together in Bergson so easily indicates an underlying structural similarity, one that, as I
show, is reproduced in both Bergson’s notion of élan vital and also Lewis’s response to it.
Though very different in their particulars, both forms of habit take the form of a leap from
the information available to a perceiving mind to the response that this perception leads to.
That is to say, Spencer’s use of “habit” to explain consciousness is as much a black box as
any theory of vitalism, since it, as Bergson would later write of vitalism, is simply “a sort of
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label affixed to our ignorance.”45 Both the vitalists and the mechanists (whether Spencerian,
behaviourist, or what have you) were simply repeating the same rhetorical and conceptual
gesture, differing mainly on whether the “inside” of the black box contained a dualist
ontology or a monist one.
For Lewis in his post-Bergson phase, this elision becomes both a source of comedy
and of great philosophical stress. Though Bergson bears a clear mark on his later writing,
Lewis excoriated him in Time and Western Man for disguising as a vitalist philosophy one
that betrayed a clear monism when placed under enough pressure. What Lewis clearly fears,
and what he goes out of his way to reject, is what the Deleuzian philosopher Manuel
DeLanda calls a “flat ontology,” or an ontological system in which all objects occupy the
same “level” of being, are arranged horizontally without any qualitative difference
recognized between them.46 That physicalism produces a flat ontology ought to be clear
enough, but for Lewis, Bergson’s approach is also far too egalitarian in that it recognizes no
essential difference between human and non-human life. Thus, in Lewis’s writing we see
numerous instances of seemingly vital, “living” characters revealing themselves to be
mechanical and predictable, in The Childermass, for instance, as well as in Lewis’s theories
on comedy where, as with Bergson, Lewis identifies the comic with the mechanical, the
predictable, and the unconscious.
But while Lewis pursues a vitalist conception of life and consciousness, he differs
strikingly with Bergson on the matter of the extent to which consciousness and vitality can be
found. For Bergson, élan vital is present in all life, and is the driving force for evolution. It is
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for this reason that Lewis attacks Bergson, arguing not only for a view of vitality limited to
human beings, but only certain human beings – those who attain it through vigorous thought
and reflection. It is in this way that Lewis’s rejection of his influences mirrors Bergson’s:
both develop dualist, anti-deterministic philosophies which they cast against predecessors
who they termed overly monist and ignorant of fundamental divisions inherent to nature.
Their respective agnotologies are, thus, basically identical, amounting to the creation of a
black box that contains and represents a hidden discontinuity around which they can
construct their respective systems. In both cases is the creation of the box likewise a
reactionary measure against monism, and their primary disagreement is where exactly the
dualist split occurs, and in what entities the black box of consciousness should be placed. The
chapter therefore deploys vitalism as a kind of model agnotology, or a place in which to
explore the basic contours of an ontological displacement of ignorance and in which I can
tease out the pattern I will find taking other shapes in the authors that I read subsequently.
The relationship between consciousness and discontinuity comes up again in Virginia
Woolf, the subject of my second chapter, whose complex responses to the problem also
provide an opportunity to extend some of my conclusions in chapter one towards a more
generalized theory of the agnotological functions of consciousness. Roughly the first half of
the chapter I devote to an analysis of Woolf’s relationship with Richard Maurice Bucke,
whose Cosmic Consciousness Woolf likely encountered as a book critic for the Times
Literary Supplement. Bucke was an advocate of panpsychism, a philosophical position that
attributes some form of “life” or consciousness to all entities in the universe, including
inanimate objects – an argument that today has its strongest articulation in the “vital
materialism” of Jane Bennett. But Bucke’s text is not so much focused on the existence of
consciousness in all objects as the awareness of it – the “cosmic consciousness” that
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(similarly to what we see in Lewis) is present only in a small number of gifted individuals.
For Bucke, cosmic consciousness was a stage of evolution, one that followed naturally from
the “simple consciousness” of most animals and the “self-consciousness” possessed by
humans. But while in the distant future all human beings would possess this heightened
awareness, a small number of people (including the founders of most major religions) would
attain it via a moment of epiphany, a radical discontinuity in which their previous pattern of
thought would be suspended and when they would attain a sense of the world that was
fundamentally new.
As I describe in the chapter’s first half, this pattern maps quite nicely onto the
character of Septimus Smith of Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway – and is certainly a better fit than the
trauma framework through which he has usually been read. Septimus evidences little of the
repetition compulsion and involuntary memory that is a hallmark of literary depictions of
trauma, and his visions of cars and trees exhibiting awareness and consciousness, along with
his desire to start a new religion, bears little resemblance to any of the usual symptoms of
trauma (symptoms that would have been well known to Woolf, writing years after the end of
the First World War). But the content of his visions clearly amounts to panpsychism, and
their etiology, and in particular their appearance in the sudden rupture of his war experience,
identifies them closely with cosmic consciousness.
As I go on to argue, though, the similarity between the origin of cosmic
consciousness and the origin of psychological trauma is not merely a coincidence. Both can
be understood in terms of a play between continuity and discontinuity, and in particular in
terms of a perceptual relationship to flat ontology. It is notable, for instance, that while Freud
in Beyond the Pleasure Principle famously points to the importance of shock and surprise in
a traumatic experience he also in the same book identifies shock as the origin of scientific
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knowledge.47 Shock, as Woolf would note in “A Sketch of the Past,” has great
epistemological value, tearing down one’s old preconceptions and potentially leading one to
see something genuinely new. For Bucke, that knowledge is the existence of a perfectly
continuous relationship between all entities in the universe, a flatness that gives panpsychism
more than a little resemblance to physicalism (in form if not in content). A shock – that is, an
experience of epistemological discontinuity – is ironically a gateway to the abolition of
surprise, a sense of universal continuity so complete that nothing could ever take one off
guard again. Or, at least, that is the implied trajectory of mechanism and its deterministic
universe. But since the omniscience that this approach requires is unattainable, the
mechanists employ their own black box – the “habit” of Spencer, which explains about as
little as the vitalist “life force,” despite all of its scientific pretensions.
The universal “life” proposed by Bucke, Septimus, and the other panpsychists is
likewise a response to the conflict between the awareness of continuity provided by their
philosophy and the continuing sense discontinuity imposed by their limited knowledge and
perception. Bucke’s universe, despite its flatness, is non-deterministic – which means that he
needs to explain how the universe can have knowable laws, and how those laws can apply
equally to stones and human minds, and yet still not conclude that the world is mechanical.
Bucke does so by abandoning the premise (taken for granted by determinists) that stones are
themselves inanimate. Instead, he says, they are full of life, and in standing at their level we
are full of life as well. His system is therefore able to metabolize unpredictability by
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encapsulating it in the black box of life, permitting him (and Woolf) to embrace continuity
while still recognizing the shocks inherent to the marriage of epistemology and perception.
Panpsychism therefore resembles vitalism in that both provide frameworks within
which otherwise incommensurable relations of continuity and discontinuity can be resolved.
In Woolf this resolution comes attached to an epiphanic epistemology, one centred on
moments of shock that serve as access points to the essentially continuous nature of the
universe. Indeed, the epistemological effect of surprise – in cosmic consciousness, traumatic
experience, and scientific experimentation – is perhaps uniquely able to resolve this split.
Surprise is most often the result of a limited perspective, an ignorance created by one’s
specific subjective position. If a baseball were to strike me in the head as I was walking down
the street, it would not be surprising because I considered it impossible for a ball to fly at the
particular speed and in the particular trajectory that would cause its line of flight to intersect
with my face. Such an event would be perfectly within the bounds of the laws of physics, and
from a god’s-eye-view would be a fairly unremarkable event. But I do not have a god’s-eyeview, but rather a limited frame of sensory perception. And the ball is surprising because I do
not see it – it seems, phenomenologically, to leap into existence at the exact moment of
connection. But in being surprised I acquire knowledge: of the ball, its thrower, its flight
path, of a totally continuous and deterministic causal chain which had existed all along
behind the shock, and which I never would have encountered had the moment of surprise
never occurred. This example is, of course, quite basic and simple, and not exactly what
Woolf seems to have in mind in “A Sketch of the Past,” but it does outline what I consider to
be an essential component in Woolf’s epistemology.
It is furthermore this epistemological relationship that allows us to see the ways that
the panpsychism of Mrs Dalloway extends itself into Woolf’s later fiction. As I show in the
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analysis of To the Lighthouse which rounds out the chapter, much of the characters’
obsession with prediction (an obsession that is strongest in Mr. Ramsay) is related to an
anxiety over perceived discontinuities. It is notable, for example, that when Mr. Ramsay
ruminates on his own limitations as a philosopher, he imagines each stage of his thinking as a
discrete unit, so that one works out an idea by hop-scotching from A to B and then to C,
hoping one day to make one’s way to the enlightenment of Z. Mr. Ramsay, here, greatly
resembles Zeno of Elea in Bergson’s critique of the paradoxes – in which he accuses Zeno of
imagining time (a fully continuous process of becoming) in the same manner as space (which
can be divided up into discrete chunks). By pulling a Zeno on his own imagination, Mr.
Ramsay has denied himself the Bucke-like epiphany that would make him able to surpass the
divides and instead range over his philosophy with the aggressive freedom of an animal let
out of its cage. Instead he responds to the threat both to his pride and to his identity as a
provider for his family by imposing a continuous relationship where one cannot be properly
said to exist – that is, he predicts the weather. Instead of facing his limited subjectivity headon, he imagines that he possesses the god’s-eye-view of the world that would banish all
surprise forever. But his consciousness is far from cosmic, and his luck in predicting the rain
proves meaningless in the face of the immense discontinuities that “Time Passes” thrusts
upon him.
The first two chapters form a kind of set – insofar as they both concern the black box
of “consciousness” in one form or another, and also set up the larger issue of the isometric
epistemological relationship between continuity and discontinuity which is essential to my
larger analysis of modernist agnotologies. In my chapter on Pound I analyze a completely
different black box, though one that functions according to a similar pattern. My key
argument in this chapter concerns the intersection between ecology, politics, and aesthetics in
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Pound’s work, an intersection which I come to refer to as his “imperative logic.” I adopt the
term “imperative” by way of the categorical imperative of Kant, and in particular a reading of
the concept by the phenomenologist Alphonso Lingis. For Kant (as Lingis points out) the
categorical imperative is not merely a good or useful way of constructing an ethical
framework, but also an expression of a particular sense of humanity’s relation to the natural
world. For Kant, the fact that human beings possess free will means that they are essentially
separate from the natural world, since they are able to act on their desires instead of being
pushed about by the laws of physics. But unlike Bergson and Lewis, who both jealously
defend humanity’s capacity for free action and creativity, in Kant’s ethics free will is a
problem, since it makes unethical behaviour possible. The categorical imperative, then, is at
its most abstract level less a system of maxims and rules, less indeed an approach to metaethics than it is a command to overcome our division from the natural world, to act as if our
inter-personal relations were bound by rules as inviolable as gravity.
The contours of Pound’s political thought are quite similar in this regard, though in
the content of his ethics he is clearly no Kantian. The biggest difference is also the most
fundamental: whereas Kant considers humans essentially separate from nature, divided at
birth by the endowment of free will, Pound treats continuity as basic but finds everywhere
instances of the natural order being contravened, the more perfect structure of the natural
order torn down in the name of avarice. It is in part for this reason that Pound was prone to
conspiratorial thinking while Kant was not: for Pound the split from nature is not essential,
but imposed, a conclusion that naturally led him to ask “imposed by whom?” It was not
necessarily the case that this question would lead him to anti-Semitism, but it did provide a
framework in which his answer to the question could appear to make sense.
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But I am getting ahead of myself. Before one can consider the role of Pound’s
imperative logic in his poetry, one must determine what his conception of “nature” is and
how it relates to an ethical system. It is C.H. Douglas, the founder of Social Credit, who
among Pound’s key influences provides the most straightforward definition in this regard. As
Douglas writes, a law should be considered “natural” if it proceeds in a way that is
“automatic and inexorable,” and in a way that empowers “the individual.” 48 Though I cannot
be sure if Pound would have formulated his sense of what “nature” is in this way, it is a
useful guideline given both the influence that Douglas had on Pound’s thinking and the ease
by which this definition complements his thinking in other areas. (It is also a classic black
box structure: Douglas’s nature, like the supercomputer in Latour, just works by itself, so no
need to interfere with it.) Pound’s idiosyncratic interpretation of Confucius, for example,
adopts this automatism as a way to translate individual characteristics and actions into largescale social changes. For Pound, Confucius holds that the character of the head of a
government directly affects the character of that government in the same way that the head of
a family dictates that family’s fortunes. Thus, Pound resembles Lewis and Woolf in his
relationship to continuities: the black box of nature when plugged into an imperative ethics
allows Pound to jump at will from the actions of an individual person across vast and
complex causal relations and contingencies to land on a particular fact about the fortunes of
the society that the person lived in. Thus, one understands the history of China by studying
its emperors, the history of America by studying its presidents, the history of the Italian
renaissance by studying the Malatestas and Medicis who helped create it. It is therefore to be
expected that Pound’s Cantos, a poem that “contains history,” contains more biography than
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any other kind of historical writing. The power of the imperative is such that the jump from
individual to group is nearly instantaneous.
What one should remember when examining the underlying ecology of Pound’s
politics is that while nature itself proceeds automatically, human beings do not. Indeed,
Pound’s writings are rife with instances of waste and destruction wrought by those who
would act against nature, with the most well-known and egregious case being usury. In a
sense, usury plays for Pound the same role that free will does for Kant: it introduces
discontinuity to the world, dividing human beings from the natural automatism which is the
source of their wealth and happiness. But for Pound this discontinuity, though present, is not
a basic fact of human existence, but rather a contingent one which can perhaps be overcome.
Pound goes farthest in figuring out how this overcoming might be possible in his poetics, but
it is also here that some of the contradictions built into his approach become apparent. The
basic problem that Pound runs into is that he at once wants both individual people as well as
society to be perfectly immanent with nature, existing in a complex mesh of reciprocal action
in which the behaviour of a single person really can affect whole populations, while at the
same time treating whole categories of human behaviour (like usury) as radically outside the
scope of nature, counter to it in some inexcusable way. How, for example, does one embrace
such a hyper-individualistic philosophy as Pound’s without also concluding that the avarice
of the capitalist elite is justified? Nothing Pound wrote manages to answer this question, and
the excesses of his later political writings affirms that no coherent answer exists.
I analyze how this conflict plays out in Pound’s poetics through an extended analysis
of how metaphor works in “In a Station of the Metro” and its origins in Japanese haiku.
Critics of the poems have often taken the relationship between the poems first and second
lines as metonymic, amounting to a displacement from the first image to the second. And
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indeed, from a certain angle the poem can seem to function like two still frames from a film
which between them “cut” our view from one scene to another. But this reading not only
misunderstands Pound’s technique of “superposition,” but also the ecological logic of haiku
poetry – which historically have described a more immanent relationship between humans
and nature more in line with what Pound supports in his politics. The two lines, then, are best
read in terms of metaphor and condensation, with the two images combining to create a third
composite image that exists beside its components, never superseding or overcoming them
but instead simply forming a third independent frame.
Reading “In a Station of the Metro” metaphorically – with the metropolitan “crowd”
condensed with the natural “bough,” neither overcoming the other – allows us to see an
image of the overarching coherence that Pound speaks of in the Drafts and Fragments as
well as his translation of Women of Trachis. But it is important to remember that this
immanence exists only in a single place and moment, enabled by the brevity of the haiku.
Pound could not make the same thing happen across the monster of obsession that is his
Cantos, which in their theme and structure requires not only immanence at the individual and
momentary level (which Pound could clearly provide) but also at higher levels of complexity.
The Cantos would require an integration with nature that was systemic, complex, and allextensive in a way that would seem to preclude Pound’s emphatic individualism. In ecology,
after all, it is not this tree or this animal which is important, but trees and animals in
aggregate: one could hardly ask for an epistemology more opposed to Pound’s ethics and his
art. In adopting an imperative logic, Pound sought a bridge across this discontinuity, one
built from the black box of a “nature” that simply sees the world proceeding “on its own”
without investigating its complexity and the basic interdependence of all within it. It is, in
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effect, a tool for turning metonymy into metaphor – and had Pound been a demigod, it might
have been enough.
My fourth chapter examines a similar problem inherent in the reading of Joyce’s
Finnegans Wake. I begin with an analysis of the first line of the Wake, and with the
(intentionally obtuse) argument that there are no words in Finnegans Wake at all. In Joyce
criticism, a “word” in the Wake effectively means a sign in the text which can be taken for
granted, one that does not require the extended glosses that analyses of this text are usually
so ready to provide. If we see, for example, the phrase “it’s as semper as oxhousehumper”
(FW 107.34) we eagerly put on our glosses for “semper” (if we know no Latin) and
“oxhousehumper” (if we know no Hebrew) but not for “it’s” or “as.” Yet as I show (and as
my above example suggests) whether or not a sign is a “word” is unstable, both because of
the text’s multilingualism and because each sign is often part of multiple, mutually-exclusive
networks of signification. One can easily gloss “semper” as the Latin word for “always” and
call it a day, but that would mean ignoring the word’s sonic resemblance to the English
“simple” as well as the phrase’s rhythmic similarity to the phrase “it’s as simple as A B C.”
“Semper,” then, is far less stable than it first lets on, and this instability means that one
cannot let one’s reading stop at the dictionary. 49 Nor can a simple word like “is” be allowed
to rest, in part because these smaller words often become incorporated into larger semantic
units in such a way that a given use of the word is only understandable when the larger
relationships are considered. When we read, for instance, that “the citye of Is is issuant” (FW
601.5), it is entirely insufficient to say that “is” is the present-tense of the verb “to be.”50
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Rather we must recognize that the word/non-word distinction is insufficient and unstable,
that all signs in Finnegans Wake exist as part of multiple overlapping signifying chains, and
that instead of seeing the sign as the empirical designator of a given concept Joyce demands
that we see it as the medial point between numerous conflicting patterns and strains.
To state the case simplistically, I argue that reading every sign in the Wake is like
trying to open a black box. Reading Joyce is always a lesson in humility, but in Finnegans
Wake the process takes on a special edge due to the gulf between the complexity of a sign’s
origin and the simplicity of its placement. Non-words in the Wake mock us with their
modesty, often taking the form of well-known words that should be easy yet are not. Every
sign is a problem, a machine that refuses to run. To attain any reading one must open the box
and begin to cross this discontinuity by whatever available means – historical, textual,
genetic, deconstructionist. But with sufficient care we can often find the various strains in
conflict, precluding a simple resolution, or if not that then the variety can overwhelm us,
bogging the reading down with detail and definitions so that nothing of value can emerge
from the mass. Nothing in Finnegans Wake is definite, is only one thing, yet a reading must
be definite. To hedge and qualify, to clarify before or after that whatever one says one must
grant the instability of the text, is merely to defer the moment of transgression. Nothing short
of re-capitulating the text of the Wake – in itself and for itself – would permit one to be equal
to the task of reading Joyce’s text, which is to say that one can only “read” the Finnegans
Wake by writing it, repeating it, almost traumatically. Clearly this kind of gesture is beyond
what one usually finds in the pages of the James Joyce Quarterly, or in what scholars
euphemistically call “readings” of a passage or a single word. Indeed, the curiously common
gesture in Wake criticism of turning one’s argument on the “exhaustive” exegesis of one of
Joyce’s coinages (my chapter looks at examples in the work of Umberto Eco and Derek
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Attridge specifically, but they are quite common) can be understood as an incomplete
reaching towards the fuller re-writing that the complexity of the Wake demands, even if it
does unspeakingly repeat the word/non-word dichotomy that the text of Finnegans Wake
rejects.
In any case, nobody attempting to understand, or read, or critique some portion of
Finnegans Wake actually goes ahead and tries, like Borges’s Pierre Menard, to repeat Joyce’s
gesture and so respond to the book in a manner that approaches its complexity. What one
does instead is permit the creation of words, which is to say that one produces a falselydefinitive reading of the text by ignoring (intentionally or not) the passage in question’s
divergent or opposing signifying networks – a process that I refer to as “de-mediation.” I do
not mean anything in this chapter to be a “criticism” in the oppositional sense; this is not an
attack. Indeed, I have serious doubts that the kind of idealized reading-through-rewriting that
I proposed above is even possible. Rather, it is my attempt to approach the Wake’s peculiar
hermeneutic demands as a kind of totally immanent agnotology, a continuous dance with
ignorance that, far from being negative, actually produces the text.
But why name this process “de-mediation?” The origin of the term actually brings my
“cyclewheeling history” (FW 186.2) back to Speculative Realism by way of its cousin OOO,
as approached by the philosopher Graham Harman. Though on a first reading Harman’s
philosophy seems obsessed with a re-interpretation of Heidegger, its ontology is highly
Aristotelian, taking as its subject fixed objects with defined essences that remain eternally
separate and “withdrawn” from each other by way of their mutual unfathomability. As
Harman points out at the end of Tool-Being, the nature of this separation is such that it
implies that no interaction between objects is possible, that his system in effect precludes any
kind of causality. Harman attempts to solve this problem via what he at first calls
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“occasionalism” and then re-brands as “vicarious causation.” In neither case does he argue
for the explicitly religious explanation for causation implied by the first term. Rather, he says
that in OOO causation is always mediated (i.e. “vicarious”) through another object. In my
critique, I show how this rather deus ex machina solution actually shows the way to OOO’s
dissolution, how it takes what was supposed to be an ontology grounded in definite,
mutually-withdrawn objects and instead transforms it into an ontology of constant interpenetration and becoming. Yet this continuous over-coding only happens, as it were, “under
the hood,” visible when one takes apart the nature of causality in detail but not at the level of
stationary instantaneous objects seemingly removed in their timelessness from their
interrelations (i.e. when one examines objects in the precise way that Harman’s writing
usually does). OOO’s peculiar objects are, in effect, the product of de-mediation, a result of a
kind of ontological hermeneutic.
By way of Joyce’s close and entirely under-studied reading of Giordano Bruno I
integrate this critique of OOO with the semantic ontology of Finnegans Wake. It was from
Bruno that Joyce took the peculiar notion of the unity of opposites and the related notion of
the mutual immanence of the microcosm and the macrocosm in the same domain. Just as the
flatness of OOO places events at an interplanetary scale on the same plane as a minuscule
transfer of electromagnetic charge, so too does Bruno’s cosmology posit the link between the
divine and the quotidian as basic to the normal functioning of the universe. In Finnegans
Wake, this relationship becomes a kind of undecidability that is basic to the text, where a
given sign’s place in a grand monomythical pattern may at one point seem to “explain” a
whole swath of text that, when read in its minutia, seems obsessed with something entirely
unrelated (a phenomenon I examine in more detail in relation to the “Norwegian Captain”
and “The Ondt and the Gracehoper” sections of the book). Explanations, rather than closing
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down the discourse, actually open up the text – causality becomes the enemy of determinism,
instead of (as in Bergson and Lewis) its friend and its enabler. One can look at any reading of
the Wake to see how it balances these criss-crossings and contradictions, how it produces
despite everything a clearly defined “object” out of the mass of interpenetrations and
becoming. That is, in its most basic form, what de-mediation is – a process as pernicious as it
is essential, a polygamous concept wedded both to knowledge and to ignorance at once.
In my concluding chapter I discuss how these findings relate to modernism generally,
and argue that the question of ignorance has gone too infrequently asked in large part
because scholars fail or refuse to recognize its omnipresence in subjective experience.
Ignorance is inescapable, a basic fact of life, and so when literature represents life it also,
without even trying, represents ignorance. Treating ignorance like a dirty word, or refusing to
consider it as a valid object of inquiry, clouds our vision, and limits our ability to critique and
investigate the texts before us.
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Chapter 1
The Ghost in the Machine is Also a Machine:
Wyndham Lewis and the Spectre of Monism
Wyndham Lewis wore a wide black hat, like a character in
the quarter, and was dressed like someone out of La
Bohéme. . . . At that time we believed that any writer or
painter could wear any clothes he owned . . . but Lewis
wore the uniform of a prewar artist.
— Ernest Hemingway, A Moveable Feast51
My Latin quarter hat. God, we simply must dress the
character.
— James Joyce, Ulysses52

1.1 The Demeaning of the Wild Body
Wyndham Lewis begins his 1927 essay on “The Meaning of the Wild Body” – a dilation
on his theory of comedy – with something like an axiom. For his theory to work, he says,
one must “assume the dichotomy of mind and body . . . without arguing it; for it is upon
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that essential separation that the theory of laughter here proposed is based.” 53 Whether or
not they accept dualism so easily, critics of Lewis have long taken at his word its
essential place in his criticism – of comedy in the above essay, of politics in The Art of
Being Ruled, and of art and philosophy in Time and Western Man, to give only a handful
of examples.54 It appears that accepting that the (real or fantastical) separation of mind
and body is an axiom of Lewis’s thought has become simply the cost of doing business in
the world of Lewis studies. There are good reasons for this tendency, not least of all
being the effort Lewis put into cultivating his intellectual and artistic persona around the
mind/body problem, a tendency that peaked with his attack on “Bergsonism” in Time and
Western Man, but which persists in one form or another across his published works.
In the Lewisian role of “the enemy,” this chapter will abandon this line of
thinking and adopt a diametrically opposed one – that to understand the place of the
mind/body problem in Lewis’s thought, it is a looming monism, rather than dualism, that
must take our attention, and that furthermore it is the constant possibility of dualism’s
failure which structures his thinking rather than opposes it. Monism emerges in Lewis’s
thought as a central black box, and a key to his agnotology. Appropriately, the disavowal
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of monism takes a similar role in Lewis’s work as it does in Henri Bergson’s, whose
difficult relationship to the thought of his former professor, the Spiritualist philosopher
Félix Ravaisson-Mollien, gives his work an analogous anxiety. Ravaisson’s 1838 Of
Habit – rarely studied outside of France, and only translated into English in 2008 –
distinguishes him from his firmly dualist contemporaries, but also from the mechanistic
and deterministic form of monism championed by scientists in his day and after, such as
Herbert Spencer and the behaviourists. Bergson rejected his argument that habit provided
the means by which mechanistic physical processes lead to creativity. By giving up on
the possibility that there would be a middle path between the two poles of vitalism and
mechanism, Bergson created a situation where his ideas on creativity demanded the
expulsion of mechanism from human thought (which proved quite difficult to achieve).
We can see this expulsion most clearly in Laughter, where he figures the social function
of the laugh to be a kind of remediation, a punishment afflicting any who descend into
thoughtless automatic movements, or a means of vitalist maintenance. Lewis’s theory of
laughter follows strikingly similar lines, but with the addition of his artistic elitism, which
reserved vitalist creativity for those artists who had done the hard work of breaking from
socially-imposed roles, rather than (as in Bergson) extending élan vital, itself functionally
a black box, to any living thing.
Whereas Lewis flips the equation, attributing comedy to the appearance of life in
a mechanical object rather than the other way around, 55 the distinction he makes between
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the autonomous behaviour of the average person and the creative work of the artist still
demands the enforcement of a dualistic vitalism, the drawing of hard lines distinguishing
life from the machines.56 Indeed, when Lewis offered up a definition of “vitalism” in his
memoir Rude Assignment, he emphasized its insistence on “the independence of organic
from inorganic life.”57 Yet throughout Lewis’s work we see examples of Bergsonian
lapses, of vital, living minds in some way or another falling into habit, cliché, and fixed
social roles. (The later parts of this chapter will focus on this pattern in more detail
through a reading of The Childermass.) Even this narrow, elitist form of dualism proves
remarkably difficult to maintain, and yet Lewis resolutely abandons in Time and Western
Man the possibility of all human consciousness being reducible to mechanistic processes.
What is being rejected here is the contiguity between mind and matter, or the possibility
that human thought and behaviour can smoothly shift from vitalist creativity to mechanist
repetition and back again, as Ravaisson would have it. It is because the division is so
stark that both the machine’s attempt to come to life and the human’s fall into thoughtless
automatism require the remedial force of laughter.
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Lewis is therefore right that his theory would fall to pieces without the mind/body
division, but his attempt in “The Meaning of the Wild Body” to deflect the possibility of
monism masks the extent to which an anxiety towards that division’s collapse is a
structuring element in his work. Much like how Bergson in Matter and Memory asserts
that his thinking is “frankly dualistic,”58 the casualness of this dismissal should be read
symptomatically, as a marker of its importance as a presupposition. Mechanism – the
belief that all life or consciousness can be reduced to a series of “mechanical” cause-andeffect relationships – is necessarily monistic, as (especially in the extreme form that
Bergson usually has in mind) it not only posits a continuity between inanimate objects
and thinking subjects, leaving no room for vitalist notions like “entelechy” or the soul,
but also brooks no hierarchy between mind and matter. It takes scientific reductionism as
both an epistemological process (in which one learns more about something by
describing its parts) and an ontological one (in which the processes being reduced to are
considered more real or more meaningful than the higher-order ones).
Though a critique of this position, in its strongest form, runs throughout
Bergson’s work from Time and Free Will to the end, its “frank” statement in Matter and
Memory testifies to the rhetorical role of the position that runs parallel to the
philosophical one. As Bergson goes on to say in the book’s introduction, the text “deal[s]
with body and mind in such a way as, we hope, to lessen greatly, if not overcome, the
theoretical difficulties which have always beset dualism, and which cause it . . . to be held
in small honour among philosophers” (MM xi). Looking back to Time and Free Will, we
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can see the importance of this defense. There, Bergson attacks mechanism in the context
of determinism, to which he considers mechanism to be interminably linked. Specifically,
Bergson says that determinists have been “condemned . . . in advance” to a form of
mechanism that “has no value beyond that of a symbolical representation” and which
“cannot hold good against the witness of an attractive consciousness, which shows us
inner dynamism as fact.”59 Mechanism, and by extension monism, thus figures as a prephilosophical presupposition on the parts of the determinists, a presupposition that
Bergson says cannot stand up in the face of actual creative intelligence. Thus, he
substitutes his own presupposition, dualism, to act as a bulwark against the real enemy,
since if determinism requires mechanism, and mechanism requires monism, then a
system that presumes dualism cannot be deterministic.
Dualism thus takes the role for Bergson (and as I will later show, for Lewis) of
what Gilles Deleuze referred to in Difference and Repetition as an “image of thought.”
These “images” take the form of philosophical presuppositions that determine the terms,
scope, and direction of subsequent thinking, often appearing under the guise of “common
sense.” As Deleuze writes, “it is in terms of this image that everybody knows and is
presumed to know what it means to think. Thereafter it matters little whether philosophy
begins with the object or the subject . . . as long as thought remains subject to this Image
which already prejudges everything.”60 I must clarify that it is not strictly dualism that
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occupies this position, for either Lewis or Bergson, but rather the rejection of mechanism
and monism. Indeed, Lewis’s own rejection of the mechanist position sometimes
struggles to rise to the level of an argument, as evidenced by his rejection of A.N.
Whitehead’s “organic mechanism,” the implications of which Lewis says make it “not
such an agreeable belief” (TFW 173).
That both have arrived at dualism through the rejection of determinist mechanism
explains in part why both promoted theories of laughter which establish a hierarchy with
consciousness at the top and mechanical processes at the bottom. In Bergson’s Laughter,
the automatic and mechanical elements of human thought and action appear most clearly
as a threat, a lurking possibility that laughter evolved to suppress. As he writes, the
human body’s “attitudes, gestures and movements . . . are laughable in exact proportion
as that body reminds us of a mere machine,”61 and he explicitly links human automatism
to absentmindedness (L 8).62 The belief that attentiveness and intellect can banish the
automatic tendencies that (if Laughter is to be believed) are present in seemingly
everyone, is in part to blame for the implicit anti-egalitarian strain in Bergson’s thought
that we later see magnified in Lewis. A taste of that anti-egalitarianism appears in that
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earlier mention of the “attractive consciousness” in the passage I quoted from Time and
Free Will, but it appears in greater force in a little-known speech that Bergson gave in
1895 called “Good Sense and Classical Studies.”
The occasion of the speech was the award ceremony for that year’s concours
général, a prestigious academic competition given to upper-year French high school
students.63 Its subject is the question of what constitutes “good sense” and whether (and
how) it can be cultivated by education. On this question, Bergson decisively splits from
René Descartes’s assertion in A Discourse on the Method, that “good sense is the most
evenly distributed thing in the world.”64 Rather, Bergson says, good sense “requires
constant wakefulness” and “dreads nothing more than the ready-made idea.”65 Both
habits (KW 347) and clichés (KW 350) receive Bergson’s opprobrium, taking the blame
for diverting people from their intelligence (and, presumably, into something other
people would find laughable). Thankfully, education can productively act, “not so much
to communicate an élan as to remove obstacles” (KW 349). The difference between these
two possibilities is vital, for Bergson is not arguing that good sense can arise from
nothing, or that education inscribes on a mental tabula rasa. Rather, it merely modifies
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an independently-existing process – which is a good thing, Bergson says, for if good
sense was entirely tied to education, then it would thereby become the domain of a
privileged few, meaning that “we would have to be saddened at the sight of the
irresistible trend which places power into the hands of the majority” which, because
education is closed to them, lack the sense to use their power wisely (KW 346).
This thought process, which argues that democracy depends on a partial division
between good sense and education (with good sense here figured as the opposite of
automatism and habit), itself depends on rejecting the possibility that mechanical
processes can lead to creative results – that is, it depends on the rejection of monism, and
the establishment of a hierarchy of mind over matter. Laughter and “Good Sense and
Classical Study,” though peripheral texts in Bergson’s oeuvre, are vital for making
explicit a hierarchy that is operative throughout his other more well-known works. And it
is this hierarchy where Bergson and Lewis begin to align politically, in the sense that this
relationship between the partial separation of education from good sense and the
possibility of democratic government is a fork from which their political roads diverge.
Because Bergson believes that education, and the class privilege it entails, is not
completely necessary for good sense, it follows that democracy (dependent as it is on a
suitably informed populis) is a viable form of government. But Lewis does not believe in
this viability, instead arguing that it was only “the wealthy, intelligent, or educated” who
had the power to escape the straitjacket of contemporary life. 66 It is in this sense that we
can see the political import of Lewis’s idea of comedy, for as Vincent Sherry observes
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“Lewis’s comic characters are not some subnormal exception; they comprise a usual
humankind, whose strenuous but vacuous attempt to supersede their animal-mechanical
nature affords the constant opportunity for comedy.” 67
Lewis’s tendency to, in reading Bergson, assume his premises while arriving at
opposite conclusions – “accepting what Bergson discards, rejecting what Bergson
endorses”68 – has led him to a system of thinking in which creativity and conscious
thought, potentially open to all in Bergson’s thinking, is so rare among the average
person that any striving for it becomes ipso facto comical. Lewis’s reactionary stance
towards Bergsonism has led, not in the opposite direction, but towards an intensification
of Bergson’s hierarchy. Whereas for Bergson intuition, good sense, and élan vital are
foreclosed only from automatic processes and inanimate matter, and are thus (at least in
principle) available to everyone, Lewis combines this hierarchy with a layer of social
elitism which places the educated and artistic mind above all. It is for this reason that the
spectre of monism is such a threat to Lewis’s system – for by doubling down on the
hierarchy, he has given himself more to lose. And yet in establishing his system through
opposition to Bergson, Lewis “effectively ensures [its] centrality.” 69 As such, Lewis
inherits the system’s instabilities as well, including the ever-present possibility of
monism.
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The next several sections of this chapter will further examine the roles of dualism
and monism in Lewis’s thought and their relationship to the problem of habit in Bergson.
The next section goes more deeply into the place of dualism in Lewis’s political
philosophy, paying particular attention to his contributions to the two issues of BLAST
and also Time and Western Man. One key point of this section is the extent to which
Lewis defined his own thinking in opposition to others – not merely Bergson, but also
those like Whitehead and the Behaviourists. This account will show how dualism, forged
from the “image” of his rejected monism, formed the basis of much of Lewis’s nonfiction writing during the inter-war period. The following section moves into a more
thorough critique and historicization of Bergson’s philosophy. It provides a fuller account
of Ravaisson’s philosophy, its possible influence on Bergson (in particular, the
similarities between Ravaissonian “habit” and Bergsonian “duration”), and the
implications this has for the status of monism in Bergson’s thought. As it did for Lewis,
Bergson’s rejection of monism has a specific source: the philosophy of Herbert Spencer,
which Bergson read and admired for many years until he rejected him, developing his
philosophical project in the process. It is through this rejection that Bergson’s antimonism takes on its status as a Deleuzian “image” rather than a well-defined “concept.”
The next section compares Lewis’s novel The Childermass to his painting A Battery
Shelled through the lens of Manuel DeLanda’s concept of “flat ontology,” or the
elimination of hierarchical relationships between ontological states. Borrowing additional
concepts from Deleuze, Graham Harman, and Levi Bryant, this section demonstrates how
The Childermass, which Fredric Jameson described as “a veritable summa of Lewis’s
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narrative modernism,”70 depicts beneath its apparent dualist hierarchy an inescapable
monist substratum into which the characters interminably risk falling.
It appears as though for the philosophies of both Lewis and Bergson, monism
exists as an omnipresent danger in the shadowed corners of their thought. Having rejected
monism through its association with determinism, and having built up increasingly severe
hierarchies from that rejection, the possibility posed by Ravaisson that creativity may
arise from mechanical processes poses a genuine threat. The evasion of this possibility
was thus a top priority for both writers, and this evasion left an indelible mark on their
thought.

1.2 Art Without Men
Lewis’s attacks on his fellow modernists have become minor legends. But while his
critique of Joyce’s “Bergsonism” in Time and Western Man has taken (for good and for
ill) a central place in the collective memory of his literary criticism,71 his attacks on
Pound are surprisingly savage given their close friendship. In Time and Western Man,
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Lewis calls Pound a “revolutionary simpleton” and “a genuine naïf,”72 and later in the
same chapter writes that “Pound is enthroned as the master-poet of the absolutely new
epoch; but all that was ever new of that showed any signs of wanting to evolve . . . has
evaporated. . . . There was never anything new about Ezra . . .” (TWM 42). Later, in Men
Without Art, Lewis’s assessment of Pound becomes even more blunt: “Ezra,” he writes in
his chapter on T.S. Eliot, “is pure mechanism.” 73 The critique here reads like the
unveiling of a great deception: Pound’s stature as “master-poet” functioning as a
widespread error, a trick that has been played on the poetry-reading public. What Pound
has claimed is that he is new, that is, creative in the sense of being non-mechanical, and
his readers have eaten it up. Despite this claim, Pound, in Lewis’s eye, has buried his
mind in erudition, so that “the dead with whom he consorts in his quaint poetics are so
numerous that they have numbed away any trace of originality.” 74 So Lewis’s role as
“enemy” here means that he must step in to oppose the consensus, first to fulfill the role’s
performative demands, and second to save modernism from a potentially stultifying
consensus (such as he sees in the “time-cult”).
Though it takes up only a small section of a very large book, Lewis’s critique of
Pound has notable implications for his approach to dualism in the latter, more
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philosophically-oriented half where the attacks on Bergson, Whitehead, Alexander, and
the like, begin in earnest. Of particular note here is that, scattered among the various
claims of Pound’s non-existent creativity, is the claim that he had recently endorsed
Futurism (TWM 40-41). Lewis bases this argument on an article in the Christian Science
Monitor which mentions Pound promoting an alignment between industrial life and
music. That it would be this which Lewis latches on to when trying to turn “Marinetti”
into a four letter word makes sense when one remembers the nature of Lewis’s criticism
of the Futurists, and his reasoning in distancing them from his own (distinct, though
aesthetically similar) Vorticist movement. In his memoir Blasting and Bombardiering,
Lewis recalls an argument he had with Marinetti where he had claimed that “you Wops
insist too much on the Machine.”75 Likewise, in his essay “Automobilism,” Lewis
critiqued “the childishness of the Latins over mechanical inventions,” and said that the
Futurist obsession with industrial machines had “nothing very new about it” 76 – a claim
resembling Lewis’s critique of Pound.
A notable trait of these anti-Futurist statements is their foregrounding of
Marinetti’s Italian origins, a nationalistic pigeon-hole that can often get quite specific –
such as when Lewis points out that Marinetti is a “milanese prefascist” (TWM 41) rather
than, say, one from Tuscany or Trieste. Lewis consistently associates the assumption of
social roles with mechanical or deterministic processes of thought and action. As he
specifies in The Wild Body, “the ideally ‘free man’ would be the man least stereotyped,

75

Wyndham Lewis, Blasting and Bombardiering (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1937), 37.

76

Wyndham Lewis, “Automobilism,” in Creatures of Habit and Creatures of Change: Essays on Art,

Literature, and Society 1914-1956, ed. Paul Edwards (Santa Rosa: Black Sparrow Press, 1989), 33.

15

the man approximating to the fewest classes, the least clamped into a system – in a word,
the most individual.”77 On the other hand, as the Vorticist manifesto of BLAST contends,
“the moment a man feels or realizes himself as an artist, he ceases to belong to any milieu
or time.”78 From Lewis’s earliest work, then, we have a dichotomy: the emancipated
artist contrasted with the common person fixed into a role. National caricatures are one
such role, and so this pattern of emphasizing Marinetti’s origin in the process of
critiquing his aesthetics, which Lewis repeats across multiple texts, appears to follow the
same rhetorical strategy that Lewis deployed in attacking Pound. Marinetti is mechanical
not only because he adores machines and industry, but also because he is (says Lewis)
stereotypically Italian. Thus it would follow that Pound, in endorsing (implicitly or
explicitly) a quasi-Futurist aesthetic, has allowed himself to fall into a way of making art
derived from a predictable, mechanical pattern. Pound thereby reveals himself to be as
uncreative as any other “Bergsonian” writer Lewis pillories in Time and Western Man.
The attack on Pound helps to focus exactly what Lewis is trying to accomplish in
his massive and varied philosophical-critical tome. Its diversity of targets and arguments
makes finding a common thread difficult, but what unites much of the work (at least
rhetorically) is a repeated overturning, a structure of arguing that holds that those who
say that they oppose the mechanism of modern society (be they Pound, or Joyce, or
Bergson) are in fact perpetuating the very crimes they criticize. There is a resemblance
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then to the satirical aims of The Apes of God, Lewis’s immense roman á clef, which
attacks the many “apes” of the London intelligentsia (principally Bloomsbury and the
Sitwells) for claiming that they are artists, when their artistry is merely affective, the
assumption of a role. Pound and the Sitwells are, according to Lewis, guilty of two
counts. First, in their aesthetic practice they promote modes of art that are essentially
anti-creative, falling out of the high place that Lewis affords the artist into the domain of
mere machines. Second, and most serious of all, is that in promoting their methods as
artistic and as creative, they attack the very terms of Lewis’s hierarchy, transforming
“non-conformity” into a role unto itself, and thereby crowding out the genuinely free.
Hence Lewis’s desperation to distinguish himself from Marinetti,79 which culminated in
him and several other Vorticists crashing a London lecture, an event that Lewis describes
in terms of a military action: “Marinetti had entrenched himself upon a high lecture
platform, and he put down a tremendous barrage in French as we entered. Gaudier went
into action at once. . . . He was sniping him without intermission . . . The remainder of
our party maintained a confused uproar.”80 This would not be the only attack. In a letter
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signed by many of the most prominent Vorticists and published in a June 1914 issue of
The Observer, Lewis put his displeasure with Futurism on the public record, writing that
“there are certain artists in England . . . who do not . . . agree with the futurism of Sig.
Marinetti.”81 This division between the artist and the machine cannot, it seems, be
permitted to blur – a point that will become important in my later analysis of The
Childermass.
The problem of deception and the problem of mechanism are therefore joined at
the hip, in that they both undermine the creative/mechanical hierarchy that is a
cornerstone of Lewis’s dualism. And it is because of this convergence that Lewis can
critique Pound’s supposed lack of creativity in the early section of Time and Western
Man and then later in the same book critique the behaviourism of John Watson in largely
the same terms – “you are sorry for Professor Watson: he has to say the same things over
and over again: for the whole of what he effectively has to say can be put into two lines.
It is the last, monotonous, dogged negation of scientific or critical philosophy” – and also
in the terms with which he attacked Marinetti – “Watson could have existed in no time or
place except modern industrial America” (TWM 319). Behaviourism, through the
synecdoche of its inventor, becomes the one-trick pony of a “revolutionary simpleton,”
and the emblem of a stereotypically American mindset (an assumption that tacitly ignores
Watson’s debt to the Russian Ivan Pavlov). This is but one of many swipes that Lewis
would take at behaviourist psychology, which as popularized by Watson took as its goal
“the prediction and control of behavior” and which “recognizes no dividing line between
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man and brute.”82 Lewis turned his satirical eye to behaviourism most directly with his
1932 novel Snooty Baronet, but we can encounter assaults on the doctrine in his nonfiction from much earlier than that.
The growing popularity of behaviourism in psychology through the early
twentieth century can be seen as something of a disaster for Lewis’s intellectual goals. Its
deterministic monism makes it a clear example of what Lewis saw as science’s tendency
to “regard life as a machine” (ABR 12) and to “[make] us strangers to ourselves” (ABR
13). But most insidious was the way behaviourism destroyed the hierarchies that Lewis
spent so much of his time advocating. “Behaviourism,” writes Paul Scott Stanfield,
“allowed for no exceptions, and for Lewis it was precisely on the exceptions that all
depended.”83 Indeed, Lewis’s attacks on behaviourism, and Watson in particular, often
take on the hint of a straw-man argument.84 But it is in the similarity between the critique
of Watson and the attacks on Pound and Marinetti that we can start to see the lines of
rhetorical similarity that draw together the heterogeneous bundle that is Time and
Western Man – and also the larger project, The Man and the World, that it was part of.
Repetition (Pound/Watson) and adherence to a national character (Watson/Marinetti)
become for Lewis evidence of a pervasive mechanistic thought. If the goal of the
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Vorticist artist is to become established “beyond Action and Reaction,”85 then both
Pound and Marinetti, by Lewis’s estimation, have failed to live up to the role.
In this sense, Watson and (to a lesser extent) Marinetti are at least honest in their
intentions, stating their positions outright in their respective manifestos. For Pound,
Bergson, and others, Lewis must uncover (successfully or otherwise) a hidden monism
that lurks behind professions to the contrary. One of the constant refrains in Lewis’s
mode of critique was that “all those expedients by which modern writers sought to
encompass value . . . were themselves no more than ideological expressions of the
processes by which modern citizens were kept childish and powerless.”86 Modernity
figures in Lewis’s thought as a mass deception, and so in at least some respects Watson
and his followers are un-deceived. Yet their ideas abandon the essential dualism, the
internal division of the mind, that Lewis thought was necessary to maintain an
individualistic personality. As he writes in the second issue of BLAST, “you must catch
the clearness and logic in the midst of contradictions: not settle down and snooze on an
acquired, easily possessed and mastered, satisfying shape.” 87 The contradictions in the
short manifesto from which I take this line, in which Lewis at once calls for the embrace
of machines while also claiming that they are the key to individuation, speak to the
difficulties Lewis must grapple with as he tries to prop up the house he has built on
dualism. As Lewis comments in a short piece called “Life Has No Taste,” “the best artist
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is an imperfect artist” – art that is perfect becomes “dilettante” inexorably. Thus, while
one “should be human about EVERYTHING” the artist must also be “inhuman about
only a few things.” 88 The drive to perfection is thus a drive towards the very selfdeceptions that Lewis attacked in The Apes of God. The undivided and self-consistent
mindset of a “perfect” artist begins to resemble the likewise undivided and predictable
mindset of a behaviourist.
It is in this sense possible, by looking at Lewis’s philosophical writings through
the lens of his rejection of monism and its related philosophies, to see the line that
connects his anti-behaviourist stance to his attack on such seemingly unrelated figures as
Whitehead and Bergson. Surely, one would think, a philosopher like Bergson, so often
categorized (dismissively or admiringly) with the vitalists, 89 could not be attacked in the
same breath as Watson, Pavlov, and Skinner. And yet we see Lewis attack Bergson
(while lumping him in with Einstein) for not being vitalist enough: “under the
characteristic headings of Duration and Relativity the nineteenth-century mechanistic
belief has now assumed its final form” (TFW 84), then writing later that “the theoretical
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truth that the time-philosophy affirms is a mechanistic one” (TFW 91). The comparison
between Bergson’s philosophy and the Victorian variety of mechanism is rather ironic
considering Bergson’s own rejection of Herbert Spencer.90 But it does fit the rhetorical
pattern already sketched out, in which Lewis claims that someone thought to be on the
side of dualistic vitalism is revealed beneath his gaze to have been a mechanist all along.
The specific reasons for this argument come down in large part to Bergson’s elimination
of Lewis’s precious hierarchy.
What Lewis accuses the “time philosophers” of following is often not, strictly
speaking, vitalism, but rather a related philosophy called panpsychism, or the belief that
some form of consciousness, soul, or vitality is present in all forms of matter.91 The
intricacies of panpsychist thought and their relationship to modernism are quite complex,
and I deal with them in more detail in my second chapter, but for the purposes of Lewis’s
argument panpsychism is essentially monism achieved by other means. Dualism, broadly
speaking, defines two separate entities – mind and matter – and argues that they are
ontologically separate and parallel. Mechanism and panpsychism are both monistic, the
first by extracting mind from matter and the second by flooding matter with mind. While
the appropriateness of tarring Bergson with this brush is at best debatable, it is true that
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his theory of élan vital does not rise to the levels of hierarchy that Lewis’s philosophy
demands. According to Creative Evolution, élan vital drives the entire process of
Darwinian evolution, and so it follows that anything that has evolved is also possessed of
this vitality. It is a qualified egalitarianism very similar to what he expressed in “Good
Sense and Classical Studies,” in that it creates a division and a hierarchical relationship,
but one that still places most of humanity on the “good” side of the line. (Recall that for
Bergson, the automatic behaviour that elicits laughter is not the norm, whereas for Lewis
it is.)
Whitehead’s philosophy of “organism” as expressed in Science and the Modern
World92 earns Lewis’s censure for similar reasons. Critiquing vitalism (though not
Bergson specifically) Whitehead calls the position “an unsatisfactory compromise”
between the proponents of mechanism and those who would prefer to see a place for free
will to exist – unsatisfactory because “the gap between living and dead matter is too
vague and problematical to bear the weight of such an arbitrary assumption, which
involves an essential dualism somewhere.” 93 Thus, Lewis attacks Whitehead, whose
“hypothesis . . . leads to the assumption of an equal reality in everything, a
democratically distributed reality, as it were” (TWM 425-26), terms quite similar to those
he uses to attack Bergson’s “Time-doctrine” a scant few pages earlier (TWM 421). These
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hints of ontological equality are simply too much for Lewis, whose political analysis rests
on the contrast between “the single figure of the privileged king with the subservient
Many,”94 a division that must be clear and distinct if it is to function.

1.3 “The Fossilized Residue of a Spiritual Activity”
In Bergson’s philosophy, creativity is a matter of no small importance. From its earliest
development as a key portion of Bergson’s thought in Time and Free Will to its eventual
role as a cornerstone of Bergson’s argument in Creative Evolution, questions of what
creativity is, how it works, and whether it is possible ceaselessly drive the development
and growth of Bergson’s system. That it would eventually be Darwin who provided the
basis for Bergson’s fullest explication on creativity in retrospect seems strange,
considering the extent to which the theory allowed scientists to fill in the many gaps in
our understanding of how life developed and change, shrinking the domain of ignorance
within which earlier vitalist and quasi-vitalist philosophies had found a ready
agnotological home. From Friedrich Wöhler’s synthesis of urea in 1828 – which
disproved the argument that organic compounds could not arise from inorganic ones 95 –
the various knowledge gaps that vitalists of centuries past had used to justify themselves
began to fall one by one beneath the steamroller of scientific discovery. That evolution,
the crown jewel of Victorian science, holds such a ready place in Bergson’s thought thus
appears at first glance counter-intuitive.
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The answer becomes clearer in light of Deleuze’s essay “Bergson’s Conception of
Difference.” As Deleuze writes:
Biology shows us the process of differentiation at work. . . .
Life is the process of difference. In this instance, Bergson is
thinking less of embryological differentiation than the
differentiation of species, i.e. evolution. . . . Opposing a
particular mechanism, Bergson shows that vital difference
is an internal difference. Furthermore, he shows that
internal difference cannot be conceived as simple
determination . . . it is [instead] indetermination itself.96
An important point to remember while interpreting this passage in relation to Bergson’s
larger philosophy (and its origins) is that, despite what many of his contemporaries and
later interpreters would argue, Bergson emphatically denied that he was a vitalist. Rather,
as he says in a 1935 letter to Floris Delattre, he sees élan vital as a middle ground
between mechanism and finalism. “The image of an élan,” he writes, “is nothing other
than this indication” (KW 367). What ties mechanism and finalism together is their
insistence that the future is already in some ways defined – either in the chain of causality
branching off from an original state (mechanism) or a teleology that processes inexorably
follow into the future (finalism). Both systems, furthermore, posit themselves as nonagnotologies, in which every black box has been opened and all contents are known. The
key to finding this middle ground is Bergson’s dualism. In Matter and Memory, the mind

96

Gilles Deleuze, “Bergson’s Conception of Difference,” in Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953-1974, ed.

David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2004), 39-40.

25

is emphatically a unitary entity, and its indivisibility is contrasted with the perpetually
divisible multiplicity of matter (MM 235). It is from the relation between the two that
allows creativity to occur. Importantly, Bergson draws a line between creative thought
and pure spontaneity, which he says would resemble too much “the case in the animal”
(MM 243). Instead, free and creative actions are possible because of a synthesis of
external multiplicities through intuition.
The result is what Bergson refers to as “becoming in general, i.e. a becoming
which is not the becoming of any particular thing.”97 In the works leading up to Creative
Evolution, Bergson established a model for creative action in which mental and physical
forces continually push against each other, making and unmaking themselves and thereby
creating a space of flux which is neither random nor determinate. Thus, when we see
Bergson oppose intuition to intellect in Creative Evolution – “intuition goes in the very
direction of life, intellect goes in the inverse direction, and thus finds itself naturally in
accordance with the movement of matter”98 – we encounter the fullest expression of a
long-developing system. And when this form of creativity is folded into the theory of
evolution to become the “impulse which thrusts life into the world” (CE 132), it functions
more like a drive rather than an entity, as that which ensures that “the future is not the
selection from a number of possibilities but the continual creation of unforeseen and
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diverging trajectories.”99 Bergson’s vision of evolution thus looks quite a lot like that of
the Situationist dérive – aimless but purposeful, creative yet guided by the environment,
forward-moving but with nowhere to go.
A major issue that this model runs into is that it essentially takes dualism as an
axiom. It is not necessitated by Bergson’s philosophy so much as it functions as a precondition for it. Deleuze’s book on Bergson makes frequent mention of its implicit
monism. He writes that Bergson’s dualism is “only a moment, which must lead to the reformation of a monism . . . just as integration follows differentiation.”100 Later Deleuze
mentions that “the Bergsonian method has shown two main aspects, the one dualist, the
other monist,”101 and then goes on to point to what he sees in Duration and Simultaneity
as “a monism of time.”102 This is the first of many ways in which Bergson’s thought
resembles that of Lewis: his dualism doth protest too much. Explaining why involves
recourse to two major nineteenth century philosophers whose influences on Bergson are
as indelible as they are often overlooked – Herbert Spencer and Félix Ravaisson. As far
as I have been able to find, Bergson only mentions Ravaisson in three of his published
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works. The first two are off-hand citations in Matter and Memory (MM 232n) and his
1889 short thesis on Aristotle,103 which has yet to be translated from Latin into English.
The third example, an essay called “The Life and Works of Ravaisson,” was
delivered as a speech in 1904, published in a journal later that year, and then re-edited
and published as an introduction to a 1932 study of Ravaisson’s works. I include this
summary of the essay’s publication for two reasons. First, because that 1904 presentation
coincides with the period when Lewis was in Paris and, still “militantly vitalist,” 104 was
attending Bergson’s presentations in earnest.105 Second, I mention this history to draw
attention to a footnote appended to the 1932 version of the essay, as reproduced in The
Creative Mind, which includes a quote from the publication committee for the book that
the essay introduced: “The author had at first thought of making a few revisions. Then he
decided to re-edit these pages as they were, even though they remain, as he says, exposed
to the accusation . . . of having ever so slightly ‘Bergsonized’ Ravaisson.” 106 This
accusation is in fact too kind, particularly when it comes to Bergson’s summary of
Ravaisson’s theory of habit. Reading Bergson’s summary and comparing to what
Ravaisson says in Of Habit, one may wonder whether Bergson had read a different book
entirely.
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The essay tries to cover all of Ravaisson’s life and work in very few pages, and
even within those bounds treats Of Habit like an afterthought. Yet what little it has said
has had a strong influence on Ravaisson’s subsequent reception.107 One passage bears
quoting:
[M]otor habit, once contracted, is a mechanism, a series of
movements which determine one another: it is that part of
us which is inserted into nature and which coincides with
nature; it is nature itself. . . . [passing] from consciousness
to unconsciousness and from will to automatism. Should
we not then imagine nature, in this form, as an obscured
consciousness and a dormant will? Habit thus gives us the
living demonstration of this truth, that mechanism is not
sufficient to itself: it is, so to speak, only the fossilized
residue of a spiritual activity. 108
The effect of this summary is to figure Ravaisson as one of Bergson’s predecessors,
through a kind of Bloomian Apophrades. It is, like the rest of the section on Of Habit,
characteristically short on details and specificity, lacking the comparatively deep analysis
Bergson’s provides in his section on Ravaisson’s book on Aristotle. It maintains a dualist
approach to habit, aligning it with “nature” in a way that implicitly excludes the rest of
human thought from the natural world. It’s mention of nature having “obscured
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consciousness,” seemingly in line with accusation of panpsychism, also appears to fold
Ravaisson in to élan vital, anticipating Creative Evolution’s publication in 1907. Finally,
it segues into Bergson’s usual degradation of habit, which is only the “residue” of a
higher kind of thought.
This approach to habit is common in philosophy, where it is (for lack of a better
word) habitually associated with thoughtless, mechanical behaviour, necessarily opposed
to creativity. Similar ways of talking about habit, and the association between materiality
and spiritual deadness, appear before Bergson and Ravaisson, in Descartes,109 Hume,110
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Kant,111 and after them as well in Lyotard112 among others. It is not, however, the
approach of Ravaisson, whose idea of habit instead elevates the faculty of habit from the
mechanical “residue” of conscious activity to the very seat of creativity and free will.
What other philosophers identify in habit as a dulling thoughtlessness, the propensity
towards mechanical behaviour, Ravaisson identifies as a substratum of predictability
from which one may vary, and which is a precondition for creativity rather than an
opponent. As he argues:
The general effect of the continuity and repetition of
change that the living being receives from something other
than itself is that, if the change does not destroy it, it is
always less and less altered by that change. . . . The change
that has come from the outside becomes more and more
foreign to it; the change that it has brought upon itself
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becomes more and more proper to it. Receptivity
diminishes and spontaneity increases.113
This process still occurs within a hierarchy, but not one based on a dualistic split between
mind and matter. Rather, Ravaisson distinguishes between the “inorganic realm” where
existence is deterministic and “Nature” which, because of habit, possesses spontaneity, 114
and for this reason his work has in this way been read as a precursor to the idea of brain
plasticity.115 In practice, the division he draws is largely between different levels of
complexity and predictability, and is somewhat similar to the philosophies of “organism”
that Lewis critiques in Time and Western Man. The division, then, is largely a matter of
degree between simple and complex processes, and is thus implicitly monist. He
therefore shows a way “to conceive freedom not as opposed to nature, but rather as
inhabiting or animating the natural body in the form of inclinations or tendencies.”116
Bergson’s reading of Ravaisson, which treats him as simply another dualistic
philosopher whose ideas on free will are best read as precursors to Bergson’s own, is
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therefore an almost complete misrepresentation. I say “almost” however because Bergson
is in a sense correct in figuring Ravaisson as his predecessor. Ravaisson’s habit is similar
to Bergson’s duration, in that both were proposed as ways to distinguish free action from
simple randomness, with both fulfilling the role of “the dividing line . . . between will and
nature.”117 Omri Moses’s observation that élan vital resembles less an impulse than “a
plastic and malleable tendency or disposition” 118 speaks in large part to the Ravaissonian
presence in Bergson’s work. Likewise, Ravaisson’s emphasis on the distinction between
multiplicity and homogeneity, and on the importance of time, find clear echoes in
Bergson’s Time and Free Will.119 But while, as a commentator on Bergson wrote in
1913, “Bergson’s philosophy bears a close genealogical relation” to Ravaisson’s,120 that
relation does not follow the contours Bergson sketches in his essay, but rather a more
complex pattern of disavowal and re-incorporation. And yet Bergson never acknowledges
these similarities, and in the end seemingly tries to bury Ravaisson’s argument. While it
is impossible to know for sure what Bergson was thinking when he produced his misreading, and then allowed that mis-reading to remain in subsequent editions of the text
after it was pointed out, one important side-effect of this Bergsonized version of
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Ravaisson is that it removes a number of parallels between this philosophy of habit and
the account of how consciousness works in the writing of Herbert Spencer.
I have not chosen Spencer arbitrarily, but rather because of his powerful early
influence on Bergson’s thought. Like Lewis, Bergson’s philosophical development is
marked by a powerful early attachment to a famous thinker who they later abandoned.
And, like Lewis, Bergson’s rejection of Spencer retains a spectral presence in his
philosophy – primarily in the form of particular philosophical images. As Bergson writes
in a 1908 letter to William James, he was “completely steeped in the mechanistic
theories” he found in Spencer, to which he “adhered more or less unreservedly” until the
period of 1881-83, when he had left the École Normale and began to examine the weak
understanding of time present in Spencer’s theories – an examination that culminated in
his concept of duration and the composition of Time and Free Will (KW 362-63). It is in
this rejection of Spencer that we encounter a possible origin of Bergson’s reflexive
disparagement of mechanism and reductionist theories of consciousness.
Bergson’s early infatuation with Spencer is understandable given the vast breadth
of his influence in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – to a degree that is
difficult to imagine in light of the low status currently afforded to his ideas. Michael W.
Taylor, in his introduction to Spencer’s philosophy, provides a summary of the extent of
Spencer’s reach.121 One particularly luminous detail is an assessment provided by the
author Grant Allen in 1904: “his First Principles place him in line as a cosmologist with
Newton and Laplace, his Biology as a naturalist with Cuvier and Darwin, his Psychology
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as a mental philosophy in front of Kant and Hegel, his Sociology as the founder of a new
and profound science before all his contemporaries.”122 Not even the most fanatical
Bergsonists ever wrote such nonsense. Such ecstatic praise ought to indicate that Tom
Quirk’s assessment that Bergson “was as much a popular phenomenon as he was a
serious philosopher”123 applies equally well to Spencer, if not more so.
In terms of Bergson’s relation to Ravaisson, and by extension his relation to
monism, the most notable aspect of Spencer’s thought is his philosophy of habit. First,
Spencer believed strongly in the power of scientific reductionism, writing in his First
Principles that “when you learn that the changes undergone by food during digestion, are
like the changes artificially producible in the laboratory; you regard yourself as knowing
something about the natures of these phenomena.”124 He followed not merely a
pragmatic reductionism, in which one breaks down a process into its component parts so
to make a highly complex system understandable, but rather what Daniel Dennett terms
“greedy reductionism,” in which an understanding of the base components of a process is
mistaken for the an understanding of that process in itself.125 For Spencer the most
elemental form of thought was the reflex action,126 which had been identified earlier in
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the century as a physical process originating in the spinal cord.127 This argument
dovetailed with another, in which Spencer held that “life is definable as the continuous
adjustment of internal relations to external relations” so that “even the highest
generalizations of science consist of mental relations of co-existence and sequence.”128
Consciousness, “inclusive of intelligence in its highest forms,”129 was thus
understandable only in terms of a complex relationship of reflex actions that allowed the
“internal relations” of the body to adjust to the vagrancies of the environment.
While Ravaisson’s theory of habit is not nearly so simplistic, but it is similar to
Spencer in several key ways. Both implicitly place human beings in what Manuel
DeLanda has called a “flat ontology,” a concept he defined in his book Intensive Science
and Virtual Philosophy, and which has been recently picked up and extended by
speculative realist philosophers like Levi Bryant and Ian Bogost. As DeLanda writes, “an
ontology based on relations between general types and particular instances is
hierarchical, each level representing a different ontological category . . . [while] an
approach in terms of interacting parts and emergent wholes leads to a flat ontology” in
which all entities share equal ontological status.130 As Bryant summarizes, “flat ontology
signifies that the world or the universe does not exist . . . there is no super-object that
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gathers all other objects together in a single, harmonious entity.” 131 This is not to say that
one cannot recognize quantitative differences between entities, as both Spencer and
Ravaisson do to some extent.132 But what one cannot be while promoting a flat ontology
is a dualist, and certainly not a vitalist, since the whole crux of dualism is to establish a
split between mind and matter on an ontological level, usually for the purpose of exalting
human intelligence in comparison to inanimate things.
In rejecting Spencer’s mechanism to the extent that he did, Bergson abandoned
(or at least tried to abandon) the possibility of a flat ontology. While, as Deleuze
suggests, some of Spencer’s monism remains in trace amounts through Bergson’s
philosophy, his surface-level dualism forced him to reject the thrust of Ravaisson’s
argument even as he incorporated a shadow of “habit” through his concept of duration.
The rejection of flat ontology (both Spencerian and Ravaissonian), then, serves as a
guiding image of Bergson’s thought, as reflected in Laughter. Bergson’s treatment of
laughter as a policing mechanism to ensure that one never falls victim to the dangers of
habitual action (L 5) elevates non-mechanistic behaviour and thought in a way that
neither Ravaisson nor Spencer would have permitted. What Bergson does with mind –
and what Lewis would take even further – is the inverse of what Spencer did. Comparing
the way consciousness is treated in Laughter and First Principles, we encounter
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examples of what Graham Harman calls “undermining” and “overmining.” 133 These
terms are related to the concept of flat ontology, in that both have to do with the elevation
of certain kinds of entities to higher ontological status than others. Undermining in this
sense can be seen as doing ontologically what “greedy reductionism” does
epistemologically, in that it essentially treats the components of an object or process as
more important or valid than the whole (as Spencer does with consciousness).
Overmining is the opposite – disregarding or ignoring the component parts of something
while elevating the whole (in Laughter, Lewis, and with vitalists generally).
We can therefore see the difficulty that Bergson faced when trying to define the
mechanisms of creative thought. The path Ravaisson charts, which comes far closer to
escaping undermining and overmining than Spencer, was cut off when Bergson rejected
monism. Yet, as Bergson’s disclaiming of vitalism in his letter to Floris Delattre
indicates, he continued to search for a dualist version of this middle way until late in his
career. What is needed is a dualism which does not overmine consciousness, and Bergson
seems to approach that in the concept of duration, and in his emphasis on “internal
difference” giving rise to non-determinate effects. But the dualism upon which this
system rests is built on sand, derived, it would seem, more from Bergson’s rejection of
Spencer than from anything necessitated by the system itself. We encounter a hint of this
problem in Bergson’s characterization of élan vital, as a concept that “may indeed not
explain much,” but is “at least a sort of label affixed to our ignorance, so as to remind us
of this occasionally, while mechanism invites us to ignore that ignorance” (CE 42). This
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admission suggests a hidden monism: that both élan vital and mechanism orbit around a
void in our knowledge, with the élan’s only claim to superiority is its Socratic claim to
know that it knows nothing.
Having thus charted the ways in which Bergson’s own thought has been affected
by his rejection of Spencer and his burial of Ravaisson, we can see more easily how
Lewis, ever the Bergsonian, followed a very similar path. His overmining of
consciousness, combined with his political ideas, intensifies both his reliance on an
axiomatic dualism and the ever-present shadow of a monism very much like that which
trailed his disavowed predecessor.

1.4 Herod’s Children
I think everyone who has tried to write or talk about The
Childermass has found himself in the same hole . . . We
don’t know – to an agonizing degree we are not allowed to
know – what it is all about. That very ignorance may be, of
course, what it is all about.
— I.A. Richards134
One of the chief presumptions that underlies a resistance to monist philosophical
approaches to human thought is that freedom and creativity need to be inexplicable. They
are said to gain power from their unknowability, from their agnotological function. True,
Bergson did not subscribe to this assumption, and his idea of duration attempted to
provide a mechanism without being mechanistic, but as far as Lewis was concerned this
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attempt ended in failure. Bergsonism, and the other “time-philosophies” Lewis attacks,
come under fire first and foremost for their supposed crypto-mechanism, a hidden
monism that Lewis thought only artists could be truly free of. In terms of Lewis’s fiction,
we can see the demands of this inexplicability most directly in The Childermass, and in
The Childermass too we can also see its failure. As I argue in this section, the apparent
randomness and discord of the novel’s world, and the apparently dualistic assumptions
that it inherits from Lewis’s non-fiction, break down to reveal a shadow of its opposite.
In many ways, then, Lewis’s intellectual trajectory mirrors that of Bergson – in his
rejection of a famous intellectual advocating a (allegedly, in Bergson’s case)
deterministic theory of consciousness, the adoption of a hierarchical dualism, and the
continuing hints of a flat ontology that remain.
In The Childermass, the mechanical processes of plot are, in Hugh Kenner’s term,
“truncate[d]” by the erasure of narrative time, 135 creating inexplicability on the surface
which does not extend to the depths. To see how this works we must examine the origin
of the novel’s title. Childermas is a Christian feast day commemorating the king Herod’s
massacre of all the children under the age of two living in the vicinity of Bethlehem, and
usually occurs in late December. The holiday is otherwise known as the Feast of the Holy
Innocents. The massacre of the innocents appears exclusively in the Gospel of Matthew,
and is rendered in the King James Version thusly:
Then Herod, when he saw that he was mocked of the wise
men, was exceeding wroth, and sent forth, and slew all the
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children that were in Bethlehem, and in all the coasts
thereof, from two years old and under, according to the
time which he had diligently enquired of the wise men.136
Herod is, of course, in search of the infant Christ, who he believes will overthrow him,
and also for the wise men, who have evaded capture by taking a different route home
than the one they took to arrive. Both groups were able to escape because they had
received a warning in a dream. The massacre is, in fact, bookended by successful
prophecies – the birth of Christ and the warning in the passages before, and the resolution
of a prediction by the prophet Jeremiah (who foresaw the massacre’s aftermath) in the
passages immediately after. The passage quoted above, on the other hand, shows Herod
going to extreme lengths to avoid a prediction, to snuff out the insurrection he believes is
brewing in his territory. As Bergson makes clear, determinism is linked to the capacity to
make predictions (TFW 143-44), and this attempt to escape determination not only fails –
Herod’s quarry escapes – but would have been completely meaningless to Herod’s
continued reign even if it had succeeded. As the narrator goes on to say, Herod dies
completely of his own accord long before Christ was old enough to even potentially
challenge him.
I include this brief interlude of Biblical exegesis in part because the second
possible meaning of the title is far more obvious. “The massacre of the innocents” could
work just as well as the name for World War One as it does for the story of Herod, and
the protagonists of the novel’s first section, Pullman and Satters, appear to have died in
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that very war. But Herod here also takes the form of a Lewisian wild body, someone
struggling against mechanization and predictability, against the determinism implied by
the existence of prophecy, whose inability to transcend his own mechanistic nature ends
in disaster. He is what Lewis would later refer to as “the man-of-action” who “can neither
understand nor feel” because “he is too busy.” 137 Herod proceeds, in less than a sentence,
from discovering he has been tricked to massacring every infant in his domain. This is
not the sort of thoughtlessness that arises from continually repeated action (presumably
he does not produce these massacres on a regular basis) but a thoughtlessness that comes
from striving towards a goal, specifically the goal of exceeding his own determination.
It does not take much examination to see how the lost souls that populate The
Childermass fulfill this model. The novel takes place in the afterlife, in a vast desert that
surrounds “the magnetic city” – a paradise in “the heavenly north” (TC 5) that all of the
dead strive unceasingly to reach (or so it seems prior to the events of the later novels). A
huge mass of them converge on a single door guarded by the Bailiff, an embodiment of
the “time-philosophy” that Lewis described in Time and Free Will. The gate to the
magnetic city forms a bottleneck, and the only way in is to convince the Bailiff to let you
by. The use of the word “magnetic” to describe the city (along with the various references
to magnetism throughout the novel) is more on the nose than it might at first seem. The
arrangement of people, their goal, and their enmassing in front of a single obstacle in
front of that goal, resembles an example William James mentions in his Principles of
Psychology, which Lewis earlier critiqued (TWM 337-39). James begins his first volume
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by questioning whether and how one may detect the presence of mental processes in an
object. As an example of a non-mental process, he offers the following:
If some iron fillings be sprinkled on a table and a magnet
brought near them, they will fly through the air . . . A
savage seeing the phenomenon explains it as the result of
an attraction or love between the magnet and the fillings.
But let a card cover the poles of the magnet, and the fillings
will press forever against its surface without it ever
occurring to them to pass around its sides138
What appears at a glance to be an act of volition and agency on the part of matter is to a
closer eye an automatic process, and one can distinguish the two by paying attention to
whether and how the object adjusts to its surroundings. Bits of iron, though they do move
in response to the force of the magnet, make no adjustment to evade the card which
blocks them. Their movement is thus truly mechanical: that of a dead object compelled
by a blind force. An animal, on the other hand, would in an analogous situation search for
a way around the obstacle.
In Herod we see one version of this situation. The story swaps the magnet’s
compelling force with a divine prophecy, but the results are the same. What appears to be
free will in action actually becomes the fulfillment of a prediction, and greater evidence
of a (in this case divinely) determinist universe. But the key trait here is not merely a
mechanism discovered through the possibility of prediction, but also the brief moment of

138

William James, The Principles of Psychology, Volume One (New York: Dover, 2014), 6.

43

undecidability, where it is difficult to tell whether the thing in question is alive and able
to adjust (as Herod, hearing that someone threatens his reign, attempts to adjust) or
whether the iron filling and the man-of-action will simply barrel on ahead regardless (as
when Herod’s massacre ends up fulfilling a prophecy of Jeremiah). In The Childermass,
what appears to be inexplicable – action without origin, true free will – may always in
fact be the result of some hidden mechanical process.
The plain outside the magnetic city, what might perhaps be Outside Heaven,
seems filled with these magnetic fillings, so-called “peons” drawn to the magnetism of
the gate to paradise. It is as though they have no choice but to move, and when they see
that the Bailiff blocks their way they simply take a seat and wait for that blockage to
leave. Despite Satters’s first impression that “they hardly seem human” (TC 30),
frequently throughout the journey to the Bailiff’s door the novel emphasizes that the
peons and spectral humans are at best barely distinguishable. Only a few pages later
Satters’s assessment changes: “I believe we only think we’re so different” (TC 43). Later,
a peon and a ploughman are confused (TC 105). Even the Bailiff seems confused as to
their status, at first claiming that there is “all the difference in the world” between “a
peon and an individual” (TC 183), but then later remarking that “their [the peon’s]
persons are sacrosanct even as my own” (TC 263). Nobody in this novel is able to tell the
difference between mindlessness and intelligence, or embodiment and spectrality, and for
Lewis’s dualist system that is a very big problem.
The confusion returns us to the alternate meaning hidden the allusion to Herod.
While a close examination of the passage reveals the importance of prophecy,
expectation, and the difficulty in spotting the difference between one who has escaped
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their fate and one who has not (presumably, Herod went to his grave believing that the
“king of kings” had died in his cradle), the resonance between “the massacre of the
innocents” and the mass-murder of the First World War is undeniable. Lewis took part in
the war, seeing action at the Third Battle of Ypres (otherwise known as the Battle of
Passchendaele), and spent much of his time under constant shelling from German
artillery.139 In a letter to John Quinn, Lewis called the war experience a “sheer loss of
time,”140 and would later represent this loss by lopping two years from his life, reporting
his birth year as 1884. The experience seems to have had a deadening effect,141 as Lewis
later described: “a gunner does not fight. He merely shells and is shelled.” 142 Eventually,
he was able to secure a transfer to a post as a war artist, which put him in a place of
relative safety.
Little has been written on the effect of the war on Lewis’s writing, but that effect
seems to have been considerable. As he would later write, “the War for me, as a soldier,
was an interminable nightmare.”143 One scholar to take notice is Paul Edwards, who in
an essay writes that “what Lewis had begun to discover during the war years was a kind
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of fissure in the surface of reality,” revealing that “reality was the product of an illusionist
secreted in our own consciousness . . . so we were not exposed to the annihilation that a
face-to-face encounter with the absolute would mean for us.”144 Edwards attributes this
“fissure” and its revelations to the effects of shellshock.145 In his analysis, Edwards
points to Lewis’s exposure to the work of W.H.R. Rivers, a psychologist working for the
British army whose task it was to treat severely traumatized soldiers until they were able
to return to the front. It was Rivers’s belief that what a sufferer from shellshock needed to
overcome was “too strong a recognition of the truth,”146 and so treatment often involved
methods of distraction – pointing out, for example, that the death of a soldier’s close
friend had at the very least been quick and painless. As Rivers reports in his article,
soldiers who have not received adequate treatment for their trauma often undergo a
process of repression:
When I find that a soldier is definitely practising repression
I am accustomed to ask him what he thinks is likely to
happen if one who had sedulously kept his mind from all
thoughts of war, or from special memories of warfare,
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should be confronted with the reality . . . [T]he question at
once brings home to him the futility of the course of action
he has been pursuing. The deliberate and systematic
repression of all thoughts and memories of war by a soldier
can have but one result when he is again faced by the
realities of warfare.147
Rivers seems to describe here a habitual response to this acquisition of knowledge – an
attempt to return to an automatic, thoughtless way of being, which might have proceeded
successfully earlier in the war, but which has now been rendered impossible by the events
that have led the soldiers to come under Rivers’s care. The treatment that Rivers
describes in his article involves a careful balancing act between the demands of the
military (to get the soldiers back to the front as soon as possible, their health and wellbeing be damned) and the needs of the soldiers (to carefully work through the trauma and
so restore a more durable version of their earlier state). Both cases treat the wound in
reality as a problem and an obstacle. What this implies for The Childermass I will
describe shortly, but one of Lewis’s wartime painting A Battery Shelled at the moment
has greater explanatory potential.
The painting brings us back to the issue of flat ontology. It shows us, as the title
suggests, the aftermath of a shelling of a battery – or a cluster of guns in a fortified
artillery position – with numerous figures in the shell crater lifting away the rubble while
others appear to be fleeing. In the foreground, three officers look on, staring serenely in
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different directions. It is on these figures that much of the interpretation of the painting
often turns. Alan Munton, for example, writes that “it is in the relationship between these
three figures and the body of the painting that the meaning to be found.” 148 Their calm
detachment, and its contrast with the clear desperation of the figures in the background,
many running for their lives, certainly speaks to the habitual deadening of the personality
and the repression of knowledge which Rivers reported among the officers he treated. But
there has indeed been a revelation in the bodies of the shelled soldiers in the background.
They have not merely been rendered abstract, or incorporated into the scene, but have
been crafted so as to resemble the shattered pieces of their bunker. Lewis drew the
scattered beams and boxes, and even the smoke, with the same yellowish colour, and in
the same simple geometric lines, as the soldiers, so that the humans and the world that
they inhabit are scarcely distinguishable. The background scene has created a situation in
which, to borrow from Levi Bryant, “humans, far from constituting a category called
‘subject’ that is opposed to ‘object,’ are themselves one type of object among many.”149
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Figure 1: Lewis, Wyndham. A Battery Shelled, oil on canvas, 1919 (Imperial War
Museum, London). Printed with permission.
This bubble of flattened ontology, revealed by the sudden trauma of the shell,
strips away the soldiers’ superiority to the objects that destroy them. Meanwhile the
officers, standing outside the bubble, continue to appear as integrated aggregates, systems
and processes whose mechanical parts are hidden beneath the façade of humanity. 150
Indeed the image’s peculiar perspective further flattens the background, so that it almost
looks as though the officers are themselves standing in front of a painting. But as Bergson
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says in Laughter, the claim to vitality comes with certain expectations that one will not
act like a machine. But the war destroys these pretensions: one sees that human beings fly
through the air according to exactly the same laws as the shells that kill them, and the
sight of such things often induces a traumatic repetitive flashback or a process of habitual
repression. In this sense, the imperturbability of the officers seems as fragile as that of
Rivers’s patient. Likewise we return through them to the indeterminacy of Herod, who
never knew how inescapable his own determination was.
The problem we face in The Childermass is of a similar vintage, and it is one that
should be familiar to us from Time and Western Man: seemingly vital processes which
are in fact mechanical, seemingly hierarchical ontologies which are in fact flat. We see
this process, as established, in the way the novel’s characters appear. The Bailiff stands
above the crowd while himself representing an ideology that Lewis had dismissed as
mechanistic, while the peons are at once below, and above, and indistinguishable from
normal human beings. And when the Bailiff and Macrob debate their relative reality – “if
you are not so real as I am, then you cannot injure me” (TC 277) – the closest the
discussion comes to a resolution is the Bailiff’s declaration that Macrob is “a habit . . . of
Space-Time” (TC 282). Satters appears at the start of the novel “a lost automaton rather
than a lost soul” (TC 7) and speaks in continuous clichés and Steinian repetitions (“most
terribly helpful and kind” etc. [TC 50-51]), but at the end it is he who is most resistant to
the Bailiff’s rhetoric, and Pullman who most falls in with it. Indeed, Pullman frequently
repeats the mantras of a “man-of-action,” advising early in the novel that “it’s best to
keep moving here” (TC 16), and then shouting to Satters on the final page, “pick up your
feet. If you must go nowhere, step out” (TC 401). Pullman doggedly drives forth towards
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the magnetic city, exchanging forward motion for the careful thought that Lewis argued
was the origin of artistic creativity. The lost souls of The Childermass thus resemble their
Biblical origin doubly: first they resemble the innocents, and then they resemble the
killer.
It is not just the people of the novel whose vitality is doubtful, but also the
landscape. The first section of the novel, which describes Pullman and Satters journeying
towards the magnetic pull of the Bailiff’s gate, brings them through various strange and
beautiful environs which make Jameson’s dubbing the novel “theological science
fiction”151 well deserved. The way the land seems to change, to follow different physical
laws than the people who inhabit it (TC 126), suggests at first blush a kind of Heraclitean
flux, an ever-changing and panpsychic universe where nothing is predictable and
everything may change. However, one such oddity gives lie to this assumption. After
venturing beyond the camp where they met up, the travelers encounter what Pullman
dubs a “panorama”: “Look at that hedge. Do you see its perspective? It’s built in a
diminishing perspective! I believe the whole place is meant to be looked at from behind
there, where we have just come from” (TC 123). Exploring the scene, Pullman takes a
leaf from the “life-sized” section of the panorama and walks with it into a region where
everything is smaller, finding to his astonishment that the leaf has shrunk (TC 125-26).
As any painter knows, achieving lifelike perspective is a difficult task, requiring
no small knowledge of mathematics. Indeed, the mathematical basis for perspective is
integral to its history, with the explosion of art works making use of the technique during
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the Renaissance deriving from Filippo Brunelleschi’s discovery of the geometric basis for
linear perspective in the early 1400s.152 In order to resemble a panorama, the scene that
Pullman and Satters come across must be constructed according to a strict, and clearly
defined, set of proportions, according to immutable mathematical laws. While the
landscape of Outside Heaven appears at times surreal and random, that variation, upon
closer inspection, follows strict rules and pre-defined patterns. In short they are, in
principle at least, predictable. Seeing otherwise means taking an epistemological problem
– we never discover what most of these laws are – and elevating it into a metaphysical
one, the very same mistake that one makes when seeing life in iron drawn to a magnet or
lost souls drawn to paradise. That these landscapes follow patterns, that they fall into
types, is enough to know that one could discover their laws if one wanted to. And that is
enough to thwart Herod for good.
William James used the image of a magnet drawing iron fillings to represent
motion defined entirely by physical laws, and lacking any true intelligence. Bergson, in
his essay on Ravaisson, put the image to opposite use: “as scattered particles of iron
fillings are attracted toward the poles by the force of the magnetic bar . . . so, at the call of
a genius it loves, the virtualities slumbering here and there in a soul awaken . . . [and] a
personality is constituted.”153 Yet it remains unclear how one is to tell the difference
between a mind of genius awakening to its potential and a mindless material object
dragged about by destiny. In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Bergson says that it is the
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role of the philosopher “to promote a certain effort, which in most men is usually fettered
by habits of mind more useful to life,”154 but the rising genius we see in this essay
appears more guided by the “virtualities” than guiding.
The Childermass offers a similar conundrum. Where in Lewis’s non-fiction the
divide between matter and mind comes out in no uncertain terms, in the fictional core of
his Man of the World project this division comes fettered with caveats, uncertainty, and
doubt. What lurks underneath is a flat ontology, a state of being that lacks the powerful
hierarchies upon which Lewis’s politics so depended.155 Put into practice, allowed to
come together in their own fictional world, these ideas appear to struggle merely to
survive, say nothing of escaping Herod’s fate.

1.5 “A Sort of Sleep”
It may well be that Lewis was at his most Bergsonian when he first sat down to write
Time and Western Man. That text’s prephilosophical rejection of a form of (arguable)
monism embodied in the work of an extremely popular philosopher mirrors eerily the
trajectory of Bergson’s thought, deriving as it does from his own infatuation with and
then rejection of the explicitly mechanistic thought of Herbert Spencer. Likewise, what
for both writers is ultimately at stake is not merely the epistemological questions of
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whether free will is possible and whether mind and matter are two distinct entities or one,
but also the ontological and ethical question of which form of existence should occupy
the higher position in their respective hierarchies. That the theories of Spencer and the
behaviourists are too greedily reductionist, and too ready to ontologically undermine
human thought and consciousness, is hardly contestable, and the gross overreach of their
arguments made them easy targets for Bergson and Lewis’s critiques. The temptation to
overcorrect – to overmine consciousness, as vitalists like Hans Driesch often do –
remains omnipresent, and despite the critiques lobbed at it, Bergson’s notion of élan vital
represents at the very least an honest attempt to avoid that pitfall, albeit an attempt
conducted within an axiomatically dualist system. What the debate thus ends up being
about is the partition and distribution of ignorance among ontological processes. It is a
fight over competing agnotologies.
Yet in both Lewis and Bergson, habit suffers grievously, as we see when
comparing Bergson to Ravaisson, and later Bergson to Lewis. And their suffering ought
to serve as a warning against too incautious a choice of black boxes. It is in habit that we
can best see the effects of the anti-monist image of thought that hangs over these works –
an image that demands that a hierarchy be instilled. As Lewis would write in Paleface,
“most men wish to be machines. They want to feed and sleep – and mechanical work is a
sort of sleep – and be told what to do, nothing more.”156 Quite simply, for Lewis one
cannot remain truly alive, nor truly thoughtful, without constant, strenuous effort, and it
is the artist who supposedly brings this effort to its peak. But the war, it seems, took a toll
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on Lewis’s vision. As he writes in The Art of Being Ruled, for a soldier at the front “the
grinding boredom you realize he must be experiencing makes a mechanical hero out of
him” (ABR 282). Not merely the trauma, then, but also the grinding monotony between
bouts of excitement enforces repetition, mechanization, thoughtlessness. The war, then,
degrades all it touches, forcing all participants to reduce themselves to mere bodies. We
see this expressed most directly in the localized flat ontology of A Battery Shelled, and
the precarious superiority of the onlookers, but also in the endemic indecisiveness of The
Childermass, where the unpredictable vitality of the landscape hides a clichéd repetition,
and the degraded, mechanical peons become indistinguishable from any other type of
person.
For Bergson, the abandonment Spencer’s mechanism, and the related
abandonment of monism, entailed as well the burying of Ravaisson. What Of Habit tends
towards is not the undermining that Spencer promotes, but rather an ontological
flattening similar in some ways to the process philosophy of Whitehead. Consciousness
and fee will appear in Ravaisson as emergent properties of complex systems, deriving
from a set of mechanisms but not completely reducible to them. One of the most notable
traits of a mechanist philosophy – determinism – disappears completely, because it is
impossible in Ravaisson to reduce the complex interplay of habitual action and novel
thought to a simple cause-and-effect relationship. But Bergson’s summary turns
Ravaisson into just another dualist, swallowing him up. And even to this day scholars
frequently define the Bergson/Ravaisson relationship in these terms, or mis-read
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Ravaisson in the same way Bergson did.157 Habit returns to the denigrated state it
frequently occupies in dualist philosophical systems, as evidenced especially in Laughter.
Though Bergson’s theory of laughter can be more egalitarian that Lewis’s, it still depends
on the same basic elements: a hierarchical ontology between mind and matter in which
mind holds the privileged place, the identification between habitual action and
mechanical action, and the imperative that one expend the effort that it takes to avoid
these actions lest one come under censure.
It is in these demands that, for both writers, the image of their rejected monism
remains. Most clearly it looms as a threat over Lewis’s characters, which we see manifest
in both A Battery Shelled and The Childermass in the form of ambiguity. It would be all
well and good if each character in the novel ultimately reduced to a purely mechanical
existence: that on its own would pose no difficulty to Lewis’s philosophy, since
according to him the vast majority of people occupy precisely that state. The problem
arises when so many elements appear at first to have vitality, to have successfully raised
themselves to a higher level, only to reveal themselves under closer inspection as nothing
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but automata. For a text derived from the same larger project as Time and Western Man,
with its emphasis on the need for a domain of art built on clear and universal
distinctions,158 this inability to know the difference between two categories of such
importance afflicts the argument with paradox. How can one build a philosophy on the
hard division between living and mechanical minds when it is impossible to really know
whether you see one or the other? It is due to this question that a flat ontology looms
above the scene, placed there by the very act of its rejection.
The hierarchy between mind and matter is also the reason why panpsychism poses
such a problem for Lewis. Though it permits the existence of free will and
unpredictability – both traits that Lewis found desirable in a philosophical system – it
remains a flat ontology, though one achieved by raising matter up instead of pushing
mind down. I will analyze the particular literary and philosophical issued posed by
panpsychism, and their relationship to Bergson, in my next chapter on Virginia Woolf,
but suffice it to say that such a system creates a degree of unpredictability entirely
opposed to the mechanization Lewis saw in everyday human life. For Lewis, it is the
hierarchy that is important, far more so than dualism. So while dualism often appears at
the center of Lewis’s system, it is quite often best read as a supplementary argument, one
that exists largely to support Lewis’s division between higher and lower orders of
humanity. Panpsychism, then, cannot prevail, because it holds that nothing is truly
mechanical, and that that very same forces which govern the everyday physical world
also give rise to creative thought. Posed as a mechanist argument, this was repugnant to
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Lewis, so it should be no surprise that he found it repelling when achieved by different
means.
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Chapter 2
The Shock of Life:
Virginia Woolf’s Panpsychic Knowledge
[N]othing happens in Nature which can be attributed to any
defect in it, for Nature is always the same . . . So the way of
understanding the nature of anything, of whatever kind,
must also be the same, namely, though the universal laws
and rules of Nature.
— Benedict De Spinoza, Ethics159

2.1 Moments of Being Continuous
In the first paragraphs of Virginia Woolf’s early short story “Solid Objects” we encounter
in miniature one of the key philosophical problems with which her fictions would engage
across much of her career, one closely tied to the role of ignorance in her writing more
generally. The story begins with a description of “one small black spot” on a beach, a
lone and unitary punctum far in the distance, which as it draws closer we see possesses “a
certain tenuity in its blackness” which shows “that this spot possessed four legs; and
moment by moment it became more unmistakable that it was composed of the persons of
two young men.”160 These men will become the focal characters of the story, but far
more important to the present analysis is the narrator – someone occupying space in
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relation to the two men, and viewing from a fixed position their movements with greater
or lesser fidelity as they draw near. Yet this embodied narrator is present only by
implication, never even arising to the level of a “character” in the sense of having a
personality, desires, motives, or even a name. It is an effacement we should keep in mind
when examining the narration’s implicit positivism – we find that the two men have an
“unmistakable vitality,” and a “vigour” in their argumentation that, while
“indescribable,” is “corroborated on closer view by the repeated lunging of a walkingstick on the right-hand side.”161 One might imagine, in reading the first section of this
story, that the text was part of some sort of scientific study, or perhaps a police report.
Yet the epistemological confidence is completely at odds with the story’s
opening, which proclaims the unity of the two men’s bodies with the same fauxobjectivity and confidence as it does its subsequent observations. Likewise does it
contrast with an observation later in the story, that “looked at again and again half
consciously by a mind thinking of something else, any object mixes itself so profoundly
with the stuff of thought that it loses its actual form and recomposes itself a little
differently in an ideal shape which haunts the brain when we least expect it.”162 An
object viewed will bend beneath the act of viewing, and repeated observations only
worsen things. The status of an object as an object is thus a construct of perception
infused with ignorance, and the object thus becomes an agnotological repository
manifesting as a physical presence in the world. It is in this way that the relationship
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between perception and epistemology becomes a problem for Woolf, one that, as I will
show, she resolves in part through an engagement with panpsychism which provides a
framework for understanding the black boxes that her thought contends with. But for the
moment a more useful connection is the one between the problems of “Solid Objects”
and Immanuel Kant’s writing on epistemology, and this passage in particular:
Suppose that cinnabar were now red, then black, now light,
then heavy; or that a human being were changed now into
this and then that animal shape; or that on the longest day
of the year the land were covered now with fruit, then with
ice and snow. In that case my empirical imagination could
not even get the opportunity, when presenting red colour, to
come to think of heavy cinnabar.163
Kant’s observation expresses in the abstract the very problem that Woolf’s story
explores: that a lack of consistency in our observations would destabilize the whole logic
of empiricism, and make it impossible to acquire knowledge about the physical world by
way of perception. This dependability is also, of course, one of the basic assumptions of
scientific experiment: if one did not believe that the universe proceeds according to
knowable rules that are true in all places and times, very little of what scientists do would
make any sense. But it is also a basic fact of our everyday relationship with the empirical
world. We must proceed as though our objects are “solid” and predictable, since it is that
assumption that makes our perceptions understandable.
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This dependability feeds directly into the logical structure of the life/non-life
dichotomy that, as I described in my previous chapter, both Bergson and Lewis in their
own manner adhere to. Though they differ greatly in the specifics, both of them take as
the key indication of mechanical, thoughtless behaviour in human beings actions which
are repeated, stereotyped, and (most importantly) predictable. “Nature follows strict,
unchangeable laws,” we might imagine them saying, “which is why it is possible for
science to study it, but humans are capable of creative, unpredictable behaviour, and so
must possess some vital aspect which sets them apart from the normal, inanimate matter
of the everyday world.” Indeed, the danger of humans falling into such automatic
behaviour was so great that certain processes evolved specifically to prevent it from
happening – as we see Bergson argue in Laughter. It is for this reason that Lewis and
Bergson’s philosophies so emphatically insist on their dualism, since such an argument
demands that one disclaim any continuity between natural physical processes and those
which underlie creative human thought. Their vitalism (or perhaps quasi-vitalism)
demands that we extract consciousness from the logical axioms upon which all empirical
knowledge lies. Or so it would seem. In fact, as should gradually become clear during
this chapter, the possibility of a flat ontology – implied to varying extents by both
mechanist and panpsychist models of consciousness – permits us to excavate from the
metaphysics of science the important epistemological role played by shock, surprise, 164
and discontinuity in the human perception of the physical world, a larger process of
which science is a highly specific (and specialized) case. Shock has long been recognized
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as one of the chief stylistic tools in the work of Virginia Woolf, whose plots often turn to
one extent or another on an epistemic break: the deaths of Jacob, Septimus, Mrs. Ramsay,
and Percival, being but the most well-known such instances.165 Indeed, death in Woolf’s
fiction is almost never expected – though (and this point will be important later) both we
and the novel’s characters can often see in retrospect the chain of events that caused these
“inexplicable” deaths to occur: Evans of Mrs Dalloway and Andrew Ramsay of To the
Lighthouse probably never saw the shells that killed them, but, as with the shells that
struck the battery in Lewis’s painting, or which possibly killed Pullman and Satters, their
paths still followed the normal laws of motion, just like any other object in space.
Objects, likewise, are of great interest in Woolf’s writing – and a subject of a good deal
of criticism.166 This alignment between objects, knowledge, and surprise, as I will
explain below, is in no way an accident, but rather a valuable critical lens, and indeed,
one that proceeds according to strikingly Bergsonian terms, despite the professed dualism
of his philosophy.
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To begin to see how this relationship might work, we might look at an
illuminating passage in Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle. At the beginning of the
text’s second part, Freud remarks on the well-known alignment between psychological
trauma and surprise. “After severe mechanical accidents,” he writes, “railway crashes,
and other life-threatening incidents, there arises a condition that has long been designated
as ‘traumatic neurosis.’ . . . [and] the weightiest element in their causation seem[s] to be
the factor of surprise, of fright.”167 Many pages later, at the end of the sixth part, Freud
writes that:
[W]e should understand clearly that the uncertainty of our
speculation was greatly increased by the need to borrow
from biology. Biology is truly a realm of unlimited
possibilities. We may expect from it the most surprising
revelations, and cannot guess what answers it may provide
in a few decades to the questions we have posed – answers,
perhaps, of such a kind as to blow apart our entire artificial
structure of hypotheses. 168
It is notable that, here, Freud implicitly aligns the onset of trauma with the acquisition of
scientific knowledge by ascribing to them the same mechanism. Surprise – and its
siblings, shock and fright – appears in Beyond as an epistemological-temporal mechanism
that wields a great deal of power. It is a “weighty element” of the onset of psychological
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trauma, but also a force of knowledge, one which both transmits knowledge (“the most
surprising revelations”) and also “blow[s] apart” long-cherished speculations. Following
Derrida’s argument in The Post Card that Beyond the Pleasure Principle does not merely
enact speculation as an argumentative mode, that speculation is not merely “the oblique
object of [Freud’s] writing,” but also “the operation of his writing,” 169 we may see the
significance this power wields. The natural world, when combined with systematic study
(“biology”), ceases to be stable. All speculation trembles at the sound of unpredictability.
If one found a particular piece of cinnabar and saw that it was red, one would not
likely be surprised. But if that cinnabar were to suddenly turn blue or green in one’s
hands then surprise would be (ironically) a highly predictable reaction. Such surprise is a
basically temporal phenomenon: the knowledge that all cinnabar is red, combined with
the assumption that all cinnabar will continue to be red in all future encounters, is an
instance of what Quentin Meillassoux, in After Finitude, calls the “mathematization of
nature,” which designates “the discovery that the world possesses a power of persistence
and permanence that is completely unaffected by our existence or inexistence.” 170 It is in
this matter that one’s experience in the present may be extended, hypothetically, into the
distant past and future. And it is in part due to this process that Meillassoux categorizes
materialism as a speculative philosophy, since materialism in its various forms assumes
that it is possible to extract from our knowledge of the world the fact of our having
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observed it, and to thereby speculate on how that world acts without us.171 The base
assumption of empirical knowledge systems is that what has been encountered in the past
will be encountered in the future so long as the same circumstances are met. To “know,”
then, is to locate oneself psychologically in the past, and to speculate then is to
imaginatively project that knowledge into the future. It is for this reason that (as Freud
recognized in his own speculations) the natural world may always intervene and make a
mess of one’s well-crafted speculations, because the future, unlike the past, is never
given. Surprise – the name we give these interjections – thereby attains its
epistemological power through its status as a temporal phenomenon.
It should be clear to readers of Bergson how this alignment of knowledge and
temporality relates to questions of what constitutes “free will” and “consciousness.” As
Vladimir Jankélévitch describes in his excellent commentary on Bergson, it is a tendency
of those advocating deterministic, mechanist philosophies to become ensnared in an
“illusion of retrospectivity,” where one always acts as though one’s relationship to all
knowledge is oriented towards the past.172 As he writes, “because we place ourselves
after the accomplished perception, it seems to us that recollection should follow it like a
deadened echo. Freedom, mobility, finality thus are absurd or miraculous only out of
season and retrospectivity.” 173 It is for this reason that, as I pointed out in the earlier
chapter, Bergson’s defence of free will derives from and depends upon his particular
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approach to temporality. It is, perhaps, unfortunate that the English translation of his
Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience demoted its highly descriptive (though
dry) French name to a mere subtitle while providing it with the more interesting yet
misleading name of Time and Free Will, thereby giving time the top billing in place of
freedom. But it is precisely Bergson’s argument that one can only get to freedom by
passing through time. The English title enacts this process, but at the cost of obscuring
free will’s paramount importance in this text.
One of Bergson’s main arguments in favour of free will examines a hypothetical
situation in which a person chooses between possible actions X and Y. Ventriloquizing
for the pro- and anti- sides of the determinism argument, Bergson describes the key
aporia of the debate: the person arguing against determinism says that the person
choosing action X could potentially have chosen Y, and so this choice represents an
unpredictable free action. The person arguing for determinism argues that the choice of X
indicates that there were forces involved which forced the choice of X, and so the
possibility of choosing Y retrospectively disappears. From this hypothetical conversation,
Bergson concludes that the example of the binary choice is a poor one, since its
application leaves the terms of the debate mostly unchanged. Instead, Bergson advocates
a third way: “All the difficulty arises from the fact that both parties [in the debate] picture
the deliberation under the form of an oscillation in space, while it really consists in a
dynamic progress in which the self and its motives, like real living beings, are in a
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constant state of becoming.”174 As in the analysis of Zeno’s Paradox in the same text, the
problem of determinism is a product not of any fact of nature but in the way nature is
understood, described, and symbolized.
The important point here is that the determinist position, through this error in
representation, takes the past position and projects it into the future. In the example of the
binary choice, the decision between X and Y has already been made and the argument is
essentially between varying interpretations of how and why it was so. But the larger
determinist claim that if one took stock of all matter in the universe and understood all of
the universe’s physical laws, one could in principle predict all events with perfect
accuracy, is speculative in the same way that Meillassoux says materialism is speculative.
It is, in a sense, an unfulfillable promise. It claims that “if X happened Y will happen,”
though with full knowledge that not only has X (the above mentioned total knowledge of
the universe) never happened, but in all likelihood never will happen. The articulation of
determinism proceeds through a counter-factual, and acts upon a world entirely alien to
its central predictive claim. As we see with Kant, a limited form of this same prediction is
what makes empirical knowledge possible, in that such knowledge is only
comprehensible if it can be projected into the future (so we cannot simply say that the
cinnabar is red, but must also say that it will always be red as well). Yet it is precisely
because our projections are circumscribed by our ignorance that we are always open to
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surprise: the deep and luminescent red of a cinnabar stone can be quite shocking to one
who has never seen it.
One key aspect of this process – and the means by which I will link it back to
Woolf – is the relationship between perceived continuity and perceived discontinuity, and
the role that ignorance plays in mediating between the two. An argument in favour of a
mechanist view of consciousness, in which one’s thought is totally reducible to physical
processes, essentially takes two seemingly discontinuous events (the influences on a brain
and the thoughts that brain produces) and links them (often deterministically) by
presuming that there is an undiscovered causal relation between them of which we are
currently ignorant, and which is too complex to be perceptible in our everyday
interactions. A vitalist view of consciousness, such as the one proposed by Hans Driesch,
argues that the continuity between the two events is as imperfect as our perceptions make
it out to be, and that there is an unobserved vital impulse – such as entelechy or the soul –
which is the real causal agent behind the mind. Both cases involve positing some form of
continuity that lies in place behind the veil, imperceptible at the present time but
knowable in principle. In examining these positions, one may recall the observation that
Baudelaire makes in his essay on “The Painter of Modern Life” regarding “people who,
having once read Bousset and Racine, fancy that they have mastered the history of
literature.”175 To such a reader, the works of these few canonical authors jump out sui
genesis as singular artistic achievements. They would be, in short, surprising. But, says
Baudelaire, if “an impartial student” were to look exhaustively at such a history (whether
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of literature, painting, or some other art), “he would find nothing to shock nor even
surprise him. The transitions would be as elaborately articulated as they are in the animal
kingdom. There would not be a single gap: and thus, not a single surprise.” 176 Both the
mechanist and the vitalist occupy the position of Baudelaire’s naive reader, familiar only
with the canon. Their respective theories are, in effect, ways of stitching together the gap
created by their ignorance: neither actually knows, empirically, that their speculations are
correct. Rather, each posits an invisible bridge between the gaps. While the two
approaches differ greatly in plausibility, one should never lose sight of their commonly
speculative nature.
Whether or not Baudelaire’s argument works as an approach to the history of art,
it characterizes a key epistemological distinction between the ideally understood
“mathematized” nature, in which, in the words of Merleau-Ponty, “there is nothing
lacking,”177 and the world as it is subjectively experienced. It is from this split, in which
dis-continuous experiences are overlaid upon a perfectly continuous world, that shock
becomes possible. It is likewise in this split that surprise gains its epistemological
usefulness, and where ignorance acquires its important mediating function. As Bruno
Latour argues, risk and unexpectedness are key components of any meaningful scientific
research, as it is precisely this unexpectedness that “make[s] the observer sensitive to new
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types of connections.”178 For an experiment to be meaningful, it must be risky, in that
there should be at least a small chance that the results will fly in the face of the
researcher’s expectations. It is in this way that the metaphysical principle that makes
scientific predictions possible – the principle of sufficient reason, which holds that
everything which occurs must have a cause – makes it possible to acquire new
information. While everything in the universe is presumed to be connected through
causal relationships, the vast majority of those relationships are obscure. An experiment
must thus be preceded by some type of speculation, in the form of a prediction. The
experiment is thus risky to the extent that its underlying prediction exceeds in some way
the already-known network of causal relations: it has the potential to work counter to
expectations, and thereby indicate relationships that were hitherto unknown. The
temporality of experimentation is thus remarkably Bergsonian,179 in that its
meaningfulness involves the deterministic causation of the past (which informs the
speculation) butting up against the virtual possibilities of the future. Just as, qua Bergson,
it is only in retrospect that we can say that a given person inevitably chose X instead of
Y, it is likewise only in retrospect that we can say that the results of a famous experiment
could not have been otherwise. It is precisely because the future cannot be predicted –
that the fantasies of determinism remain thwarted – that meaningful experiments are
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possible. Experimentation, and scientific observation generally, is a process by which
researchers use the unexpectedness of the present to mine the experiences of the past:
irregularities in the orbit of Mercury become in retrospect the effects of relativistic
gravity,180 peculiarities in a finch’s beak become in retrospect the effects of natural
selection,181 – such are the fruits of risk.
It is at this point that Woolf re-enters the conversation. While I have spent the
chapter up to this point outlining a number of philosophical concepts seemingly unrelated
to the writing of Virginia Woolf, I have done so largely in service of an analysis of
Woolf’s relationship to shock and surprise, and specifically the ways in which these
experiences take the form of epistemological breaks. While numerous critics have taken
up the question of shock in Woolf’s writing, none so far have examined the role of shock
as a form of knowledge production, nor has Woolf criticism dealt significantly with the
related question of “life” as an epistemic category. And yet the alignment of the two
notions – particularly in the case of Septimus Smith – appears scattered throughout
Woolf’s writings. But perhaps the most overt articulation of this relation appears in her
short autobiography “A Sketch of the Past”:
Perhaps this is the strongest pleasure known to me. It is the
rapture I get when in writing I seem to be discovering what
belongs to what; making a scene come right; making a
scene come together. From this I reach what I might call a
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philosophy; at any rate it is a constant idea of mine; that
behind the cotton wool is hidden a pattern; that we – I mean
all human beings – are connected with this; that the whole
world is a work of art; that we are parts of the work of art . .
. And I see this when I have a shock.182
In this passage we see condensed many of the issues that I have detailed so far,
particularly in Woolf’s belief in a vast web of relationships and connections hidden
behind the “cotton wool” of everyday experience which can be revealed at particular
moments through shock. Though phrased in a more ethereal, possibly mystical,
rhetoric183 (an issue I will return to later), in terms of its epistemology the above passage
is remarkably similar to the model of scientific discovery summarized above. Indeed, as
Claudia Olk has argued, “A Sketch of the Past can be regarded as an experiment in which
fiction records its own processes of rendering the past and analyses them at the same
time.”184 In Woolf, it would seem, the relationship between shock and knowledge could
hardly be closer.
The open question, then, is the importance of panpsychism in this network of
relationships. While it has taken several forms that differ in their specifics, we can
broadly designate with the term “panpsychism” any belief system which attributes “life,”
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“agency,” or “consciousness” (however defined) to entities traditionally believed to be
inanimate. It therefore shares a family resemblance with vitalism, in that both forms of
thought found themselves on models of “life” outside of those provided by mechanism
and/or scientific realism. However, as we saw in the previous chapter, there are several
tensions between the two systems. As Lewis noticed, panpsychism can often take the
form of a flat ontology, in that it posits a continuous relationship between stones and
humans along a scale of “consciousness.”185 Vitalism, meanwhile, posits a caesura
between the living and the dead, and so often aligns itself with some form of dualism.
(Bergson’s notion of elan vital is a peculiar case, and one that I will return to in a
moment.) This emphasis on continuity is in large part what makes panpsychism
interesting as an interpretive tool, particularly with regards to Woolf. Though I will argue
that Woolf’s particular form of panpsychism owes much (though indirectly) to the
theories of Richard Maurice Bucke, whose Cosmic Consciousness was wildly influential
at the turn of the century and which (like Woolf) linked the perception of continuity to a
kind of mystical experience, I would first like to address the recent vogue for varieties of
panpsychism among proponents of Object Oriented Ontology (OOO), several of whom I
draw on in this study.
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Probably the most well-known version of panpsychism to arise recently is Jane
Bennett’s “vital materiality,” which she describes in her 2010 book Vibrant Matter as “a
theory of distributive agency.”186 Borrowing Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the
“assemblage” – which she calls “ad hoc groupings of diverse elements . . . living,
throbbing confederations”187 – Bennett characterizes matter as agential, and pitches her
argument against the tendency to ascribe agency to human actors while denying such
agency to other things. As she writes later in the book, “vital materiality better captures
an ‘alien’ quality of our own flesh, and in so doing reminds humans of the very radical
character of the (factitious) kinship between the human and the non-human.”188 In this
sense, her defence of panpsychism resembles that of Graham Harman, who in his Prince
of Networks argues that “human cognition is just a more complicated variant of relations
already found amidst atoms and stones.”189 Likewise, Steven Shaviro, in his The
Universe of Things, opines that “vital materialism and object-oriented ontology both
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entail some sort of panexperientialism or panpsychism.” 190 While panpsychism has
proven in several circles to be an eminent source of mockery, and while it is my purpose
here to distance my own approach to these issues from Bennett, Harman, and the like, I
argue that its chief conceptual flaws also make it useful in certain cases as a mode of
inquiry. We can see this usefulness in Bennett’s defense of anthropomorphization on
epistemic grounds – arguing that a massively and confoundingly complex artificial
structure such as the North American electrical grid cannot be properly grasped without
ascribing it human characteristics.191 This argument quite tellingly resembles Bergson’s
on the neo-vitalism of his day, that “the ‘vital principle’ may indeed not explain much,
but it is at least a sort of label affixed to our ignorance . . . while mechanism invites us to
ignore that ignorance.”192
It is in the question of ignorance that we see both the flaws and the usefulness of
panpsychism. Bennett is correct that there exist structures of such complexity that no
human mind could ever comprehend them (we should recall here my discussion of
Asimov in the introduction), and Bergson is correct in identifying with this ignorance the
subtle hubris of mechanism. Likewise, in other contexts Harman’s comment on the
contiguity between human consciousness and “atoms and stones” would strike as
boilerplate physicalism – in that both essentially argue that there is a knowable, material
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structure “behind” consciousness which is not ontologically distinct from those processes
found among non-human entities. What distinguishes their approaches – and what puts
them in a similar conceptual ballpark as Woolf – is their emphasis on our ignorance of
these processes rather than their potential knowability. Panpsychism’s key flaw is that it
posits a metaphysical universal to solve an epistemological problem – that being the
relationship between a fully continuous world and our discontinuous understanding of it.
Recognizing a continuum between electro-chemical reactions in the brain and selfconsciousness raises problems that panpsychism does not solve. Replacing this ignorance
with a universal risks stripping these complex relations of their specificity, just like if one
were to treat elephants and E.coli bacteria as the same species simply because they share
a common ancestor. One can recognize this continuity without sacrificing taxonomy or
ignoring an object’s singularity.
In Woolf we see a different relationship. Panpsychism, in her writing, serves not
as a universal but as a mode of knowledge. Surprise, then, emerges as a powerful tool
that may grant life as easily as it takes that life away. In Woolf we see not an opposition
between life and non-life, nor a simple mysticism that treats all matter the same, but a
complex play of animacy and inanimacy193 sprawling across contested fields of ignorance
and of the known.
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2.2 Objective Interventions
Objects should not touch because they are not alive. You
use them, put them back in place, you live among them:
they are useful, nothing more. But they touch me, it is
unbearable. I am as afraid of being in contact with them as
though they were living beasts.
— Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea194

Woolf would have perhaps agreed with Bennett regarding the alienness of the
human body. As she famously writes in her essay “On Being Ill,” “all day, all night the
body intervenes.”195 While scholars have often cited this line to argue that Woolf’s
writing dismantles mind/body dualism,196 the use of the word “intervenes” strikes an odd
pose. What is the nature of this intervention? And what does the body intervene upon?
An earlier passage gives some indication: “what waste and defects of the soul a slight
attack of influenza brings to view, what precipices and lawns sprinkled with bright
flowers a little rise in temperature reveals, what ancient and obdurate oaks are uprooted
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in us by the act of sickness.”197 Such effects are clearly involuntary, and the fact that
Woolf extrapolates these processes to an intervening “body” rather than a pathogen
indicates that this text does not produce a simple dismantling of the mind/body split. The
body, in that it intervenes, acts distinctly from the mind – in a manner that might
resemble agency. Likewise, this intervention is aggressive, taking no care or mind to
anything else. The body simply acts, and simply is.
But what does the body intervene upon? A simple dualism will not work here,
since it is specifically the body and not the mind which is described in these terms, and
which is given agency. A clue here can be found in the earlier passage, in which
influenza “brings to view” the nature of the soul and a high temperature “reveals” the
beauty of a flowered lawn. The body’s intervention, for Woolf, is a supplier of new
knowledge: its effects are not merely pathological, but also epistemological. This
intervention, then, resembles the disruptive effects of “biology” Freud remarked upon,
and also the revelatory effects of a “moment of being,” which this essay clearly
prefigures. That the body can intervene upon consciousness indicates that the two are not
ontologically distinct. Yet the complexity of the relationship is such that they appear to
be discontinuous, if not completely autonomous. It is this discontinuity that diseases
bring to view: calling forth in their complexity the appearance of an agency other than
one’s own. The etiology of a particular instance of a disease is often complex, and
perhaps knowable only to a small level of detail – in retrospect, after one has already
experienced symptoms. As such, at the onset of an illness one encounters an entity that is

197

Woolf, “On Being Ill,” 4:193.

79

both alive and dead, one located at the annex of the predictable past and the mysterious
future.
This split manifests in Woolf’s fiction from a very early stage. “On Being Ill” is a
text from roughly the middle of Woolf’s career, first appearing in The Criterion in 1926.
But we see the odd collusion of life and non-life (not the engulfing of one into the other,
but an inability to settle once and for all on the distinction) as early as Woolf’s 1917 short
story “The Mark on the Wall.” Indeed, “The Mark on the Wall” is one of several Woolf
texts that ought to have earned greater attention by now from OOO philosophers (with
the “Time Passes” section of To the Lighthouse being another obvious case). The story,
one of Woolf’s first experiments with stream of consciousness writing, describes in detail
the thoughts of its protagonists as she stares at a mark on her wall of unknown origin,
coloured “black upon white.”198 Staring at the mark, refusing to get up to look at it more
closely, the protagonist follows a complex chain of thoughts, speculations, and flights of
fancy, some related closely to the mark and its hidden nature and some quite distant from
the question at hand, until her husband walks in and says that the mark is a snail, ending
the flow of thoughts. At first glance, the story seems to establish a firm distinction
between life and non-life along the lines Bennett criticized, in which the inanimate object
is acted upon by human agency (here in the form of the narrator’s consciousness) while
the living thing is able to resist this agency, breaking the train of thoughts and attaining
an independent existence. But we have already seen from “On Being Ill” that we ought to
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be suspicious of such clear distinctions in Woolf’s writing, and close attention to the
story shows Woolf’s disruption of this dichotomy along epistemological lines – in favour
of a more ambiguous, unsettled relation to the perception of life.
The story observes an odd parallelism between its beginning and its end. The
revelation that the mark is a snail, though of crucial importance to the plot, occurs as an
off the cuff remark from the narrator’s husband, whose dialogue is worth examining in
detail: “it’s no good buying newspapers. . . . Nothing ever happens. Curse this war; God
damn this war! . . . All the same, I don’t see why we should have a snail on our wall.”199
This passage seems to prefigure what Woolf would later write in A Room of One’s Own
while commenting on the irrational anger of upper class men, who “with the exception of
the fog . . . [seem] to control everything.”200 Or, as William Johnsen paraphrases, “why
are men angry . . . if they control everything except the weather?”201 The war, like the
weather, refuses to bend to the man’s influence, refuses to change itself and respond to
his agency (and already we can see how easily natural forces and human creations blend
together at the level of perception). To say that “nothing ever happens” – whether in
regards to the First World War or in general – is patently untrue, for the unchanging
trench lines conceal constant, frenzied activity and a tremendous human cost, while the
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narrator sitting in her chair conceals a rich and complex mental life. And likewise does
the “mark” conceal an entity of far greater complexity than any hole or stain.
That the revelation that the mark is a snail amounts to an “intervention” in the
sense outlined above ought to be clear, since it clearly disrupts the ongoing chain of
thoughts in the narrator’s head and restricts her ability to exercise her interpretive agency
upon the mark. That this intervention – this shock – likewise involves the overlay of
discontinuous knowledge upon a continuous reality should also be clear: the narrator’s
speculations on the mark’s nature and origin depend on her ignorance of the snail (there
are, in fact, several times throughout the story where she considers getting up to take a
closer look, but decides not to). She is not only ignorant of the snail’s existence but – as a
necessary corollary to this ignorance – does not see it clearly or completely. Given that
she seems to perceive the mark, in a manner similar to the narrator of “Solid Objects,” as
a homogenous blob, lacking the fine details of a snail’s shell and body, her perception
must be very limited. Finally, the husband’s own intervention, in addition to being
phrased as a statement of ignorance (“I don’t see why we should have a snail on our
wall”) is prompted by his own troubled, discontinuous perception of the War. The story,
then, is built on layers of ignorant discontinuous experience, as we see quite clearly at its
end.
But as I said earlier, the ending itself mirrors the beginning. And we can see how
so by examining the moment when the narrator first notices the mark:
[F]or I remember that I was smoking a cigarette when I
looked up and saw the mark on the wall for the first time. I
looked up through the smoke of my cigarette and my eye
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lodged for a moment upon the burning coals, and that old
fancy of the crimson flag flapping from the castle tower
came into my mind, and I thought of the cavalcade of red
knights riding up the side of the black rock. Rather to my
relief the sight of the mark interrupted the fancy. 202
Though the sight of the mark began the particular chain of associations recorded in the
story, that chain was itself an interruption of an earlier line of thought begun when the
narrator looked at some hot coals. Furthermore, this sight of the mark does not merely
interrupt the previous thoughts, but does so involuntarily. It is “to [her] relief” that the
mark brings an end to the thoughts occasioned by the coals – as though she were unable
to bring about such an interruption herself, as though her agency does not extend to her
own stream of consciousness. The partial autonomy of body and mind are, as noted,
implied by the later “On Being Ill,” and Bennett’s “vital materialism” represents a serious
attempt at theorizing this autonomy. But in this early Woolf story we see an attempt at
understanding the implications of living in a world of continuities that one can never fully
perceive. When the narrator complains of “how very little control of our possessions we
have,” before listing all the myriad items – bird cages, book binding tools, a coal-scuttle,
a hand organ – that she has lost over the years,203 all of which have seemingly vanished
from existence, we see a trace of the blurred distinction between animacy and inanimacy
created by discontinuous perception.
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It is in this way that we can start to see the close affinity between Woolf’s
“moments of being” and Bergson’s critique of Zeno. As Bergson has it, in Time and Free
Will, the chief error underlying Zeno’s paradoxes is their attitude to representation.
Duration, says Bergson, is homogenous and continuous, lacking completely the discrete
instances within which an arrow might be frozen in the air, or in which Achilles may stop
mid-stride. But our representation and description of movement and of time, and our
fixing to these specific and discrete quantities, creates the illusion that time itself passes
in jumps, with each moment severed from the rest. Thus, we can easily imagine a
footrace broken down into indefinitely smaller portions, an infinity of space contained in
even the tiniest gaps, and might then conclude from our imaginings (as the Eleatics did)
that movement is impossible. This position would hold that space and time are essentially
discontinuous, and that the appearance of continuity (say in the straight line of an arrow’s
flight) is an illusion of perception. Bergson’s position is precisely the opposite:
continuity, for him, is fundamental, and it is in our manner of perceiving and representing
the world that divisions appear.
What Woolf does is take this notion of hidden continuity and extend it to the
larger web of causal relationships linking everything to everything else. Just as in the
case of Zeno these connections are hidden from perception – yet, as we see in “The Mark
on the Wall” they have the power to create interventions or shocks which can then make
one at least somewhat aware of the larger network hidden just out of view. How exactly
one interprets these shocks, though, remains an important question, for the inanimate
world has long been denied the capacity for change, its perfect continuity taken as a form
of perfect stasis. Thus, unexpected or apparently autonomous activity on the part of
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inanimate matter – the result of precisely the problems of perception and representation
that lie at the root of Zeno’s paradoxes – become coded as “alive” of “agential,” since it
is precisely those who have life and agency that are supposed to act unexpectedly.
Woolf’s encounter with the snail shows her, from very early in her career, attacking the
simple divisions upon which these assumptions rest.

2.3 The Cosmic Mind of Septimus Smith
Whither, then, panpsychism? In Woolf, it finds its most clear embodiment in Septimus
Smith. The First World War veteran, usually read as suffering from shell shock, has
recently returned to London after living and marrying in Italy. As he travels through the
city, he experiences a number of revelations on the nature of reality, such as:
[L]eaves were alive; trees were alive. And the leaves were
being connected by millions of fibres with his own body . .
. when the branch stretched he, too, made that statement . . .
Sounds made harmonies with premeditation; the spaces
between them were as significant as the sounds. A child
cried. Rightly far away a horn sounded. All taken together
the birth of a new religion.204
While it is indeed true that trees, being plants, are alive, Septimus appears to have given
the term a greater significance – the tree is not merely a self-replicating organism, but an
agential being capable of affecting those around it much like a person could. This
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capacity also is not restricted to plants and animals, but apparently includes “inanimate”
objects like horns. Indeed, in an earlier passage Septimus also ascribes life-like qualities
to an engine, which “sounded like a pulse irregularly drumming through an entire body”
(D 12-13).
This vision of life embedded in the connectedness of all things – one that, for
Septimus, is explicitly religious – seems out of place in a character so frequently read as a
classic sufferer of war trauma. The description of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in the
DSM-V does not list messianism or mystical experience as a symptom of psychological
trauma. And earlier accounts of war trauma likewise fail to mention the traumatized
soldiers who wanted to go off and found religions.205 (While there is some similarity
between what Septimus experiences and Freud’s analysis of Schreber, the key element of
wartime trauma is absent.) Septimus’s tentative panpsychism, and its growth out of
religious experience, simply does not fit with any model of psychological trauma,
whether contemporary with Woolf or not. Yet we can see traces of this diagnosis in much
of the criticism concerning this character. Several scholars, for example, have identified
Septimus as closed off and isolationist,206 and indeed such behaviour would not be
uncommon among sufferers of trauma. But Septimus is quite clearly and emphatically
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not mentally closed off from the rest of the world. From his perspective, he is more
connected to the world around him than he has been at any other point in his life – with
sounds and sights and the sway of branches all showing him how connected he is to a
continuous world. What disguises this connectedness is its refusal of anthropocentrism.
For certainly Septimus has been neglectful to Rezia and has done little or nothing to
integrate with London society. His “new religion” seems to define no hierarchy between
the acts of people and the acts of horns and trees. Thus, his openness, precisely because it
is so extensive, is easily mistaken for solitude – or even solipsism.
But where Septimus sees himself in continuity with all things, we find ourselves
stumbling over a split: if Septimus’s visions are not just another symptom of his shell
shock, where did they come from? I propose that a possible model for Septimus’s visions
is the philosophy of Richard Maurice Bucke, a Canadian “alienist,” mystic, and doctor,
whose 1901 Cosmic Consciousness proved highly popular among European intellectuals.
Though recent studies of the history of panpsychism habitually neglect him,207 Bucke’s
work found an influential reader in William James, who in The Varieties of Religious
Experience, quotes and summarizes Bucke extensively, calling his book “a highly

207

A short list of recent studies of panpsychism that fail to mention Bucke: D.S. Clarke, Panpsychism and

the Religious Attitude (New York: State University of New York Press, 2003); David Skrbina,
Panpsychism in the West (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005); David Skrbina, ed., Mind that Abides:
Panpsychism in the New Millennium (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2009) – the last
being a collection of essays by several authors.

87

interesting volume.”208 The Russian philosopher and theologian P.D. Ouspensky – whose
lectures in London were attended by the likes of T. S. Eliot and Aldous Huxley, 209 and
whose work influenced a number of people in Woolf’s orbit210 – likewise dedicates the
twenty third chapter of his Tertium Organum to a discussion of Bucke’s ideas. Bucke’s
popularity around the turn of the century ought to, on its own, be enough to justify using
his ideas as a lens through which to examine Woolf: in much the same way that critics
continue to produce psychoanalytic readings of Woolf’s novels even though she claims
never to have read Freud before 1939,211 the similarity between the ideas and the sheer
likeliness that Woolf encountered them in some second-hand form in her time as a highly
active intellectual and woman-of-letters212 means that the usefulness of these ideas to
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Woolf critics is undeniable. There is also, on top of all this, at least one documented
instance of Woolf encountering a description of Bucke and his writing.
In 1918, writing for the Times Literary Supplement, Woolf reviewed Visits to
Walt Whitman, a sort of biography-cum-travel narrative by J. Johnston and J.W. Wallace
– two Englishmen who visited Whitman frequently in the 1890s. 213 Bucke, who
published an authorized biography of Whitman in 1883 and was a great admirer of his
poetry, appears frequently in Visits, particularly in the section written by Wallace.
Cosmic Consciousness itself is mentioned very early in the account,214 and is
sporadically alluded to throughout. Likewise, mystical experiences and the sensations of
universal connectedness occur at several instances in the book, such as when Wallace
experiences “a most vivid consciousness of the presence with us of my mother, who died
six and a half years before” while observing Bucke.215 It is this mysticism and sense of
connectedness that Woolf picked up on in her review, which frequently emphasizes
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Whitman’s own egalitarianism. Furthermore, the review’s final line, in which Woolf says
that “although the authors of this book lament that they have only a trivial bunch of
sayings to offer us, we are left with a sense of an ‘immense background or vista,’” 216
strikes many of the same notes as Woolf’s writing in “A Sketch of the Past.” While it is
impossible to show whether or not Woolf actually read Cosmic Consciousness, reading
Visits to Walt Whitman would have put her in contact with both Bucke himself and the
basic notions of his philosophy. Woolf’s review, furthermore, demonstrates that she not
only registered these ideas, but also incorporated them into her own thinking.
But this all still leaves open the question as to what Bucke can tell us about
Woolf’s incorporation of panpsychism into her work, and answering this question will
require a brief summary of Bucke’s key ideas. As Bucke argues, forms of consciousness
evolve and propagate through a species progressively over time – beginning with “simple
consciousness,” or the mere awareness of one’s own physical body and presence in the
world (an attribute Bucke ascribes to “the upper half of the animal kingdom” 217).
Following simple consciousness is “self-consciousness,” in which one attains the
capacity of meta-cognition: “the animal is . . . immersed in his consciousness as a fish in
the sea; he cannot, even in imagination, get outside of it . . . But man by virtue of self
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consciousness [sic] can step aside, as it were, from himself.”218 The process by which a
species transitions from one type of consciousness very loosely resembles Darwinian
evolution.219 As Bucke describes, as humans were first gaining self-consciousness it
“appeared at first in mid-life, here and there, in isolated cases, in the most advances
specimens of the race, becoming more and more nearly universal . . . manifesting itself at
an earlier and earlier age.”220 Having fully grown into self-consciousness, humanity, says
Bucke, is currently in the process of evolving into cosmic consciousness, or an awareness
of the presence of mind that manifests on a universal scale. The “manifestation” of a new
kind of consciousness takes the form of an intense mystical experience, where “the
person, suddenly, without warning, has a sense of being immersed in a flame, or rosecolored cloud” yet “at the same instant he is, as it were, bathed in an emotion of joy,
assurance, triumph, ‘salvation.’”221 Finally, once the experience is complete, “he does
not come to believe merely; but sees and knows that the cosmos, which to the self
conscious [sic] mind seems made up of dead matter, is in fact far otherwise – it is in very
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truth a living presence.”222 What Bucke provides, then, is not merely an articulation of
some form of panpsychic philosophy or attitude, but also a mechanism by which such an
attitude is achieved – mystical experience.
It is thus useful to compare the way expressions of panpsychism are framed in
Mrs Dalloway to that of “The Mark on the Wall,” the latter which was published prior to
Woolf’s review of Visits. “The Mark on the Wall,” as befitting a stream of consciousness
narrative, begins abruptly, in the middle of the narrator’s thought process, just as she is
moving her attention from one object to another. That she jumps so readily from the coals
to the mark indicates that this is a fairly normal part of her thinking, that she regularly
fixes on seemingly inanimate objects, and that an awareness of their latent independence
is a normal part of her internal life. We receive no real analysis of how she came to think
this way: it is as if the story had begun with an ellipsis, or with a fade-in (as Beckett does
in Not I). But Septimus’s panpsychism is much more etiologically grounded. While the
specifics are obscure, it is clear that his new awareness of the world stems from his
experiences during the war – there exists a clear beginning. Indeed, Septimus’s own
speculations lead to a deeper (and very Bucke-like) understanding of how his awareness
came about. “It was the heatwave presumably,” he thinks to himself, “operating upon a
brain made sensitive by eons of evolution” (D 58). Furthermore, his newfound
consciousness has endowed him with a sense of purpose: to tell the Prime Minister his
newfound revelations (D 57) and then found a new religion. The development of Woolf’s
engagement with panpsychic ideas follows a process surprisingly similar to the jump
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from simple to self-consciousness that Bucke describes – proceeding from a depiction
which only shows that this awareness exists to one which also provides an image of how
and why it came to be, and which gives a gives a notion of what its possessor was like
prior to the initial shock.223 It is quite important, then, that Woolf locates the origin of
Septimus’s visions in a mystical experience, if only because not doing so might mean
denying them any origin at all.
The religiosity of Bucke’s theory, reflected in Septimus, is demonstrated by his
catalogue of “instances of cosmic consciousness” in the books fourth part (as well as his
list “imperfect” and “doubtful” cases in part five), which includes several religious
figures (the Buddha, Jesus, Mohamed) as well as several writers whose work deeply
engaged with theology (Dante, Blake, Emerson). The pattern, as Bucke describes it,
usually involves a deeply sensitive, intelligent person who has undertaken an extensive
period of study and reflection. In the early stages of a new stage of consciousness – prior
to its widespread adoption, when those who attain it often appear as prophets and
geniuses – it is only from this highly fertile psychological ground that a new
consciousness can spring. This type of origin story is easily adapted to the biographies of
various religious figures, with the Buddha’s years of meditation and asceticism prior to
attaining enlightenment being perhaps the paradigmatic example. But, as a result, cosmic
consciousness cannot be said to belong to any particular religion, and instead can be
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thought of as a meta-religion – a grand unified theory of mystical experience, in the face
of which “all religions known and named to-day will be melted down.”224 As Bucke
writes, “the better known members of this group [i.e. people with cosmic consciousness] .
. . have created all the great modern religions, beginning with Taoism and Budhism . . .
[and] have produced the few books which have inspired the larger number of all that have
been written in modern times.”225 As such, Bucke’s philosophy at once embraces
religiosity and corrodes the claims of established faiths.
This approach allows Bucke to include people like Whitman on his list – those
who do not unproblematically fit the label of “religious leader,” but who nevertheless
expressed cosmic consciousness. It likewise helps Woolf incorporate mysticism into her
work given her own lack of belief. Furthermore, garbing Septimus as a prophet raises him
to a high level of epistemological prominence. This would not be a common way to read
Septimus – as Christine Froula has remarked, “that [Septimus] is mad would seem
indisputable; even sympathetic discussions cast him as a war victim and not a
prophet.”226 But we need not make this choice. To oppose the “Septimus the prophet” to
“Septimus the mad” implies that mental illness cannot function as a seat of knowledge.
But taking such a position with regard to Woolf would be contradictory, given that her
“moments of being,” though more lucidly described and lacking the overt panpsychism,
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follow the logic of Septimus’s experience. The repetition we first saw in Freud – where
surprise appears at first as a source of mental illness before appearing again (the return of
the repressed!) as a source of knowledge – Woolf here uses to her advantage, conflating
the two effects in a single character. When we encounter Septimus imagining himself
“alone, called forth in advance of the mass of men to hear the truth” (D 57), we must in
part recognize that Septimus’s supposedly “mad” truth appears in different guises
throughout Woolf’s body of work. Why should we dismiss it as “madness” here if not
elsewhere too?
The most important of these similarities is of course between Septimus and
Clarissa. Though Clarissa Dalloway does indeed believe in a philosophy of
“connectedness” which resembles what we find in “A Sketch of the Past,” it does not at
first glance seem obviously related to Bucke’s philosophy, and perhaps one might be
tempted to read Clarissa’s as the “sane” versions of Septimus’s ideas. Yet important
similarities remain, the key one here being her thoughts at the party, after hearing about
the suicide, where she thinks about the
Odd affinities she had with people she had never spoken to,
some woman on the street, some man behind a counter –
even trees, or barns. It ended in a transcendental theory
which, with her horror of death, allowed her to believe . . . .
that since our apparitions, the part of us which appears, are
so momentary compared with . . . the unseen part of us,
which spreads wide, the unseen might survive, be
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recovered somehow attached to this person or that (D 129130 my emphasis).
Clarissa’s “affinities,” like Septimus’s visions, extend beyond the human and include
both plants and non-living things. Likewise, she sees people as divided between their
“apparitions” and some sort of “wide,” “unseen” aspect – which if the structure and
content of Mrs Dalloway is any indication, amounts to the vast network of observations
and relationships one participates in simply as a matter of being alive. The belief that
these connections allow one an existence after death is quintessentially Buckeian. As he
writes early in his book, with cosmic consciousness comes “what may be called a sense
of immortality . . . not a conviction that he [i.e. the cosmically conscious] shall have this,
but the consciousness that he has it already.” 227 What we encounter with Clarissa, then, is
very like what we encounter through Septimus: a form of panpsychism following, in a
very general way, the terms Bucke outlined in Cosmic Consciousness. In both cases, the
characters’ ideas become in large part heuristics for managing their encounter with
continuities – of physical laws, of social interaction, of people watching a plane write in
the sky – which they are aware of but cannot fully perceive or understand. The shocks
and surprises that result from this incomplete knowledge thereby take on, to them, the
appearance of life, and so it is in the terms of life and living things that the characters
understand their vibrant, discontinuous world.
It is in this light that we ought to read the final moments of Septimus’s life, before
his suicide. As Dr. Holmes runs up the stairs to see him, prompting Septimus to cast out
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for a way to kill himself, his thoughts turn to at once to the objects scattered around his
room – the bread knife he decides not to “spoil” with his blood, the gas fire that would
take too long to asphyxiate him, the razor blades that Rezia has already packed (D 126),
all of which seem to exert upon him some form of agency, guiding his attention from
point to point towards the window. We see a similar moment just before Septimus jumps:
“Life was good. The sun hot. Only human beings? Coming down the staircase opposite
an old man stopped and stared at him. Holmes was at the door. ‘I’ll give it you!’ he cried,
and flung himself” (D 127). The vagueness of Septimus’s final call, and in particular the
undefined object of the “you,” points to a conflation of the human and the not. While the
meaning of Septimus’s final words has been much debated, there has always been an
underlying assumption that the “you” refers to some kind of person – a tenuous
assumption given the extent to which Septimus devotes his final thoughts to the objects
lying about the room. If one were to ask what gift he is giving, one could do much worse
than to say that it is the “you” – a gift of subjectivity to the “life” he finds so beautiful, a
class not limited to “only human beings.” But while we might be privy to Septimus’s
final thoughts, and so have some hope of reconstructing his decision, Rezia and Holmes
do not. And so his final actions can only seem, to them, an act of madness, the care with
which he acted smothered by the “cotton wool.”

2.4 Agency and the Gaps of To the Lighthouse
Someone possessing seemingly no problems with hidden continuities is Mr. Ramsay of
To the Lighthouse, at least insofar as we can see from his actions in the novel’s first part.
It is notable that this novel begins with an argument about the weather, given that the
earth’s climate is one of the most complex systems that humans have regular, imminent
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contact with. Indeed, the split between the “climate” – the global, long-term fluctuations
of the planet’s atmosphere – and “weather” – the short-term, localized manifestation of
climate effects – fits quite well into the division I discussed earlier between the
discontinuous information gained through perception (weather) and the complex
continuity that lies behind it (climate).228 That the conversation hinges not merely on the
weather, but the prediction of the weather, is also notable, not only because of the novel’s
general thematic concern with prediction (especially in the first section) but also because
of what prediction means, in practical terms, when dealing with entities as grand and
complex as climate patterns. What the weather is like at a particular time and in a
particular place is the singular result of a complex network of relationships, the vast
majority of which will be obscure to the average person, getting caught in the rain on the
way home simply because of a lack of omniscience. A particular event is only
predictable, after all, if one has comprehensive knowledge of its predicates: I can predict
with certainty that a stone I drop will fall to the ground because I know that it is bound by
the earth’s gravity and because I know that there are no obstacles or impediments in its
way; if I drop the stone only for it to be caught by someone else before it hits the ground,
then my prediction failed because my knowledge was incomplete (I didn’t see the person
hiding behind me, waiting for a chance to spoil things). None of the Ramsays possess
anything close to comprehensive knowledge of their local weather conditions, so it would
be absurd for them to express absolute confidence in their predictions – at the very least,
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a tentative statement like Mrs. Ramsay’s “it may be fine”229 would be more appropriate.
And yet Mr. Ramsay’s prediction is unequivocal: the rain will come. Frustratingly, he
ends up being correct.
The argument about the weather in To the Lighthouse ought to remind us of
Woolf’s criticism in A Room of One’s Own of the furious man, blind to his own power,
whose agency yet fails to extend to nature itself. It should also recall a prediction made
by Terence, of Woolf’s The Voyage Out, just after the death of his beloved Rachel: “look
at the moon. There’s a halo round the moon. We shall have rain to-morrow.”230 And that
evening, the rain does indeed arrive.231 In both of these cases, Woolf identifies the
weather with a domain outside of a particular man’s control. To see how this works
regarding Terence, we can compare his actions to what Woolf says later in the same
passage of A Room, where she diagnoses the anger of misogynist men: “is anger, I
wondered, somehow, the familiar, the attendant sprite on power? Rich people, for
example, are often angry because they suspect that the poor want to seize their wealth. . .
. Possibly when the professor insisted a little too emphatically upon the inferiority of
women, he was concerned not with their inferiority, but with his own superiority.” 232 The
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exertion of power and certainty, then, becomes a way of supplementing a perceived
personal weakness. Terence, then, upon encountering his own limitations through his
inability to save Rachel, casts about for some other external entity that he can act upon.
Spotting the “halo” around the moon, he latches on to it and makes a prediction, and is
fortuitous enough to see that prediction come true.
What then is Mr. Ramsay insecure about? The clear answer seems to be his own
philosophical development, which seems to have stalled out. Having secluded himself
from his family, Mr. Ramsay begins to think about his progress as a philosopher.
Tellingly, the harsh assessment of his own intellectual limitations begins with his claim to
have “a splendid mind” (TTL 37). “If thought,” he thinks, “. . . like the alphabet is ranged
in twenty-six letters all in order, then his splendid mind had no difficulty in running over
those letters one by one . . . until it had reached, say, the letter Q. He reached Q. Very few
people in the whole of England ever reach Q” (TTL 37). But at Q he remains stuck. As he
struggles to reach the next letter, R, he finds that he has run up permanently against his
limits. This is a problem not merely of intellectual pride, but also for his self-image as the
family’s patriarch. As his thoughts transition from reaching Q to searching for R, Mr.
Ramsay briefly glimpses his family through a window: “he perceived, his wife and son,
together . . . They needed his protection; he gave it to them” (TTL 37). Because he is a
philosophy professor, his ability to think, and to develop new concepts, is central to his
self-identified role as “protector.” Thus, when later Mr. Ramsay cedes defeat to R, and
hears “in that flash of darkness . . . people saying – he was a failure – that R was beyond
him” (TTL 37), we can begin to see the immense emotional toll that his intellectual
stagnation has put on him.
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Mr. Ramsay responds to this stagnation with, not merely a prediction, but one he
declares repeatedly, chauvinistically, until he is sure that James’s dream of seeing the
lighthouse has been completely abandoned. As Patrick Whiteley observes, “although
[Mr. Ramsay’s] predictions turn out to be right, his reactions . . . have an intensity
disproportionate to the issue at hand, which encourages us to suspect an underlying
emotional need that he will not acknowledge.” 233 And we can determine what these
needs might be by returning to the structure of his alphabet metaphor for the process of
thought. It is a clear example of what Bergson identified as the spatialization of thought,
where thought processes are described in terms of physical objects or sequences,
allowing them to be lined up in a row and quantified. As he writes, “as soon as we try to
give an account of a conscious state . . . this state, which is above all personal, will be
resolved into impersonal elements external to one another, each of which calls up a genus
and is expressed by a word.” 234 This is the mistake we make if we believe, like Zeno did,
in a motionless Achilles, forever trapped by the infinite number of discrete points that lie
between any two locations. As Bergson has it, Zeno’s paradox fails to take into account
the difference between an object passing through successive locations in space and the
synthesis between those locations. The mind perceiving motion performs a kind of
mathematical integration, stringing together the points through which the object passes to
form a line. That, according to Bergson, is what the perception of motion is, and as a
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process that occurs entirely within consciousness it is indivisible. But in representing this
perception, we invariably treat it as though it occurs in physical space, which then renders
it subject to space’s divisibility.
In conceiving of his progress as a philosopher in terms of the alphabet, Mr.
Ramsay might well be playing Zeno to his own thought – convincing himself of his own
immobility by improperly applying spatial concepts to conscious states. He fails as a
philosopher, then, because he has been robbed of his ability to synthesize, to integrate his
discrete points of thought into a continuity. Reeling with a sense of failure, Mr. Ramsay
looks outwards for something to synthesize, and comes upon the weather. His prediction
that it will not permit a trip to the lighthouse depends on very little information –
Tansley’s observation that the wind is blowing in the wrong direction (TTL 9) and also a
falling barometer (TTL 35) being some of the only meteorological data reported to us.
Mr. Ramsay is working with very little information, a few choice local observations
made without any knowledge of the broader weather conditions at play, but he
synthesizes these points into a definite conclusion. He has, essentially, made his earlier
mistake in reverse, taking processes occurring in space (which can be divided into
discrete points) and synthesizing them as easily as if they were the products of his
consciousness: having lost a sense of continuity in his own thoughts, Mr. Ramsay went
out looking for continuity in the natural world, and then tricked himself into thinking that
he had found it.
That Mr. Ramsay would find solace for the limitations of his thinking in his
ability to predict the natural world is quite ironic, given that it flies in the face of his own
philosophy. We do not get much specific information regarding his thought, much less
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any particular concepts he has developed or arguments he has made. But it is possible to
glean the broad strokes. When Lily Briscoe thinks about Mr. Ramsay, she remembers
Andrew saying that the work has to do with “subject and object and the nature of reality,”
and he asks her to think “of a kitchen table . . . when you’re not there” (TTL 26). This
passage, at the very least, defines Mr. Ramsay as some kind of philosophical realist.
Furthermore, his attentiveness to the table “when you’re not there” sounds almost like a
summary of object oriented ontology, at least insofar as in indicates an interest in
physical objects as they exist independently of perception. In any case, it is a basic
assumption of realism that objects have an existence outside of human perception – that
they act and are acted upon in myriad ways that our senses simply fail to account for.
That knowledge alone ought to make Mr. Ramsay more careful with bandying about
predictions. But he has instead confused the continuity of the natural world with his
discontinuous perception of it. He therefore makes his predictions with a completely
unwarranted level of confidence.
And he is not the only one to do so – in fact, “The Window” is absolutely full of
predictions, most of which turn out to be not nearly so successful as Mr. Ramsay’s
weather forecast. “Andrew,” thinks Mr. Ramsay, “would be a better man than he had
been. Prue would be a beauty, her mother said” (TTL 72) (in fact, neither character
survives “Time Passes”). Elsewhere, Tansley predicts that “James will have to write his
dissertation one of these days” (TTL 35), and who could forget Mr. Ramsay’s prediction
that “the very stone one kicks with one’s book will outlast Shakespeare” – which he
immediately follows up with another: “his own little light would shine, not very brightly,
for a year or two, and would then be merged in some bigger light, and that in a bigger
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still” (TTL 39). On the very first page we are told that James Ramsay “belong[s] . . . to
that great clan which cannot keep this feeling separate from that, but must let future
prospects, with their joys and sorrows, cloud what is actually at hand” (TTL 7), and it
would seem that this “clan” includes most of the book’s principle characters. All
throughout “The Window” we see people making and arguing about predictions, and the
predictions are often quite confident, often quite certain. Mrs. Ramsay’s hedging and
qualification when suggesting that James might be able to visit the lighthouse is an
exceptional case: most of the time the declarations come closer to those of Mr. Ramsay –
“It will rain.”
It is in this way that we can begin to see the importance of “Time Passes” in the
structure of To the Lighthouse.” Often neglected in criticism of the novel,235 “Time
Passes” here appears as an antidote to the certainty of the previous section. “We must
wait,” says Mr. Banks in the section’s opening line, “for the future to show” (TTL 129),
and in its own austere fashion the section enacts this showing. “Time Passes” is an
exploration of what goes on “behind” human experience – the vast array of non-human
events and actions so often hidden from view, though occasionally peeking in as
“moments of being” or dalliances with panpsychism. The section brings us back to the
distinction I discussed at the beginning of the chapter between characterizations of nature
as unchanging and predictable and characterizations which hold nature to be
unpredictable and surprising, with these surprises functioning as sources of knowledge.
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The repeated shocks that the Ramsay family suffer through the ten years the section
covers – including the deaths of Mrs. Ramsay, Andrew, and Prue – amount to an
intervening of the wider world upon the characters. Their predictions, it turns out, were
based on too little information, far beyond their vision lay forces of war and disease that
robbed them of their futures.
The structure of this section enacts this discontinuity in a number of ways, with
the most notable being the seeming inexplicability of the parenthetical asides. For
example, in one we go from a description of the onset of spring to, suddenly, the
marriage of Prue Ramsay (TTL 135). We are not told who the husband is, nor how they
met, or anything about what the two are like together, and it is only a page later that we
are told that Prue had died in childbirth. That there is so little information, and that this
information comes to us in the form of interruptions in the primary narrative, emphasizes
the fact that, though the Ramsays have left the narrative eye, their lives are continuing
beyond our gaze. Ten years pass between “The Window” and “The Lighthouse,” and the
characters live every moment of those years without close narratological observation. So
then no wonder all manner of strange discontinuities occur – characters turning up
suddenly dead or married without so much as a warning. But the process also functions in
reverse, in that reading “Time Passes” allows us to encounter the continuous changes and
events that occur inside the empty house which, to the returning Ramsays of part three,
are invisible.
The world without the Ramsays is one of constant motion and change. As the
narrator describes in the third part of “Time Passes”: “the nights now are full of wind and
destruction; the trees plunge and bend and their leaves fly helter skelter until the lawn is
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plastered with them and they lie packed in gutters and choke rain-pipes and scatter damp
paths” (TTL 132). This passage, full of frenzied activity, is notable also for how it
ascribes grammatical agency. “The trees plunge” – they act, insofar as the grammar is
concerned, under their own agency. Though we might infer that the plunging, bending
trees are being acted upon by the “wind and destruction” of the previous clause, this
connection occurs only at the level of implication. Next the leaves, which “fly helter
skelter,” again seemingly under their own motivation, bring us to the first passive verb
with “the lawn is plastered with them.” This passivity simply emphasizes the active
quality of the leaves, which clog gutters and pipes and spread seemingly everywhere. The
passivity of the lawn effectively gives the leaves an object upon which to intervene.
This intervention is still, of course, motivated by the wind from the beginning of
the sentence. But by separating the cause from its effects with a semicolon, Woolf enacts
the same kind of discontinuities that give the appearance of agency to inanimate objects.
The active voice, here, hides information, occluding the events behind the bending tree
and flying leaves so to make these objects appear agential. We see the reverse occur near
the end of the section, when the repairs on the house are nearly finished and the Ramsays
are preparing to return: “dusters were flicked from the windows, the windows were shut
to, keys were turned all over the house; the front door was banged; it was finished” (TTL
145). Again the voice here hides information, in this case keeping back details of who is
doing all of these repairs. This phrasing does, however, maintain focus on the objects
themselves, in this case emphasizing their capacity to be acted upon. But far from simply
emphasizing the objects’ fall into passivity, the use of a list here emphasizes the sheer
quantity of things that have to be done in order to erase all sign of the activity of the past
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ten years. This work, which has involved “days of labour” (TTL 145), is essentially antientropic, in that it seeks to undo all of the changes affected on the house through a great
exertion of energy. What we see in this passage is simply how much work it takes to
cover up the accumulated actions of the inanimate world with a veneer of human agency.
What kind of house, then, do the Ramsays and Lily Briscoe return to? It is in part
an illusion of stability and continuity – exactly the same illusions that lead to their many
confident, erroneous predictions ten years ago. And we see them attempt to exploit this
continuity to return to finish what they started in “The Window,” with James and Mr.
Ramsay taking their trip up to the lighthouse, and Lily finishing her portrait by sitting in
the exact same spot she had ten years earlier. But the changes of the previous decade
have extended even to the way they perceive the landscape. James, for example,
remembers seeing the lighthouse as “a silvery, misty-looking tower with a yellow eye,”
but now when he looks sees it “stark and straight . . . barred with black and white . . .
[with] washing spread on the rocks to dry” (TTL 189). In this context, Lily’s painting
becomes very interesting. Though the second sitting supposedly captures the same scene
as the first, the intervening time would have irrevocably altered the landscape in
thousands of subtle ways that Lily would be unlikely to even notice. And though the
scene in “The Window” and the scene in “The Lighthouse” are linked, continuously, by a
decade of natural changes, these changes have all happened out of Lily’s sight. She
therefore perceives these two scenes discontinuously, and must then merge them into
each other, integrating the two distinct points into a single continuity. The painting, then,
is an enactment of the post-war nostalgia that pervades this final section. The attempt to
“return,” both to the old house and to the abandoned desires of an earlier time (visiting
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the lighthouse, finishing the pointing), is an attempt to stitch these two discontinuous
moments into a single unity that hides the painful decade lying between them.
We should therefore pay close attention to the manner in which Lily finishes her
painting, which in many ways resembles the act of artistic creation as Bergson describes
it in Creative Evolution. She sees it, nearly finished, “with all its greens and blues, its
lines running up and across, its attempt at something” (TTL 211), and initially dismisses
it, imagining that it would end up abandoned in an attic somewhere. The painting,
meanwhile, is not really being described – rather, we are told of the painting’s
components, its lines and colours, and not the larger whole that these elements ought to
make up. Then Lily seems to notice something: “with a sudden intensity, as if she saw it
clear for a second, she drew a line there, in the centre. It was done; it was finished. Yes,
she thought . . . I have had my vision” (TTL 211). What Lily seems to have done in this
brief flash of insight is glimpse some underlying continuity “behind” the image before
her eyes. Indeed, this final passage seems to follow exactly the pattern of a “moment of
being,” occurring as it does in a moment of artistic production (remember that Woolf
would associate her own moments with her writing) and involving a sudden, surprising
flash of insight which illuminates for a moment some greater scheme behind the “cotton”
of the everyday. This moment, which transforms the painting in Lily’s eyes from
disposable to a “vision,” is perhaps the kind of flash of inspiration James and Mr.
Ramsay sought as they visited the lighthouse – a sudden glimpse of the continuous world
that they once believed they had.
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2.5 The Stuff of Life
“Woolf’s problem,” writes Mads Thomsen,
is that she experiences a high level of coherence in the
phenomena of the world that are of a character and beauty
that might lead one to imagine that a higher power, a
collective will, or at least some kind of artistic intention
underlies them. She also clearly states that she cannot
believe . . . [in] any such agency in the world, least of all a
god.236
Panpsychism seems to have been a solution to this problem. In its various shapes and
guises – including the mysticism of Mrs Dalloway and the more subtle embrace of
physical animacy in To the Lighthouse – panpsychism has served her stories not so much
as a metaphysical backdrop as a way of knowing the world. The problem begins in
perception, in that Woolf’s characters encounter the world discontinuously, witnessing
effects cut off from their causes, perceiving relationships far too complex to be fully
teased out. In the case of some characters, like Mr. Ramsay, the tendency is to take the
part for the whole, or at the very least to presume that the part is sufficient, and to then
crudely integrate these discontinuous scraps of perception into a single image. This
image, mistaken for the real physical world, is attributed all of that world’s qualities,
namely is continuity and, by extension, its capacity to be subject to prediction. Mr.
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Ramsay then makes the old determinist’s mistake of moving the frame of reference from
the present, with its indeterminacy, to the past, in which every act is set. The future seems
spoken for, as the speculations extend across it, blinkering its latent possibilities.
For Mr. Ramsay, as with so many of Woolf’s other characters, the antidote to this
total integration is a shock, an event completely unforeseen which disrupts the prior
expectations. As I established at the beginning of this chapter with my discussion of
surprise and science, the unexpected is an important epistemological force, not merely
through its ability to dismantle previously-held, erroneous ideas, but also by allowing the
inanimate world to introduce new information – to intervene upon the observer with
inexplicable actions that cry out for explanation. It is at this junction that panpsychism
can function, in certain cases, as a heuristic tool, in that it offers a label for the observer’s
ignorance, designating the occluded causal relations behind the shock with the label
“agency” or “life,” linking the unexpectedness of the event analogically to the
unexpectedness thought to distinguish the living from the not. Clearly, as a tool of
scientific investigation, this would be an unsuitable way to resolve the question. But in
Woolf’s writing what we encounter are not the carefully curated shocks of a laboratory
experiment, where the variables are controlled and limited to make the results as easily
interpreted as possible, but rather the myriad, irresolvable discontinuities of everyday
existence.
Ignorance, it seems, is a common thread linking these analyses of perception
together. The narrator of “The Mark on the Wall” is, of course, unaware that the mark is a
snail for most of the story, and the first part of To the Lighthouse draws much dramatic
irony from the fact that none of the characters can foresee the First World War. And Mrs
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Dalloway – perhaps Woolf’s most extended fictional engagement with continuity – is full
of instances in which those continuities go unperceived, such as the famous scene with
the sky-writer, where Clarissa and Septimus (and a number of other passers-by) are
linked through their mutual observation of this spectacle, and yet never realize it.
Furthermore, as James Harker characterizes, Woolf’s “rhetorical reliance on
misperception” is “a central theme in her fiction.”237 And so, for example, in “Solid
Objects,” we see the remarkable narration of a single black spot splitting into two distinct
men238 – yet another instance in Woolf where ignorance, so often acting as a divisive
force that splits continuities apart, appears to also have great synthetic power, bringing
together disparate entities to form unexpected wholes. It is this process too that allows
Lily Briscoe to sit in her old panting spot and see the “same” scene that she had a decade
earlier, and it is precisely because she doesn’t know about the millions of tiny events that
have happened in that spot during her absence that she is able to complete the painting
and her vision – because the vision itself is the product of Lily breaking through this
presumed sameness.
These characters are performing a kind of everyday speculation, transforming the
forever incomplete data of perception into a common-sense notion of how things are
supposed to work. It is perhaps this common-sense formation that Woolf has in mind
during “A Sketch of the Past” where she described the “nondescript cotton wool” in
which most of human experience is wrapped (and which one only breaks through after a
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shock, during a moment of being). As Woolf writes, “a great part of every day is not
lived consciously. One walks, eats . . . deals with what has to be done” but one rarely
remembers these countless, mundane events.239 As we might recall, it is precisely
“behind” this “cotton wool” that the larger “pattern” of existence lies, waiting to be
discovered in a moment of being. The shock that precipitates these moments, and the
sense of all-connectedness that results, is essentially the breaching of the bubble of
discontinuous experience in which the subject lives. So, for example, when Woolf
describes an early experience of hers in which she “was looking at a plant with a spread
of leaves; and it seemed suddenly plain that the flower itself was a part of the earth,”240
she says something that is at once both quite obvious and quite fascinating. Virtually
everyone knows that plants are integrated into the earth – they are embedded in it, they
gather nutrients from it, they fertilize it when they die. Yet these processes of integration
so often happen outside the scope of human perception (unless, perhaps, you are a
botanist) that it is often simply easier to perceive the flower and the soil and completely
distinct entities without ever pondering the complex relationships that link them. And so
Woolf’s sudden encounter with this continuity comes as a surprise, and takes on the
feeling of a mystical experience.
That these moments of being derive from moments of shock has a lot to do with
why they lead to versions of panpsychism rather than, say, determinism, which likewise
posits a perfect continuity between all entities in existence. This divergence brings us
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back to the discussion of Kant at the beginning of the chapter, and the common
materialist understanding of nature as changeless and predictable (which we see reflected,
for example, in Mr. Ramsay’s line about Shakespeare and the stone). Despite this
presumption that the universe follows the same rules in all places and at all times – a
presumption that makes prediction possible – it is surprise, the failure of prediction, that
serves as a key tool for gaining new information about the world. Philosophers have also
commonly identified unpredictability as a trait of consciousness and agency, and it is
indeed upon matter’s ability to act in unexpected and perplexing ways that defenders of
panpsychism have built their arguments. By identifying unexpectedness with agency,
then, Woolf allows these shocks to have an integrative force, giving one a glimpse of a
grander, more complex web of relationships, mediated through the notion of “life” – as
opposed to the dis-integrative role that shock plays for more decidedly materialist
thinkers like Mr. Ramsay, for whom the many shocks of “Time Passes” did not point
towards cohesion, but rather destroyed it. By grasping shock and using it to break down
the division between human beings and other kinds of matter, panpsychism grants Woolf
a way to find unity and coherence in an unstable world. It is therefore of little surprise
that Woolf’s most straightforward representation of panpsychism results from Septimus’s
war trauma, since the cohesion he finds “behind the cotton wool” can serve as a potential
replacement for the cohesion that he has lost in his everyday life.
Panpsychism does not appear in Woolf, it would seem, as a metaphysical or
ontological tenet, but rather as an epistemological mode and as a strategy for engaging
with perception. It is, in effect, a product of her agnotology, in which Woolf takes the
multitudinous interconnectedness of which she is aware but cannot fully understand and
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transposes it into a quality (“life”) that is present in the objects themselves rather than
emergent from the relations between them, a change which therefore makes it possible to
think the objects in isolation. Panpsychism is in that sense a rather ingenious solution to a
difficult problem. Woolf’s characters (and occasionally her narrative voice) modulate the
play of discontinuous impressions and habitual speculation by strategically endowing
inanimate objects with agency and intelligence of their own. It is precisely because Woolf
knows that there is not some higher intelligence guiding these processes that she employs
the tropes and language of mysticism and mystical experience, since it is in this way that
she can express the great web of relationships she knows connects everything even
though she can never actually show that web in her fiction. Panpsychism, then, becomes
a way of interacting with the world and of allowing the world to act back – endowing her
fiction with a liveliness it would have otherwise lost.
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Chapter 3
Winds that Turn the Arrow:
The Ecological Imperative of Ezra Pound
Thou hast a voice, great Mountain, to repeal
Large codes of fraud and woe; not understood
By all, but which the wise, and great, and good
Interpret, or make felt, or deeply feel.
— Percy Shelley, “Mont Blanc”241

3.1 “The whole tribe is from one man’s body”242
Already we have seen the importance of prediction, and of prophecy, in modernist
authors’ relationship to epistemology, agnotology, and to the unknown. For Bergson and
Lewis, successful prophecy always threatens to reduce human beings to deterministic
automata (as we see, for instance, in Lewis’s engagement with the story of Herod), and
have seen in detail the importance occupied by shock and surprise in the implicit
metaphysics of Woolf’s fiction and their relation to ignorance. It is with these
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relationships in mind that we should turn to the following passage from Ezra Pound’s
1954 translation of Sophokles’s243 Women of Trachis:
HERAKLES: My father told me long ago
that no living man should kill me,
but that someone from hell would, and
that brute Centaur has done it.
...
I thought it meant life in comfort.
It doesn’t. It means that I die.
For amid the dead there is no work in service.
Come at it that way, my boy, what

SPLENDOUR,
IT ALL COHERES.244
Herakles is dying. A centaur, Nessus, has tricked his wife into poisoning him, and he is
lying in front of his son in agony begging in the name of “Filial Obedience” 245 to be
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dragged up a hill and burned in sacrifice so that he might be put out of his misery. And
yet in this agony, and in the completion of Zeus’s dire predictions, he does not despair,
but rather gasps at the “splendour” of the transcendental coherence that the prophecy
reveals to him. But the exclamation (which Pound takes the trouble of emphasizing with
capital letters) should reveal to those familiar with Pound’s writing a further coherence,
this time with a far better known passage from Canto CXVI, in his Drafts and
Fragments:
But the beauty is not the madness
Tho’ my errors and wrecks lie about me.
And I am not a demigod,
I cannot make it cohere.
(C CXVI/815-16)
There are many similarities between these two passages, 246 and likewise between
Herakles’s fall and the situation Pound found himself in as he wrote the Drafts and
Fragments – the collapse of both his fascist politics and the poetic goals of The Cantos
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here taking the place of Herakles’s impending demise. Indeed, Pound’s recognition that
he is not a “demigod” seems like a fairly direct allusion to the half-god tragic hero, and
Pound’s own estimation of the exclamation’s importance (he calls it “the key phrase, for
which the play exists” in one of his few footnotes247) makes it unsurprising that the line
would appear later among his epic’s many allusions. But the purpose of this chapter is not
simply to gesture towards a subject rhyme, or to excavate a series of classical allusions.
Rather, I begin the chapter with these passages to provide an avenue into an underlying
tendency in Pound’s thought – what I call, for reasons that will become clear, his
imperative logic – that provides a fulcrum between his aesthetics and his politics, and
which may likewise serve as an access point for scholars interested in studying Pound
through eco-criticism.
What are we to make of Herakles’s cohesion? As with Herod before, it comes at
the behest of a divine prophecy and is experienced as one would experience a law of
nature. Much like how a physicist, if cognizant of the relevant forces, can predict the
motion of an object in space, Zeus in his omniscience has predicted the fate of his most
famous son. In both cases the success of these predictions gives evidence of an
underlying order to the universe, though the nature of those orders differ considerably.
But Herakles does not begin his speech with the phrase “Zeus predicted,” but rather with
“my father predicted,” a turn of phrase that aligns the fulfillment of the prophecy with the
later invocation of filial piety. By dying in the manner that he is, Herakles has fulfilled
the will of his father, which here takes on the force of a natural law. He then turns to his
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son Hyllos and asks him to swear that he do the same “by the head of Zeus.” 248 And
Hyllos, like his father, comes through – dragging Herakles to the place of sacrifice,
lighting his body ablaze:
HYLLOS: Hoist him up, fellows
And for me a great tolerance,
matching the gods’ great unreason.
They see things being done,
calamities looked at,
sons to honor their fathers,
...
wrecks many, such as have not been suffered before.
And all of this is from Zeus.249
Though he, unlike his father, is blind to the larger system, he obeys his father’s order
anyway, and keeps his promise, attributing as he does so the mass of events to the will of
Zeus, his grandfather and his god. This higher order is, as should be clear by now, not
merely one of physical laws and the procession of nature, but also of ethical and political
duty. Herakles’s status as a demigod thus makes him useful vehicle for Pound’s
exploration of the alignment between natural and cultural forces, and to the
epistemological-agnotological relation that those have with each other. He is a hybrid in
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the Latourian sense,250 drawing together those two domains often thought to be
ontologically separate.
It is in this way that we can begin to see a way towards an ecological reading of
Pound – though it is admittedly one that we must enter sneakily, through a side-door,
rather than through the main entrance as one would with ecological critiques of Percy
Shelley or Marianne Moore. That we must do so ought to be surprising, given the sheer
quantity of nature metaphors and similar asides to the non-human world that one finds
scattered throughout Pound’s poetry. Indeed, as far back as 1976 we can read C. David
Heymann opine that “everything considered, Pound is, in a real sense, a nature poet.”251
And yet, despite the recent vogue in eco-criticism among modernist scholars, one finds
almost no analysis of Pound in ecological terms.252 I do not here claim to have solved the
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many complexities that have no doubt given would-be Poundian eco-critics such a
difficult time. Rather, I wish here to gesture towards how in Pound a particular notion of
what “nature” is and how it works is baked into his other theories of politics, economics,
and poetics.
The issue turns in part on a problem that Timothy Morton describes across his two
books Ecology Without Nature and The Ecological Thought. Drawing from Latour and
more recent work in Object Oriented Ontology (OOO), Morton establishes an important
taxonomy of approaches to thinking about the natural world, one that distinguishes
between thinking in terms of “nature” and thinking in terms of “ecology.” As Morton
describes, “Nature was always ‘over yonder,’ alien and alienated. Just like a reflection,
we can never actually reach it and belong to it. Nature was an ideal image, a selfcontained form suspended afar, shimmering and naked behind glass like an expensive
painting,”253 whereas “the ecological thought is interconnectedness in the fullest and
deepest sense. . . . The ecological thought insists that we’re deeply connected even when
we say we’re not.”254 This split between ecological thought and natural thought –
between integration and division – is one of the primary tensions spanning over Pound’s
poetic project. We see it, for example, in the death of Herakles, who despite invoking
familial bonds to coerce his son had spent much of the play cheating on his wife with
another woman, and who (by his own admission) thought that the prophecies of his death
meant that he would never be killed at all. Despite the seemingly “ecological”
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connectedness implied by his death, the rest of the play reveals Herakles to be profoundly
detached from his family, a detachment that we see continuing in the Hyllos’s
incomprehension at what he has been asked to do. Likewise Pound, who set out to write a
poem “containing history,” 255 instead found himself contained by history – knowing that
“it coheres alright / even if my notes do not cohere” (C CXVI/817) yet unable to express
that knowledge in his epic’s structure.
The nature of these tensions between integration and division ought to come out
over the duration of the chapter, but we can begin to see how they arise by looking to the
importance of familial relationships in the play’s alignment of natural and cultural forces.
It is not immediately obvious that the dissolution of the nature/culture divide should
begin at the individual’s relationship with the family, yet Women of Trachis is not the
first time that Pound implied this relationship. In Canto XIII – the first to deal directly
with Confucius (Kung, as the name is rendered here) – we see the following anecdotes:
And they [Kung’s students] said: If a man commit murder
Should his father protect him, and hide him?
And Kung said:
He should hide him.

And Kung gave his daughter to Kong-Tch’ang
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Although Kong-Tch’ang was in prison.
And he gave his niece to Nan-Young
although Nan-Young was out of office.
(C XIII/59)
To begin with the second half, though the canto does not explain who Kong-Tch’ang and
Nan-Young are, a look to Confucius’s Analects reveals both of them to have been
unjustly punished, the latter by a government that Confucius thought was run in defiance
of “right reason.”256 The first half of the passage is likewise a paraphrase of The
Analects:
The Duke of Sheh said to Kung-tze: There are
honest characters in my village, if a man steals a sheep his
son will bear witness to it.
Kung-tze said: There are honest men in my village
with this difference; a father will conceal his son’s doing,
and a son his father’s. There’s honesty (straight seeing) in
that, too.257
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It is from passages like these that we can see why Pound tended to view Confucianism as
a “libertarian discourse” the ethics of which “opposes any intrusion into the sphere within
the ‘outline’ of a person’s personality.”258
What we encounter in the two anecdotes from canto XIII are cases of individual
ethical proscriptions operating in opposition to the law. Familial bonds trump legal
commands (to the point that lying to protect one’s child can be considered a form of
honesty), and a good person can still be recognized as such even after being thrown in jail
(or, as Pound would write much later, “the greatest is charity / to be found among those
who have not observed / regulations” [C LXXIV/454] – an observation he makes after a
guard in his Pisan prison camp gives him, in violation of the rules, an old crate on which
to write). Yet elsewhere in both Confucius generally and in Pound’s appropriation thereof
we encounter signs that Pound’s support for the fidelity of the individual does not take
the form of a simplistic opposition between the individual and the state. Rather, the
opposite is true: in both Pound and Confucius the proper functioning of the state depends
entirely on the characters of individual people. As we see in The Great Digest: “wanting
good government in their states, they [the “men of old”] first established order in their
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own families; wanting order in the home, they first disciplined themselves.” 259 Or as
Pound relates in canto XIII:
If a man have not order within him
He cannot spread order about him;
And if a man have not order within him
His family will not act with due order;
And if the prince have not order within him
He cannot put order in his dominions.
(C XIII/59)
As Confucius goes on to claim, “one humane family can humanize a whole state . . .
[and] one grasping and perverse man can drive a nation to chaos.”260 Time and again in
Pound the success or failure of any grand enterprise always ties back to the character of
the person undertaking it – one need only look at the China cantos and their neat
equations of prosperity with “good” emperors for confirmation.
It seems that Pound, in taking Confucianism as a “totalizing philosophy rooted in
the objective reality of organic nature,”261 saw in it the possibility of approaching the
machinery of government ecologically (in Morton’s sense) without sacrificing his
individualism. In Confucius, the microcosm of the individual and the family scale
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smoothly and linearly upward to the macrocosm of society and the state. This hierarchy
permits a kind of integration – to such an extent that one can easily attribute the functions
of a government to the personality of its leader – but at the cost of making that influence
mostly unidirectional. While the subordination of the whole to its parts permits the
flouting of unjust laws, it also means that the “order within,” the presence or absence of
which shall determine the fate of the empire, is seemingly without origin. An individual
person becomes not merely a unit of population, but rather like the theme in a set of
musical variations which, once established, provides the basis for what follows. Or, as
Pound writes in an essay on Confucianism, “you can’t know a canzone, which is a
structure of strophes, until you know strophes.”262 Yet the opposite would not seem to
hold true.
It is in this way that an individual person’s character can become aligned with the
fate of a whole society without it being subordinated to that society, and it is likewise in
this manner that we can begin to align Pound’s Confucianism with the earlier analysis of
Women of Trachis and canto CXVI. A society for Pound in a certain sense becomes its
leader, who in ordering both their own mind, character, and family structure, create the
first iteration of a pattern that repeats with variations across all regions under that leader’s
influence. Such is the power of this influence that “if theft be the main motive in
government / in a large way / there will certainly be minor purloinments” (C
LXXVII/502) – i.e. the influence will proceed inexorably, automatically, as though it

262

Ezra Pound, “Immediate Need of Confucius,” in Selected Prose: 1909-1965, ed. William Cookson

(New York: New Directions, 1973), 76.

126

were a law of nature. Yet this system does not create a perfect hybrid; there is no
Herakles, no demigod, to permanently link the social and the natural together. The very
act of marking out the attainment of “order within” as a virtue, and of establishing it as a
goal that must be pursued by all, separates individual human beings from their natural
environment, and re-introduces human personality to what was once a Confucian state of
nature. The fulfillment of Pound’s politics is conditional in a way that the prophecies of
Zeus are not, since while Herakles was always fated to die in the way that he did, the
automatic repetition of individual and family structure can end in any number of ways
depending on the constituent parts that one begins with. The problem for Pound is that in
politics and in economy failure is always an option, and it is the possibility of this failure
that establishes in Pound’s writing a larger, subtler ethics of ecology.

3.2 Political Ecology
Earlier I wrote that one could see in Pound’s alignment of politics, aesthetics, and
ecology the operation of an imperative logic, but I have not yet explained what exactly
that means. I take my definition of the word “imperative” from the phenomenologist
Alphonso Lingis, who himself derives the term from the categorical imperative of
Immanuel Kant. As Lingis writes:
Kant takes the species’ trait of thought, which distinguishes
humans from other natural species but which constitutes
itself into a separate agency in conflict with the human
sensory-motor vitality, not as a sign that the human
psychophysical organism is destined, by an imperative
external to the inner works of nature, to an extranatural or
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supernatural status, but as an index that a human must, of
his own thoughtful initiative, make himself natural, make
himself into the integrated nature he is not naturally.263
I should state upfront that I am not proposing to do a Kantian reading of Pound – indeed,
as will be clear soon, their ethical conclusions diverge quite considerably. Rather, I offer
the categorical imperative (and Lingis’s interpretation thereof) as a model for a particular
structure of thought that both Kant and Pound share, and which can be accessed most
easily through analogizing one with the other. In this case, we can see already how
Lingis’s description of the categorical imperative’s ecological presumptions contains
many of the conflicts that we found already in Pound’s Confucianism.
Imperative logic can be seen as essentially a middle ground between the poles of
natural and ecological thinking sketched out with Morton above. Humans are
“distinguished from other natural species,” yes, but the very humanness which
distinguishes them also makes it possible for them to integrate themselves by “thoughtful
initiative” with the very same natural world that they have been divided from. One must
remember that for Kant, the famous rule that one should “act only according to that
maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” 264
is not merely a restatement of that old rhetorical question, “what if everyone acted like
that?” It ties instead with an important distinction that Kant draws quite early in his

263

Alphonso Lingis, The Imperative (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 185.

264

Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, in Ethical Philosophy, trans. James W.

Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 30

128

Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals between “laws of nature and laws of
freedom.”265 As Kant elaborates in his second critique, ethical maxims should be
regarded as “universal law[s] of nature.”266
The implications of this position become clear when if we turn, not to the Critique
of Practical Reason, but rather to Kant’s essay “On the Supposed Right to Lie because of
Philanthropic Concerns,” where he (in)famously argues that it would be unethical to lie in
order to protect one’s friend from murder. This position, as we can see by comparison to
Canto XIII, differs greatly from the Poundian-Confucian position which holds that
familial bonds (and, presumably, bonds of friendship) are sacred enough that one can be
permitted to, essentially, lie in the name of honesty. Yet both positions, though they
arrive at different places, get there by the same means. In justifying his argument, Kant
points out that, in the example he sketches, one cannot be fully cognizant of all the
potential consequences of one’s actions, and it is quite possible that the lie you tell could
inadvertently send your friend into the murderer’s clutches – which would make you
ethically culpable for that friend’s death. But if you tell the truth, then regardless of your
friend’s fate “public justice cannot lay a hand on you,” for “truthfulness is a duty.” 267
Thus, because the maxim against lying should be followed as inexorably as the law of
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gravity, nobody can be blamed for following it. Whereas Pound’s imperative is
essentially bottom-up, privileging the individual parts of the larger mesh which create
society through self-replication, Kant’s imperative is top-down, privileging the abstract
maxims to which all rational beings must pledge themselves (or, as Lingis puts it, for
Kant “thought is obedience. Freedom of thought makes this obedience possible” 268).
The result of this position is that Kantian ethics requires a continuous
subordination of the personal will, which manifests not (as in Pound) a virtue to be
cultivated but rather as a problem to be solved. One must be indifferent to the procession
of ethical laws just as one would be towards the laws of physics, finding no more
emotional investment in one’s maxims than one would in the laws of thermodynamics.
(Or as the Kantian scholar Scott M. Roulier puts it, for Kant “virtue necessarily
presupposes apathy.”269) Thus, one’s decision to tell the murderer where one’s friend is
hiding carries no risk of reprobation because it ought not to have been a decision in the
first place. Kant’s gestures to unintended consequences are therefore a red herring, since
a liar in his system is already guilty regardless of its results. The fact that we are ignorant
of the connection between one’s decision to lie or tell the truth and the fate of their friend
is elided in favour of a black box labeled “natural laws.” But though imperative logic
prizes the integration of “nature” (laws of physics) and “culture” (ethics), it is not fully
ecological, since it takes as its starting premise that human will and ethical failings leave
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humanity separate from nature, pushing it “over there” into a world of fixed laws that we
can only dream of one day occupying.
To see how this problem manifests in Pound, I would like to turn from Confucius
and Kant now to Pound’s obsession with usury. In particular, to Pound’s condemnation
thereof in Canto XLV:
Usura rusteth the chisel
It rusteth the craft and the craftsman
It gnaweth the thread in the loom
...
Usura slayeth the child in the womb
It stayeth the young man’s courting
It hath brought palsey to bed, lyeth
Between the young bride and her bridegroom
CONTRA NATURAM
They have brought whores for Eleusis
Corpses are set to banquet
At behest of usura.
(C XLV/230)
The condemnation “contra naturam” (“against nature”) which sits so prominently in this
passage needs some explaining. Many of the things that usury prevents, after all, are
themselves products of human action – since stonework, courtship rituals, banquets, and
the Eleusinian Mysteries seem all to fall squarely on the “culture” side of the line.
Likewise, the rusting of a chisel seems like a natural process, being a simple chemical

131

reaction. Yet the canto aligns all of the former firmly with nature and against usury’s
unnaturalness. The canto, then, raises the question of what exactly is “nature” as Pound
defines it, and we can see an answer to that question in one of Pound’s early influences –
C.H. Douglas, who mid-way through his Social Credit provides a definition.270 “The test
of a natural law,” he writes,” is that it is automatic and inexorable” – with the
empowerment of “the individual,” as he immediately makes clear, being a necessary
consequence of natural laws.271
Douglas’s equation of the natural with the automatic, and the subsequent embrace
of individualism under that banner, at least partially explains his embrace of anti-Semitic
conspiracy theories like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. 272 It also sheds light on his
dismissive assessment of the labour movement, and in particular the calls for workers’
control of industry, which he regarded as “crude credit-distribution societies” and
“against the nature of things.”273 What we see in Douglas’s text a development of an
economic paranoia that would blossom forth in Pound, who would go on to identify “in
alliance with Usura . . . the rulers of Europe and betrayers of America; the bankers,
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munitions dealers, professors, men of commerce, and even men of letters who either
openly or tacitly serve Usura.” 274 One need only glance at Pound’s Guide to Kulchur, for
example, to see him speaking of a “secret history” consisting of “the secret corruptions,
the personal lusts, avarices etc. that scoundrels keep hidden.”275 By elevating the myriad
injustices of global finance to the level of a conspiracy, and by conflating under that
conspiracy a vast number of diverse groups and interests (many of which actively oppose
one another276), Pound is able to equate any kind of active, systematic intervention in the
economy and the financial system with an abrogation of the laws of nature. But, as
Confucius writes in The Analects, a properly-run government ought not involve such
interventions, since “when a prince’s character is properly formed, he governs without
giving orders” while “if his character is twisty he can give orders, but they won’t be
carried out.”277 Nature is automatic, and a good government is one that aligns with nature
– it therefore follows that a good government is one that functions automatically.
Societies which follow nature therefore overcome the messy question of how individual
actions translate into society-wide effects – the relation “just works,” in the same way
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that Bruno Latour’s super-computer “just works.” A natural society is a society
constructed upon a black box, a society structured by political agnotology. A finance
system in thrall to an international conspiracy, that is a system entirely unmoored from
automatic systems, would thus be a worst-case scenario.
Yet while Pound’s economic theories did lead him to embrace a conspiratorial
worldview, it is not only at the level of grand alternate histories that imperative logic
takes hold. Pound’s belief that the personal character of individual leaders could directly
affect larger global processes – that one could be ecologically enmeshed in a global chain
of cause-and-effect while still separate enough from nature to be intelligible in purely
individualistic terms – means that the very shape of the landscape can often turn on the
personality of a specific person, as we see in his early poem “Sestina: Altaforte,” which
though predating his encounters with Douglas and Confucius enacts many of the patterns
of thought that Pound would develop and expand upon as he encountered his later
obsessions. As Pound writes in its headnote, the poem’s speaker, the troubadour Bertrans
de Born, was placed in hell by Dante for being “a stirrer up of strife.”278 He appears in
Inferno Canto XXVIII, presenting himself to Dante and Virgil holding his severed head
in his hands, an ironic punishment for his crimes:
I made father and son rebel against each other:
Achitophel did no worse by Absalom
And David, with his incitements to harm.

278

7.

Ezra Pound, “Sestina: Altaforte,” in Selected Poems of Ezra Pound (New York: New Directions, 1957),

134

Because I separated persons so close,
I carry my brain separated, alas,
From its beginning, which is in this trunk.279
The specific incident referred to here is the role that de Born allegedly had in the revolt of
Henry the Young King against his father, Henry II of England, in 1173. Dante here
compares de Born’s role to that of Achitophel in the Biblical story of Absalom’s revolt
on his father King David. Thus, de Born appears in Dante as almost an inverse of
Herakles in Women of Trachis – one who, in defiling the bonds of filial piety, honours the
joining of nature and culture in the breach rather than in the observance. By placing de
Born in hell and identifying the 1173 revolt with Absalom’s revolt on King David, Dante
elevates this particular familial relationship to a degree of cosmic importance comparable
to the merging of paternal command and divine prophecy that we see in the death of
Herakles.
Pound carries forward Dante’s enframing of de Born’s crime by projecting the
troubadour’s warlike personality across the French countryside surrounding his castle. As
the poem begins: “Damn it all! All this our South stinks peace. / . . . I have no life save
when the swords clash.”280 And as we see de Born continue in the poem’s second stanza:
In hot summer have I great rejoicing
When the tempests kill the earth’s foul peace,
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And the lightnings from black heav’n flash crimson,
And the fierce thunders roar me their music
And the winds shriek through the clouds mad, opposing,
And through all the riven skies God’s swords clash.281
De Born’s love of war is undeniable, and so strong that he begins to project it onto the
landscape, imagining violent summer storms more in tune with his personality. But the
force of this image should not cause us to forget that outside his window he does not see
storms, but rather a calm and temperate climate. Peace, not war, is the “automatic” state
of things, and the violent landscapes of the second stanza and after are an artificial
imposition, where de Born unleashes his violent desires by reshaping the landscape into
his own image. His monologue is therefore a re-enactment of the very crime that found
him cast into Dante’s hell. But what for Dante is a crime against God – one best
understood by analogy to a story from the Bible – for Pound instead first manifests as a
crime against nature, which then takes on the religious import of the source material:
“Hell grant soon we hear again the swords clash! / Hell blot back for always the thought
‘Peace!’”282 Even as de Born strives to exert his will over the landscape, the form of the
poem resists him. Three years after writing “Alteforte,” Pound would remark in A
Walking Tour of Southern France that the undulating hills and trees on the road to Celles
are “indeed a sort of sestina” in that both the poetic form and the hills expressed the

281

Ibid, 8.

282

Ibid, 9.

136

“recurrence in nature.”283 The form of the sestina, with its initial set of six end-words that
are then repeated with variations, imitates the productive regularity of nature, which like
a sestina is “automatic” and predictable (in that the order of the repetitions is determined
by its fixed form in combination with the text of the initial stanza) yet still productive.
For Pound the form of nature is reoccurrence – and it is therefore notable that de
Born in this poem expresses his desire for war in the same breath as his desire for
summer. While this alignment of war and summer might strike at first as an imperativebound alignment of human activity with a natural process, de Born’s declaration is not
merely a benign preference, but a rejection of the flow of seasons itself: it is the summer
that he may ride out to war, and he would rather have “one hour’s stour than a year’s
peace.”284 But we might compare this declaration to another group of soldiers from
Pound’s oeuvre – those we meet in his version of the poem “Song of the Bowmen of
Shu” in Cathay.285 The speaker of the poem, one of the eponymous bowmen, does not
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rejoice in war, and neither do his fellow soldiers (as he remarks early on “when anyone
says ‘Return,’ the others are full of sorrow. / Sorrowful minds, sorrow is strong, we are
hungry and thirsty” 286). They have been away from home for a long time, and seem to
have been worn down by the hardships and monotony of regular soldiering. Notably, they
are not “stirrers up of strife,” but rather shy away from combat, associating the “three
battles a month” the Mongols thrust upon them287 with the general exhaustion they
experience on the field. Hanging over the whole poem is the question of when they will
return home, and it is in the final lines that they do:
When we set out, the willows were drooping with spring,
We come back in the snow,
We go slowly, we are hungry and thirsty,
Our mind is full of sorrow, who will know of our grief?288
Certainly the de Born of “Alteforte” would not know their grief, but rather despise them
as pacifists who flee from war. Yet their term of service evidences a far greater alignment
with the flows and patterns of nature than the presumptuous warmongering of de Born.
Unlike their French counterparts, they have fought for a whole year and during all four
seasons, and their attitude towards war is not marked by joy but by resignation and
acceptance. They are wary of the Mongols, but they still fight their three battles a month,
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just as they also take what peace comes their way in between. Finally, it is nature itself
that witnesses their grief: for just as they return home “full of sorrow,” they find the
landscape also laden with snow.
In Pound’s 1911 collection Canzoni we find another indication that the eternal
summer of the warlike mind is not in keeping with the fecund repetitions of nature. In
“Canzon: The Yearly Slain,” taken from that collection, Pound pursues an extended
metaphor that equates the waxing and waning of love to the yearly seasonal procession:
Love that is born in Time and comes and goes!
Love that doth hold all noble hearts in fief!
As red leaves follow where the wind hath flown,
So all men follow Love when Love is dead.289
As he does quite frequently in The Cantos and elsewhere, Pound is here equating love
with a natural process that proceeds automatically, and which if embraced allows one to
be better aligned with nature. Looking forward to Pound’s later writing, we can see how
the alignment of productive desire with nature would later feed into his economic
theories. As Alec Marsh observes, much of Pound’s objection to usury is based on the
way it contravenes automatic, naturally productive processes like the procession of the
seasons in favour of the creation of artificial wealth. As he describes, “the usury system
forces natural values and production – for example, a given quantity of wheat – to
measure up prior to monetary debts. . . . If the harvest is bad, the interest must still be
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paid in money or the farmer must forfeit real property. . . . [thus] foreclosure is the
destruction of real values to prop up artificial percentages on paper.”290 Marsh’s
summary draws this particular example from one of Pound’s speeches on Rome Radio,
but we can Pound’s association between the automatic flow of the seasons and the
growing and shrinking of productive desire in these much earlier poems.
The growth and fallow periods that contour farmers’ lives – which allow them to
produce food precisely because they are hard-coded into nature – are in Pound’s view
overwritten by usury in the name of artificial profit in much the same way that de Born
overwrites the seasons in the name of war. Those like the bowmen of Shu who align
themselves with the natural world are ultimately exulted by Pound as the true producers
of value and the enemies of usury. “The true base of credit,” as Pound would write in
Canto LII, “is / the abundance of nature” (C LII/257), and in formulating his imperative
logic in terms of individual actions that set patterns repeating through society (the
strophes that become a canzone, or the warlike de Born who turns sons against their
father) Pound is able to avoid defining his ethics in terms of abstract Kantian maxims,
instead putting forth specific examples that ought to set his preferred pattern forth. And
we can see one such instance in Canto VIII, which begins with a letter by Sigismundo
Malatesta to a son of Cosimo de Medici:
And tell the Maestro di pentore [master of painting]
That there can be no question of
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His painting the walls for the moment,
As the mortar is not yet dry
And it wd. be merely work chucked away
(C VIII/28)
In this moment, in this seemingly mundane instruction regarding the painting of a wall,
we see what Pound would dub, in his multi-part essay “I Gather the Limbs of Osiris,” a
“luminous detail” – small facts or anecdotes “which govern[] knowledge as the
switchboard the electric circuit.”291 Such details are “luminous,” that is, not because of
their relative historical importance, but rather because of how they define the intersection
of an array of diverse processes and thereby allow them to be understood. Such is what
we see in the detail of Malatesta and the paint: an intelligent figure, attuned to the
automatic procession of nature (the rate at which mortar dries), using that attunement to
ensure that work being done is genuinely valuable (i.e. not wasteful), all while giving
commands to a member of the most powerful banking family in all of Italy. Collapsed
into this moment, in this letter by one of the early heroes of Pound’s epic, is precisely his
imperative logic at work, marrying the natural world with the careful temperament of an
individual human being.

3.3 Poundian Metaphor and Imperative Poetics
Given the importance in Pound’s artistic and political project of individual units that
repeat and vary themselves to produce more complex schemas, it seems a good idea to
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embrace particularity (at least for the time being) to give attention to a specific poem and
the network of relations it illuminates. Any scholar of modernist poetry will be familiar
with Pound’s “In a Station of the Metro,” but just to be thorough I shall quote it anyway:
The apparition of these faces in the crowd;
Petals on a wet, black bough.292
A number of the poem’s features make it understandable in terms of Pound’s imperative,
the most obvious of those being the way it directly overlays a human activity on a feature
of the natural world. But a much more intricate (and interesting) facet of the poem’s
imperative is the manner in which uses metaphor.
In 1913 – the same year Pound first published “Metro” in Poetry – Pound
encountered the writings of Ernest Fenollosa and began work editing the mass of notes
that the late sinologist had left behind, a process that resulted in Cathay, a collection of
translated Noh plays, and (most importantly for my analysis here) Fenollosa’s essay “The
Chinese Written Character as a Medium for Poetry.” It is from this work that Pound’s
interest in China (and his use of Chinese ideograms in his writing) springs, and in this
essay we find the following observation:
A true noun, an isolated thing, does not exist in nature.
Things are only the terminal points, or rather the meeting
points of actions . . . Neither can a pure verb, an abstract
motion, be possible. The eye sees noun and verb as one:
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things in motion, motion in things, and so the Chinese
conception tends to represent them.293
Here we see the Chinese ideogram being the tool that aligns, not merely poetry, but all of
writing with natural processes as they actually occur in the world, forming a contiguous
ecology of signs.294 Phonetic writing systems, on the other hand, create needless
abstractions – pure nouns and verbs that posit relationless objects and motion unattached
to any definite thing, which though useful concepts for coordinating parts of speech
detach that speech from the world that it describes. This embrace of abstraction is
something Pound would himself criticize, such as in his ABC of Reading where he
complains that “in Europe, if you ask a man to define anything, his definition always
moves away from the simple things that he knows perfectly well . . . [towards]
progressively remoter abstraction.”295 But we see an even earlier (pre-Fenollossa) interest
in a linguistic fidelity to nature in his essay “A Few Don’ts by an Imagiste,” which not
only advised poets to “go in fear of abstractions,”296 but also not to “mess up the
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perception of one sense by trying to define it in terms of another. This is usually only the
result of being too lazy to find the exact word.”297 This advice – consistent with F.S.
Flint’s injunction, in the same issue of Poetry, that imagism concerned the “direct
treatment of the ‘thing,’ whether subjective or objective”298 – aligns with an interest in
the exactness of poetic description (the “exact word”) with a rectitude of description that
for Pound as for Fenollosa precludes the messy abstractions common in everyday speech.
That is to say, both imagist poetry and Chinese ideograms are, for Pound, defined by a
Flaubertian search for le mot juste extended to its logical extreme.
I bring up the similarities between the main stylistic tenants of Pound’s imagism
and Fenollosa’s interpretation of Chinese writing in large part to demonstrate how the
imperative logic of the latter did not create in Pound a set of literary preoccupations that
did not exist prior, but rather described systematically a number of different notions that
Pound was already exploring in his earlier work.299 Though his version of “The Chinese
Written Character” would not appear until 1918, Pound had been putting its central
tenants into action since before the Great War. Thus, when looking at the way “In a
Station of the Metro” enacts a particular attitude towards representing nature, we should
keep in mind the importance that Fenollosa placed in the essentially metaphoric nature of
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the Chinese ideogram and the way that metaphor (in his view) proceeded along a type of
imperative:
Metaphor, the revealer of nature, is the very substance of
poetry. The known interprets the obscure, the universe is
alive with myth. . . . It is a mistake to suppose, with some
philosophers of aesthetics, that art and poetry are to deal
with the general and the abstract. . . . Art and poetry deal
with the concrete of nature.300
Metaphors, for Fenollosa, are deeply immanent with nature, being a reflection of the
interconnectedness that all particular elements of the world enact in every moment of
time. Art, for him, is the expression of these concrete relations, and the ideogram, being
built on metaphor, inscribes this poetic imperative in the very basis of the Chinese
writing system. The key to the underlying imperative logic of “In a Station of the Metro”
therefore lies in its enactment of a metaphoric relation between the faces in the crowd and
the petals on the bough.
At least one critic has, however, contested the reading of this relation in terms of
metaphor, and the nature of the objection ought to help elucidate the precise way this
poem fits into the larger architecture of Pound’s nature poetics. In Modernist Form, John
Steven Childs argues that the form of “In a Station of the Metro” is better understood as
metonymic. As he argues, the relation between the two objects is not such that one could
substitute a submerged “like” between them – that is, the second line does not emerge as
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a simple substitution of the first. Rather, the juxtaposition of the two images gestures
towards a higher unity to which the two particular objects are subordinate, being the
“parts,” or the particular instances, that stand in for the whole.301 This reading can be
quite convincing, especially since it is consistent with Pound’s interest in Neoplatonism –
the higher order meaning of the poem here being its “Form,” of which the specific objects
are mere shadows.302 Pound himself, in fact, seems to encourage this kind of reading in
his Vorticism essay where, only a page after offering up “Metro” as an exemplum, and
after defining Vorticism as an “intensive art,” pound attempts to explain what he means
with recourse to the Pythagorean Theorem:
There are four different intensities of mathematical
expression known to the ordinarily intelligent
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undergraduate, namely: the arithmetical, the algebraic, the
geometrical, and that of analytical geometry.
. . . [I]t is true that
32 + 42 = 52, 62 + 82 = 102, 92 + 122 = 152, 392 + 522 = 652.
. . . [But] one expresses their “algebraic relation” as
a2 + b2 = c2.
That is the language of philosophy. 303
The invocation of Pythagoras, and his mathematical idealism,304 seems to suggest that
Pound is viewing the juxtaposition used in his poetry in very much the terms Childs
describes, where the individual objects are merely parts of a larger whole to which they
are subsidiary, just like any particular drawing of a triangle can only suggest or gesture
towards and ideal perfect triangle which can only be accurately represented in the
abstract through the use of equations. Yet this reading would go against every other
dominant tendency in Pound’s poetics, and in particular his vehement rejection of topdown systems of organization.
Pound’s use of mathematics in “Vorticism,” luckily enough, provides us with a
solution to this conflict – one which shall also give us an answer to Childs’s metonymic
reading of the poem. It happens that Pound had used the exact same comparison several
years prior to publishing his essay, invoking it in The Spirit of Romance as a way to
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describe Dante’s Divine Comedy, and the “four senses” in which it can be read: “the
literal, the allegorical, the analogical, and the ethical.” 305 It should be easy to see the
similarities here between these four “senses” and the “four different intensities of
mathematical expression” to which Pound compares his notion of “intensity” in
Vorticism, and in the passage he even introduces the equation in the same way –
beginning with the same examples (32 + 42 = 52, 62 + 82 = 102, and so on) before
identifying them as merely different instances of a2 + b2 = c2. Yet Pound’s use of this
analogy, as well as his discussion of Dante in The Spirit of Romance generally, resists the
urge to read Dante’s poetry in terms of pure abstraction, holding instead that his “socalled personifications are real and not artificial” and that (in a text that pre-dates
“Imagisme” by three years) “Dante’s precision . . . comes from the attempt to reproduce
exactly the thing which has been clearly seen.”306 But if Dante is not idealizing – and if,
by extension, Pound is not idealizing either – then what exactly is the invocation of the
Pythagorean Theorem supposed to tell us?
The answer to that question is clearest in light of Childs’s metonymic reading.
Metonymy, most simply defined, involves taking a part of something for the whole – as
when one, for instance, uses a picture of the Mona Lisa to stand-in for “Early Modern
painting” generally. The relationship between the signifier and signified in such a case is
hierarchical, for while in this example the image of the Mona Lisa is what we encounter,
its semantic role in that act of signification is to be purely subsumed by the larger
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category it represents. While we encounter the painting, what we see is a larger history
that ultimately overwrites it. Metonymic writing, though it appears to deal in the
concrete, is really concerned with abstractions.307 Pound, in his writing on poetics, firmly
rejects such subordination, and this rejection comes through in his analysis of Dante.
Following his invocation of the Pythagorean Theorem and its comparison to the “four
senses” of the Divine Comedy, Pound explains the comparison thusly:
[T]he Commedia is, in the literal sense, a description of
Dante’s vision of a journey through the realms inhabited by
the spirits of men after death; in a further sense it is the
journey of Dante’s intelligence though the states of mind
wherein dwell all sorts and conditions of men before death;
beyond this, Dante or Dante’s intelligence may come to
mean “Everyman” or “Mankind” . . . In a fourth sense, the
Commedia is an expression of the laws of eternal justice . .
. or the law of Karma, if we are to use an Oriental term.308
Though it is likely a coincidence, the frequent use of semicolons in this passage is telling
given the importance of the semicolon in “In a Station of the Metro.” For while Pound
does move systematically in his description from the specific, literal meaning of a text
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towards greater abstractions, at no point does Pound subordinate one set of meanings to
another. Rather, he simply places the different “senses” on top of each other without any
overt invocation of hierarchy between them. Dante, then, is “Everyman,” but in becoming
“Everyman” he nevertheless remains irrevocably himself, just as he continues to remain
himself even as his literal journey through the underworld becomes a figurative journey
through the abstract “laws of eternal justice.” It is thus that we can see what Pound means
when he writes that “the image is not an idea. It is a radiant node or cluster . . . a
VORTEX, from which, and through which, and into which, ideas are constantly
rushing.”309 “From which,” “through which,” and “into which,” all happening at once –
such is not the formula for metonymy. Though this “vortex” relates to an abstract
meaning that arises from its constituent parts, those parts can no more be subordinated to
that abstraction than a river can subordinate the water that runs through it. The ontology
of a vortex is flat – part and whole exist in perfect unison.310
None of the foregoing is to say that Pound’s poetics is straightforwardly
metaphorical, but rather that the ethics of his ecological imperative express themselves in
the form of a striving towards metaphoricity, a striving we see expressed quite clearly in
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his “Metro” poem. I think a useful heuristic here is Lacan’s alignment of metaphor and
metonym with (respectively) Freud’s concepts of condensation and displacement,311
particularly in comparing Pound’s imperative with Kant’s. The ecological linguistics (for
lack of a better term) of Kant’s categorical imperative is freely metonymic, in that it
displaces human beings from nature by way of free will. But Pound will accept nothing
less than a perfect condensation of the two domains – the faces in the crowd and the
leaves on the bough must become one, must be perfectly overlapped, must perfectly
become each other, in the mind’s-eye of the reader if not on the page. (It is in this manner
that I align Pound with Morton.) But, as will become clear shortly, this condensation is
unstable, not only because of the pragmatic necessity of placing poetic lines side-by-side
(that is, displacing them) but also because of Pound’s rejection of usury and everything
he associated with it. What Pound seems to want is a system in which all of human action
is perfectly condensed with the natural world except for one or two special cases, cases
which he tries to displace. These difficulties leave Pound with what we might call a
metaphorical utopianism, in which an ideal of perfect condensation does constant battle
with the forces (internal and external) of metonymy and displacement. “In a Station of
the Metro,” then, is not only a paradigmatic example of Pound’s Imagist reductionism,
but also of how his political and ethical ideas became integrated with his aesthetic
practices.
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The “Metro” poem’s status as an expression of the relationship between metaphor
and nature arrives not merely though a comparison to Fenollosa (enlightening though the
comparison is) but also through the poem’s origin in Pound’s reading of haiku, which
Pound explicitly points to in “Vorticism” when he compares “In a Station of the Metro”
to a well-known poem by the haiku master Arakida Moritake as well as another haiku
related to Pound by his associate Victor Plarr.312 Though the essay gives no indication of
where Pound first encountered haiku poetry, Yoshinobu Hakutani, in his Haiku and
Modernist Poetics, argues convincingly that the encounter came through the JapaneseAmerican poet and literary scholar Yone Noguchi, who published an essay on haiku in a
1913 issue of the little magazine Rhythm, and who began a correspondence with Pound n
1911.313 Noguchi’s essay, “What is a Hokku Poem?,” clearly frames the form as a kind
of nature poetry founded in the specificity of its language: “this ‘hokku’ poem in whose
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gem-small form of utterance our Japanese poets were able to express their understanding
of Nature, better than that, to sing or chant their longing or wonder or adoration toward
Mother Nature . . . [it] is distinctly clear-cut like a diamond or star, never mystified by
any cloud or mist like Truth or Beauty of Keats’ understanding.”314
The importance of the haiku-form’s imperative function was such that it seems to
have affected the way Pound arranged the English examples that he quotes in his essay.
While English readers of Haiku poems commonly understand the form to be made of
three poetic lines with the syllables 5-7-5, in Japanese haikus are most commonly written
as a single line with the tripartite structure being formed by kireji, or “cutting words,”
which break the line into formal units.315 It is these units within the one-line Japanese
haiku that become the three lines of the English haiku, both in translations from the
Japanese and in the semi-independent tradition of haiku poetry in English, to which
Pound is a key contributor. But in addition to this three-part structure, there frequently is
also buried in the single Japanese line a two-part structure where “either the first two
lines or the last two lines are one unit, and the first line or the last line is another unit.” 316
While the three-line arrangement is now established as the primary way that haikus are
written in English, the equally valid two-line arrangement that Pound favoured, and in
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which we can see the origin of the two-line form of “In a Station of the Metro,” has many
advantages. In addition to making it easier for Pound to emphasize the method of “superposition” he employed in his poem317 (and emphasizing as well the poem’s similarity to a
mathematical equation, with the split between the lines taking the place of the equals
sign318), the use of the haiku’s two-part structure as the basis of its lineation emphasizes
the poem’s conceptual units at the expense of its formal qualities (whereas the three-line
arrangement does the opposite).
In order to demonstrate the importance of this decision, it would be useful to
compare “In a Station of the Metro” to another haiku written by the seventeenth-century
master Matsuo Bashō. While Pound does not seem to have read much of Bashō, his
eminent status in the history of Japanese poetry – comparable to Dante in Italian and
Shakespeare in English – makes him a useful exemplum.319 The haiku in question is thus:
Full moon
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Walking around the pond
All night320
Like “In a Station of the Metro,” this haiku engages in a form of “super-position,” in
which one image is overlaid directly on the other to create a third image out of the
combination (with the first line being one unit and the second two being another). But the
images that Bashō presents are not merely juxtaposed, but have further relations: the
image of the full moon is doubly reflected both in its reflection on the pond and in the
speaker’s circular walk, which is thus defined both by the pond’s perimeter and by the
image of the moon. What the poem therefore achieves is a unity of self and nature very
much like what Pound sought, where one does not simply pay fealty to an ideal natural
law (as with Kant) but rather where one achieves a more ecological relation with the
world. As the poem’s translator observes, its ambiguous syntax (present also in the
Japanese) means that it “can be read with the idea that the moon ‘walks’ around the pond
as it seems to go from east to west or that the author walked around the pond the whole
night enjoying the full moon.”321 Bashō’s haiku therefore reflects one of “In a Station of
the Metro’s” most important features – its flat ontology. Though the poems present
multiple images, and though some images arise from others, no entity in either poem is
hierarchically above or below another. For Bashō, we can see this “flat” relation in the
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way that the lake brings the moon down to earth, letting it stride around the lake just as
the speaker does, so that both entities (by virtue of haiku’s ambiguous syntax) can
effectively walk around the lake as one. For Pound, the flatness comes in the poem’s
presentation of multiple “intensities” present in the varying levels of abstraction that
Pound permits to stand beside each other in a relation of equals.

3.4 Denaturing the Image
Pound, as should be clear by now, saw metaphor not only as a kind of ornament, but as a
means of acquiring knowledge about the world. His embrace of figurative writing is also
an embrace of objective knowledge – as evidenced by his likening of “In a Station of the
Metro” to a mathematical formula, and of his later embrace of Fenollosa, who explicitly
declared metaphor to be a “revealer of nature.” Pound’s use of metaphor is therefore
essential to the larger imperative logic of his poetics, and in particular to his attempt to
marry the breadth and repetitiveness of his Confucian-inspired historiography with his
strong sense of individualism. Indeed, as Chet Lisiecki has recently argued, “the
imagists’ attempt to revitalize metaphor” is in keeping with a trend towards representing
in poetry “the pre-linguistic image and one’s emotional experience of it” that can be
traced back to Nietzsche.322 But the particular kind of metaphor that Pound uses in his
“Metro” poem is fairly unusual – not at all conforming to the common “tenor-vehicle”
model that most metaphors follow. If, as I.A. Richards defines it, “we can describe or
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qualify the tenor by describing the vehicle,” 323 then the super-position of “In a Station of
the Metro” would hardly seem like a metaphor at all.
The problem is that Richards’s definition turns metaphor into a basically
hierarchical relationship – something like the inverse of the problem we encountered with
metonymy. When, for example, Shakespeare has Romeo declare “But soft! What light
through yonder window breaks? / It is the east, and Juliet is the sun”324 a clear hierarchy
appears: the point and focus of this metaphor is Juliet, who beauty makes her appearance
at the window resemble the sun rising in the east. We are expected to understand what a
sunrise looks like, and Shakespeare only invokes that image so that we may better
understand Juliet. The passage is not really “about” the sun at all. Such is the problem
with Richards’s definition: a vehicle can carry, but cannot itself be carried, which is to
say that the definition is only useful when applied to metaphors that only work in one
direction. But “In a Station of the Metro” is basically reversible, in that one can compare
the petals on the bough to the faces in the crowd just as effectively as the inverse. The
image created from their super-position is an independent entity, a third object that arises
from the first two but remains equal to them. The poem, then, is much more similar to the
kind of “proportional metaphor” that Aristotle describes in his Rhetoric, which “must
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always apply reciprocally to either of its co-ordinate terms.”325 The example that
Aristotle gives here is a metaphor that equates the shield of Ares to the drinking bowl of
Dionysus, where both objects (in addition to physically resembling each other) are
heavily associated with their respective deities. Thus, one can say that the shield
functions for Ares in the same way that the bowl does for Dionysus, or one can say the
reverse, and in both cases the comparisons would be equivalent. While on the other hand,
though Shakespeare wrote that “Juliet is the sun,” and one could conceivably write that
“the sun is Juliet,” the two comparisons suggest completely different things. 326
While “In a Station of the Metro” is a particularly extreme example, this kind of
“flat” metaphor, with its interchangeable and ontologically independent parts, are fairly
common in Pound’s writing. We can see another example in “The River Song” of
Cathay, which ends: “For the gardens at Jo-run are full of new nightingales, / Their sound
is mixed in this flute, / Their voice is in the twelve pipes here.” 327 The movement in these
lines from the sound of the nightingales to the sound of the flutes – proceeding so that
neither sound outdoes the other, so that both instead play in harmony – allows for one to
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be compared to the other without one overpowering the other. It is a type of transition
that we see most famously in H.D.’s “Oread,” another major imagist work, which
achieves an effect quite similar to that in “The River Song”:
Whirl up, sea–
whirl your pointed pines,
splash your great pines
on our rocks,
hurl your green over us,
cover us with your pools of fir.328
The key difference here between these poems and “In a Station of the Metro” is that the
super-position of the images does not occur in a single momentary flash but is rather
worked up to over the course of several lines. As the passage develops, one objects
slowly bleeds into another until they form a third, composite image, while nevertheless
retaining their respective separateness. The firs and the sea, the faces and the petals, the
nightingales and the flutes – all continue to be themselves even as their proximity creates
something new, just as the moon in Bashō remains in the sky even as it dances with the
speaker around the lake.
We can see other manifestations of this process in Pound’s early poetry – it is the
central conceit, for example, in “Portrait d’une Femme” (which ends, tellingly, “No!

328

H.D. [Hilda Doolittle], “Oread,” in H.D.: Collected Poems, 1912-1944, ed. Louis L. Martz (New York:

New Directions, 1983). 55.

159

there is nothing! In the whole world and all, / Nothing that’s quite your own. / Yet this is
you”329), and likewise of his earlier “Histrion”:
[T]he souls of all men great
At times pass through us,
And we are melted into them, and are not
Save reflexions [sic] of their souls.
Thus am I Dante for a space and am
One François Villon, ballad-lord and thief
...
This for an instant and the flame is gone.330
Though the speaker is “melted into” previous authors, this combination is only
momentary, which forces him to drift from author to author, unable to fully “become”
someone else. In the later poem, this transience becomes equated with the gathering of
junk and refuse in the gyre of the eponymous sea, created by the nearby currents. Though
the junk and flotsam are what make the Sargasso Sea distinctive, these various objects
remain clearly and obviously independent of the region – their colour contrasting with the
famous clear blue of the waters. Likewise, the poem’s subject, as a repository of rumour
and conversation, becomes herself through the adoption and ventriloquization of other
people’s speech, which remains distinct from her (and she from it) despite forming part
of her personality. Though not “images” in the sense that we encounter in the “Metro”
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poem, these works demonstrate a preoccupation in Pound’s early poems with balancing
the super-position of different entities with those entities’ continued ontological
independence. It is a preoccupation that we see extend into his later work with his use of
“subject-rhymes” – which remain a constant throughout all the cantos.
These rhymes – in which, as Hugh Kenner summarizes, “snow fills ten lines of
Iliad XII to rhyme (alike, yet different) with hurtling missiles, and the reader of the
snowfall passage at the end of Joyce’s ‘The Dead’ may detect rhyme with the Iliad”331 –
though seemingly estranged from Pound’s particular use of metaphor in “In a Station of
the Metro” are nevertheless of the same lineage. Indeed, it is still fairly easy to see in
Kenner’s example of the “hurtling missiles” that resemble falling snow an echo of both
the metaphoric logic of Fenollosa’s Chinese ideograms and of the snow that greets the
bowmen of Shu and reflects their sorrow-laden hearts. The subject-rhyme is very much
the narrativization of Pound’s earlier method of Imagist super-position, retaining the nonhierarchical metaphoric logic of “In a Station of the Metro” while also incorporating the
“repeat in nature”332 that he saw in the sestina-like hills of southern France and while he
explicitly set out to capture in his Cantos. When, for example, Pound in Canto LXII
creates a subject rhyme between the American and English constitutions – first in
describing the latter English constitution “without appeal to higher powers unwritten” (C
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LXII/343) and then later having John Adams name “a love of science and letters / [and] a
desire to encourage schools and academies” as the “only means to preserve our
Constitution” (C LXII/349) – he finds (in his equation of good governance with a welleducated population) a repeat in history that is directly related to the repetition found in
nature.333 In these cases, then, the use of metaphor ceases to be simply a matter of
ornamentation, or of finding an effective way to explain one thing by analogy to another,
and instead becomes an effective means of analyzing the natural world, and a source of
knowledge in its own right.334
Thus, before moving on from this extended engagement with the development of
Pound’s metaphors, it is important to make a final comparison between Pound’s writing
and the place that metaphor holds in the philosophy of Graham Harman, whose ideas
have been implicit in much of my analysis thus far. While Harman’s excursions into
literary theory have been rather disappointing, 335 his writing on the role of metaphor in
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OOO gestures to Pound as an unsung predecessor. Metaphors, for Harman, function as an
access point to each object’s inherent strangeness. An object in a metaphorical relation
becomes both “an image sparkling with diverse features” while still retaining a “strange
concealed integrity of individual images.”336 Of particular interest to Harman is a littlecited essay by the Spanish phenomenologist José Ortega y Gasset called “An Essay on
Esthetics by way of a Preface” – originally published as a preface to a collection of
poems by Moreno Villa. The essay contains an extended meditation on the function of
metaphor:
A Valencian poet, López Picó, writes that the cypress “is
like the ghost of a dead flame.” This is a suggestive
metaphor. But what is the metaphorical object here? It is
neither the cypress, nor the flame, nor the ghost: all these
belong to the realm of real images. The new object that
confronts us is a “cypress-ghost of a flame.” Notice,
however, that this cypress is not a cypress, nor this ghost a
ghost, nor this flame a flame.337
The image that Ortega cites from Picó thus falls into a dialectic of combination and
distinction that should by now be familiar. It is not only the flame, the ghost, and the
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cypress which are distinct objects, but the bizarre combinatory image that flashes out
from their metaphorical relation. Far from the explanatory metaphors of I.A. Richards,
metaphor for Ortega and Harman becomes a process of opacity and occlusion rather than
a means of access.
As Ortega goes on to write, “we are to see the image of a cypress through the
image of a flame; we see it as a flame, and vice versa. But each excludes the other; they
are mutually opaque. . . . We simply sense an identity, we live executantly this being, the
cypress-flame.”338 Harman – for whom withdrawal and hiddenness are essential aspects
of object relations339 – this approach to understanding metaphor turns it into a way, not
of accessing the underlying nature of objects, but of perceiving more readily their
withdrawal: “since the two images are unable actually to melt together instantly by way
of their truly minimal common qualities, [their] cryptic essences . . . remain before me in
a kind of permanent collision.”340 There is no mixing between these objects, nor any
subjugation between tenor and vehicle. What does this tell us about Pound? First, the
similarities between Ortega’s analysis of the Picó simile and the implicit ontology of “In
a Station of the Metro” is notable in itself, given how infrequently the two writers have
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been analyzed together.341 But the relationship becomes more complex in light of
Harman’s uptake of Ortega. Harman, like Pound, sees metaphor as a means of acquiring
new information about the world as we encounter it. The relationship between the cypress
and the flame is not, for him, a matter of explanation or decoration, but rather of
revelation – the making visible of a fundamental ontological fact. Yet there are important
differences in Pound and Harman’s approach to the epistemology of metaphor. Pound
considers the revelations of his metaphors to be actual objective knowledge about the
material world,342 essential for the fidelity to “the thing which has been clearly seen.”
Such knowledge is necessary if his “automatic” imperative logic is to genuinely bring the
closeness to nature upon which Pound has built his ethics.
Throughout Pound’s prose writing we encounter exhortations to his readers
calling on them to acquire better, more precise definitions of words – much like how his
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poetics calls for a precision in the presentation of images. One can look, for instance, to
the short anecdote about the zoologist Louis Agassiz, which he includes near the start of
his ABC of Reading. Pound offers up the story as a way to show that “the proper
METHOD for studying poetry and good letters is the method of contemporary biologists,
that is, the careful first-hand examination of the matter.343 The anecdote itself describes a
student working under Agassiz who is asked to describe a sunfish. The student begins by
providing the fish’s taxonomic designation (“Ichthus Heliodiplodokus, or whatever term
is used to conceal the common sunfish from vulgar knowledge,” as Pound describes
it344), which soon proves insufficient. The student then writes a short essay on the
subject, which likewise fails. Then Agassiz “told him to look at the fish. At the end of
three weeks the fish was in an advanced state of decomposition, but the student knew
something about it.”345 As Pound would write, in reference to this story, in a later essay,
“any teacher of biology would tell you that knowledge can NOT be transmitted by
general statement without knowledge of particulars,” and he advocates a similar program
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for the teaching of literature.346 This attitude is well in line with what I have already
described throughout this chapter – such as Pound’s preference for the specific over the
general and his desire for greater fidelity in representation. Likewise, as Bob Perelman
has analyzed, the anecdote is also consistent with Pound’s approach to both
Confucianism and his readings of Chinese Ideograms. 347 The anecdote also illustrates the
importance of particularity – and the exhaustive knowledge of particulars – in the natural
and automatic arrival of generalizations. If, as Pound writes elsewhere, “all knowledge is
built up from a rain of factual atoms,”348 then one must attain an exhaustive knowledge
of those “atoms” in order to arrive at generalizations one can trust.
Consider the student, who begins in the received abstractions of a jargon which –
though useful to an expert – simply serves to obscure from them the gaps in their
particular knowledge of the fish. (One might recall here Canto XIII, where Kung muses
that “even I can remember / A day when the historians left blanks in their writings, / I
mean for things they didn’t know” [C XIII/60]) Their knowledge, being top-down, is
incomplete, and over-privileges broad taxonomies above the brute haecceity of the
specimen before their eyes. The student’s responsibility to the object is great, and yet this
story has a happy ending: though it takes three weeks of work and examination, and
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though in the process the specimen is destroyed, by the end the student actually knows
something, and has therefore moved upwards from the particular into an early, tentative
generality. Pound is, then, quite opposed to what Harman has called “overmining,” or the
privileging of groups and collectives of objects to their constituent parts – as in where
one considers a table “more real” or perhaps “more important” than the atoms that
construct it.349 His opposition to beginning with the ideal and the general does not
amount to an abandonment of generalities per se, but rather – as we saw with “In a
Station of the Metro” and elsewhere – the creation of an even, horizontal relationship
between composite images, such as the music of the flutes and nightingales, and their
constituent parts.
This all sounds like an approach well in keeping with Harman’s philosophical
project, to the point where one might be tempted to dub Pound’s writing an “Object
Oriented Poetics.” But it would be a mistake to do so, since the two differ quite sharply
on a key axiom: whether or not it is possible to “move up” between different levels of
generalities by analyzing the “atoms” exhaustively. Pound clearly believes that one can,
whereas Harman holds precisely the opposite. Instead Harman essentially generalizes the
object withdrawal found in Heidegger’s famous tool analysis to all forms of object
relations, a position that renders Pound’s implicit ontology explicitly impossible. If no
object cannot be exhausted by its relations then one can never know everything about it,
since the acquisition of knowledge invariably requires some form of relation to it. The
comparison to Harman, then, demonstrates a possible fissure in Pound’s imperative logic,
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one that begins (appropriately enough) at the bottom and works its way up. It is a
problem that will dog any philosophy that predicates itself in one way or another on
“getting back to nature” – that being the unspoken assumption that “nature” is something
that one can get back to. For Pound, whose imperative arises from the combination of
miniscule attentiveness and automatic repetition, the danger that the images which set the
pattern might themselves be flawed and over-generalized – that this over-generalization
may in fact be a basic axiom of object relations – is an unspoken threat throughout his
writing, one that only comes to the foreground late in his body of work.

3.5 Demigod Ecology
A working country is hardly ever a landscape. The very
idea of a landscape implies separation and observation.
— Raymond Williams, The Country and the City350
Let us enact again the “repeat in history” by turning back to that image of the
dying Herakles and its echo in the final fragments of Pound’s epic work. Herakles’s death
was clearly automatic in the sense that Douglas uses the term, in that it was inexorable
and not created by any presumptive higher-order manipulations. No value has been
created from nowhere; no life has been declared by fiat in the face of nature. And because
Herakles is a demigod – the literal son of Zeus – this natural process is also an ethical
one, connected both to Herakles’s social role as a son and (in his commands to Hyllos) as
a father. The relationship “just works;” it is natural, proceeding automatically, a perfectly
functioning agnotology. Here is the coherence: the resolution of a cryptic prophecy
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through the workings of natural law, which creates in Herakles’s death a genuine
ecological integration. Herakles’s godhood therefore manifests as a kind of perception, in
his ability to see the condensation that others cannot. But Pound is not a demigod, and his
failure to conjure in his cantos the final unity he had for so long pursued has by now
become part of his personal legend, the fragmentary final verses and the nearspeechlessness that defined the last years of his life standing as testament to the complete
collapse of his ideals, a collapse that we can easily (perhaps too easily) see as a subject
rhyme to the collapse of the fascist regimes he pledged his loyalty to.
Yet unlike the destruction of those regimes, the elliptical ending of The Cantos
can at least be seen as a noble failure, one that expresses, in the refusal to swerve even in
the face of total collapse, an unshakable devotion to the ideals that animated the project to
begin with. There is no outline to The Cantos, nor anything like the Gilbert and Linati
schemas which gave much-appreciated critical toe-holds to early readers of Joyce’s
Ulysses. What scholars have instead is a mountain of Pound’s non-fiction writing,
comprising letters, essays, lectures, monographs, prefaces, speeches, epigrams, sayings,
and manifestoes, some of which appear in multiple forms and contexts – like the parts of
F.S. Flint’s “A Few Don’ts by an Imagiste” which reappear in Pound’s “Vorticism” – all
of which is of potential relevance to The Cantos, and none of which was pursued with
anything like a systematic program of philosophical development.351 Rather, what holds
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Pound’s work together is a set of deeply held philosophical obsessions which that go on
to manifest in a panoply of diverse interests. Yet while Pound expected, in the optimistic
early days of his epic-writing career, a final display of the revelatory “magic moment,”
and epiphany (or perhaps what Woolf would call a “moment of being”) in which it all
makes sense in the end, the absence of this moment should not blind us to the underlying
system which made that expectation possible. Pound’s poetics in The Cantos, his
technique of arranging individual “luminous details” in carefully layered webs of
metaphorical relations to recreate in his text the network of self-replicating “atoms” that
will form a society in tune with the imperative of the world, is as much an expression of
his politics as any essay he might have written. Pound writes how Confucius says an
emperor should rule: by putting his words in order, by putting himself in order, and then
expanding outwards across the layers of complexity until this unity encompasses the
world. It is a poetics built from productive ignorance, where the perfection of the system
allows the whole to emerge naturally from its parts.
It is for this reason that I have continued to say that Pound sought to be in tune
with “nature” despite my earlier invocation of Morton’s definition of “ecology” in The
Ecological Thought. As I suggested briefly during my discussion of Kant, imperative
thinking is not ecological thinking, nor is it properly natural thinking, but is instead an
unhappy compromise between the two poles. Simply stated, the belief that one should be
connected to the natural world (however that world is conceived) implies that one is not,
but it also implies that the division between nature and culture is also not an essential
ontological division, since if that were the case the imperative would be doomed to
failure to begin with. For Morton, the prime example of ecological thinking is Darwinian
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evolution, which recognises no essential division between human beings and other
animals, and recognizes humans, sunfish, and wet, black boughs as simply different
nodes on an enormous web of relations – abandoning entirely the Aristotelian “great
chain of being” that so ruthlessly hierarchicalizes the natural world.352 So while Pound
seems to value ecological thinking above all else, his mode of thought continues to figure
the natural world as an eternal “away” to which we must venture, a key characteristic of
Morton’s “nature.”
Let us look, for instance, at this moment in Canto LXXXI:
Learn of the green world what can be thy place
In scaled invention or true artistry,
Pull down thy vanity,
Paquin pull down!
The green casque has outdone your elegance.

“Master thyself, then others shall thee beare”
Pull down thy vanity
Thou art a beaten dog beneath the hail
A swollen magpie in a fitful sun,
Half black half white
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Nor knowst’ou wing from tail
Pull down thy vanity
How mean thy hates
Fostered in falsity
(C LXXXI/541)
The central line in this long passage – “master thyself, then others shall thee beare,” an
echo of a similar line from Chaucer’s “Ballade of Good Council”353 – combines Pound’s
Confucianism with his pedagogical theories, aligning (through the surrounding passage)
the attainment of education through the study of specific specimens (whether a sunfish or
a line from Chaucer) with the self-mastery expected of any “good” Confucian emperor.
The attainment of self-knowledge, here taking the form of a kind of zoology (“knowst’ou
wing from tail”), becomes linked to a drive toward the natural “green world,” the distance
of which has filled the addressee with “falsity” and has given a meanness to their hates.
Such is the problem with ethics, as Kant well knew – free will exists, and so ethical laws
will always lack the gravity of an inexorable fiat of the universe.
Though the above passage suggests an automatic progression from ignorance and
meanness towards the knowledge of particulars and the pulling down of vanity,
elsewhere in the later cantos Pound appears to recognize the position of separateness that
his ethics have placed him in. As he writes in the Pisan Cantos, “the wind is part of the
process / the rain is part of the process” (C LXXIV/455) – and this after the wind and rain
had tortured him in his open air cage in the Pisan prison camp. Then later, in the Drafts
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and Fragments, the wind appears again, where Pound implores “do not move / let the
wind speak / that is paradise,” which comes right after the admission that “I lost my
center / fighting the world” (C CXVII/822). That Pound twice, in the face of failure,
conjures stillness and the autonomy of the wind, keeps his project (even as it collapses) in
tune with his Confucian ethics. The vital passage in this regard is as follows:
Le Paradis n’est pas artificeal
nor does the martin against the tempest
fly as in the calm air
“like an arrow, and under bad government
like an arrow”
“Missing the bull’s eye seeks the cause in himself”
(C LXXVII/488)
The final line in this quote is a quite direct paraphrase of a passage from Confucius,
which holds that “there is an analogy between the man of breed and the archer. The
archer who misses the bulls-eye turns and seeks the cause of his failure in himself.”354
Coming as this passage does well into the Pisan Cantos, one obvious reading of this line
is that the archer here is Pound, looking inwards to correct the failure that has placed him
in such peril. Yet the context of the line suggests that we can take the reading even
further. The echo of Douglas’s definition of the natural – “le Paradis n’est pas artificial” –
and the image of the martin adjusting itself to the different kinds of wind together
embody the paradoxes of an imperative like Pound’s.
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The archer is not detached from nature, their shot is as subject to the wind, and its
paradisal coherence, as any other entity. Yet the failure of the shot still remains the
archer’s own, for like the martin they were expected to be in tune with nature, to sense
the speed and the direction of the wind, and tilt their bow accordingly. Pound, as he
would recognize, was not a demigod, and so could not bridge the gap between his politics
and the natural world. He knows that this cohesion exists, and claims to be aware of it,
but his attempts to represent this system in his poetry only end up embodying its
contradictions: he knows the wind is there, and he pays attention to its force, but when his
arrow turns from the target he is unable to incorporate its actions with the breeze. We
may be reminded here of an observation from Emmanuel Levinas that seems to have
prefigured Harman’s work on metaphor. “Things,” he writes, “refer to an inwardness as
parts of the given world . . . caught up in the current of practice where their alterity is
hardly noticeable. Art makes them stand out from the world and thus extracts them from
this belongingness to a subject.”355
To represent an object, Levinas holds, is to remove it from the world it occupied,
disentangling it from its relations. As with Harman and Ortega’s metaphors, then, it is the
very act of holding an object up, alone, for detailed scrutiny that serves to mystify it. But
whereas for Harman this detachment arrives from the impossibility of exhausting an
object via its relations, for Levinas it is precisely because of the relationality of objects
that representation occludes them. These are, in a sense, natural and ecological
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approaches to the ontology of representation – with Harman figuring objects as forever
“away,” and withdrawn from knowledge, and Levinas reading them as highly integrated
into their environments to the point that they become unknowable. Pound, following the
logic of his imperative, finds himself in the middle of these two drives. In his distinct
images he flirts with the possibility of their withdrawal, while in his flat and integrative
politics he continues to valorize the individual and so remove his heroes from the very
natural world to which their art and politics supposedly align. “No wind,” as he writes in
Canto IV, “is the king’s wind” (C IV/16), invoking the wind-bag of Aeolus, which in the
Odyssey so famously taunts Odysseus with his homecoming before blowing it all away.
Such are the dangers of too quickly joining a force of nature with political might: too
often, as you step up to the gates of paradise, its gales will blow and throw them shut
across your nose.
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Chapter 4
The Semantic Ontology of Finnegans Wake:
Reading as De-Mediation
It depends upon what the meaning of the word “is” is.
— Bill Clinton

4.1 What “Is” is Not
In a very important sense, there are no words in Finnegans Wake. What this “sense”
amounts to will be the central topic of the present chapter, but provisionally I will say
that the way in which Wake criticism and interpretation divides the symbols of the text
(implicitly or, less often, explicitly) into both “words” and what Gabriel Renggli has
appropriately called “non-words”356 is unfounded. The narrative and textual ontology of
Finnegans Wake is flat, populated with non-words as far as the eye can read. The claim
that “Finnegans Wake contains no words” might be somewhat surprising, since though
the text is famously obscure and difficult even a perusal of the first lines reveals the
presence of entities that seem like words: “riverrun, past Eve and Adam’s, from swerve
of shore to bend of bay, brings us by a commodius vicus of recirculation back to Howth
Castle and Environs.”357 Before even getting to the close analysis of the word/non-word
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division and what its relation is to ontology, it ought to be clear at a glance that the line
above, for all of its obscurity, does indeed contain words as the term is commonly
understood. Indeed, these appear to be English words placed in the sentence as they
would be in common English grammar: past, from, swerve, of, shore, to, bend . . . There
are even recognizable names (Eve and Adam) and a place name that should be familiar to
anyone who has visited Dublin (Howth Castle).
Other words, of course, are not so easily categorized – “riverrun,” for example –
and so it can appear that the signifiers of the Wake can be split generally into the two
categories, “words” and “non-words.” A word in Finnegans Wake does not generally call
for special resolution. While of course scholars are attentive to its place in the larger
patterns of signification in which each word participates (such as the way “Howth Castle
and Environs” produces an instance of the HCE acronym) words in the Wake are seldom
decomposed in the way that non-word portmanteaus tend to be. A word like “is” rarely
receives the sort of attention that, for example, Umberto Eco lavishes on “sansglorians”
(FW 4.7) in The Aesthetics of Chaosmos, which he resolves into the equation
“sang+sans+glorians+sanglot+riant,”358 or like Derek Attridge gives “shuit” (FW
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620.4), which he breaks down into “suit,” “shirt,” “shit,” and “chute,” among other
things.359 This is also an attitude that we see in the much earlier work of Clive Hart, who
writes that “the essential value of the pun or portmanteau-word in Finnegans Wake lies
not in its elusive and suggestive qualities but in its capacity to compress much meaning
into little space.”360 Indeed, this kind of analysis goes straight back to the coining of
“portmanteau,” and perhaps its most famous example, in the poem “Jabberwocky” which
Humpty Dumpty recites to Alice in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass, and
which begins:
Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.361
Humpty Dumpty glosses these “hard words” in much the same way that Joyceans have
tended to gloss the non-words of Finnegans Wake: “Well, ‘slithy’ means ‘lithe and
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slimy.’ ‘Lithe’ is the same as ‘active.’ You see it’s like a portmanteau – there are two
meanings packed up into one word.”362 For Humpty Dumpty (as with, it seems, many
Joyceans), non-words decompose into the words that form their primary elements, their
strangeness resolving into clarity.
But while one can often see this scene offered as a clear definition of
“portmanteau,” its larger context indicates that we should take care to use it suspiciously.
As Humpty Dumpty says two pages earlier, “when I use a word . . . it means just what I
choose it to mean – neither more nor less.”363 This declaration should be a red flag for
Wake critics for a number of reasons, the most obvious being its brash declaration of the
insuperability of authorial intent (a shaky ground at the best of times, and especially
given the somewhat aleatoric nature of the Wake’s composition), and the way it plays
into the larger HCE/Finn meta-myth of a patriarch’s rise and fall (in which Humpty
Dumpty already participates in multiple ways). But the larger scene itself seems to
undermine the portmanteau’s supposed unity. As Humpty Dumpty continues to explain
the first verse of “Jabberwocky,” he is interrupted by Alice at the word “wabe”:
“And ‘the wabe’ is the grass-plot round a sun-dial, I
suppose?” said Alice, surprised at her own ingenuity.
“Of course it is. It’s called ‘wabe,’ you know,
because it goes along way before it, and a long way behind
it—”
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“And a long way on each side,” Alice added.
“Exactly so.”364
The definition of “wabe” is not so much a combination of disparate words as it is a riddle.
Alice is able to figure out its third characteristic because she notices that the first two can
be expressed as “way before” and “way behind” and so makes the leap to “way
beyond”365 (which suggests that Humpty Dumpty’s pronunciation of “wabe” resembles
“way-be” rather than, say, “wade” or “wave”). That Alice is able to do this, however,
destabilizes Humpty Dumpty’s authority, because it roots the definition of “wabe” in a
signifying structure that can operate independently of him. A clever reader can not only
figure out the riddle and the three senses that Humpty Dumpty had considered, but also
develop further iterations that he seems not to have considered – like “way between” or
“way beside.” “Wabe,” then, is not the sum of a limited set of linguistic elements, a
knowable object that can be exhausted by a sufficiently close analysis, but rather a
particular node in a network of relationships that exceeds and defies any individual
reader’s attempt at exhaustiveness.
In his analysis of the non-word “mardred,” from the phrase “the author, in fact,
was mardred” (FW 517.11), Renggli comes to a very similar conclusion. After first
marking the obvious connection to “murdered,” he asks: “How do we know that a murder
has taken place? . . . we do not in fact know it. . . . the constellation of letters that form
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‘mardred,’ is not a word, at least not in any readily recognizable language.”366 Renggli’s
conclusion very much resembles that of Attridge following his reading of “shuit,” where
he says that to call the term a “word” is “of course misleading, since it is precisely
because it is not a word of the English language that it functions in the way that it
does.”367 Thus, for the sake of our heuristic, temporary taxonomy of Wakeian terms, we
can treat as an essential element of the non-word that of the potential for reducibility, of
being dis-integrated into a set of lexical elements – a potential signaled by its status as a
problem, or as a stoppage in the flow of interpretation. The trait of reducibility seems to
arise from a given term’s relation to a pre-existing human language, much like how
Humpty Dumpty’s portmanteaus all seem to reduce to words in modern English.
Finnegans Wake is likewise closely related to English, though in a much more complex
way. As Sam Slote has remarked, “in terms of basic critical orientation, the Wake is
certainly not written in English . . . Perhaps it would be safer to say that it is written from
English,”368 and Attridge has likewise observed that “a fundamental property of
[Finnegans Wake is] its being more than one language at once.”369 But the English-ness
of a particular word likely matters less than its being related to any language whatsoever.
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The division between word and non-word therefore seems to be fairly
straightforward. A non-word is something which does not exist in any linguistic system
outside of the Wake, and which can by one means or another be resolved into a set of
words. I use the word “resolve” deliberately, because in a certain kind of reading (Eco’s,
for example) it is the function of analysis to explain and to “explain away” the non-word
by essentially transforming it into a short-form for the combination of words that it
“really” represents. The critic becomes like Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty, listing the basic
components of a non-word so to define its meaning once and for all. But as Renggli and
Attridge make clear, it is Alice one ought to resemble instead – taking the non-word not
as a mystery to explain, but rather as an invitation to explore the ways and contours of the
Wakeian language game. Yet even this openness leaves the basic word/non-word split in
place, since it recognizes this exegetic potential in only the “problematic” non-words not
clearly part of any external language system. What I wish to attack here is the unspoken
assumption that if one can gloss a given word as simply a term from English, French,
Mandarin, Latin, Arabic, Romansch, Somali, Frisian, Cree, Korean, Basque, or what have
you, then the kind of analysis we see granted to “sansglorians,” shuit,” and “mardred”370
is either needless or unlikely to be fruitful.
This issue brings us back to the book’s first lines, and in particular the phrase
“commodius vicus.” “Commodius” both is and is not a “word” in the sense that I have
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been using the term. To begin with, the recent corrected edition of Finnegans Wake
released by Danis Rose and John O’Hanlon indicates that it is mis-spelled, with their
edition presenting it as “commodious.”371 However, as the OED indicates, both of these
are correct English words – and are in fact different variations of the same word, which
means “advantageous, beneficial, profitable, of use” and also simply “convenient.” (And
is, in keeping with Joyce’s “cloacal obsession,”372 related also to the word “commode.”)
The -ius spelling that we see in the first edition is rarer, but it has still seen definite
use.373 It is perhaps a fortuitous coincidence that the variation between these two versions
of the term have no effect on its pronunciation, meaning that (in a manner similar to the
word-play behind Derrida’s coinage, “différance”) the variation is purely textual. This
silence contrasts with the doubling of the word “vicus,” which many readers quite
logically take as an allusion to Giambattista Vico, whose historiographic philosophy is an
important structuring element in the Wake. However, “vicus” is also a word in its own
right – a Latin one, which the Oxford Latin Dictionary defines as “a group of dwellings”
and “a block of houses, street, group of streets, etc., in a town, often forming a social or
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administrative unit,” and which originates in the Greek “oikos” (“οἶκος”). (This
connection to municipal units likely also connects the word to the “Vico Road, Dalkey”
we encounter in the “Nestor” episode of Ulysses [U 2.25].) And, since “vicus” is a Latin
word, it makes sense that we should read it with Latin pronunciation, which the
dictionary provides as “uīcus.” The term’s status as a Latin word thus splits it, giving it a
textual resemblance to “Vico” but not an auditory one. Given the importance of the
sounds of words in Finnegans Wake, the common advice to read a section aloud if one
finds it impenetrable, and the importance of sound and pronunciation to many of the
Wake’s allusive patterns, this is not a division that we should take lightly. While one
could argue that an etymological relation between “uīcus” (a spelling I will retain to
indicate its pronunciation) and “Vico” would allow us to bring the philosopher in again
through the back door, this still does not remove the division between text and sound, nor
does it restore the obviousness that the allusion seems to have if we ignore the Latin
pronunciation. In fact, it seems that to read the word at all we will have to ignore at least
one of its signifying relations.
But let us return to “commodi(o)us,” with which we have not yet finished. I add
the O in brackets because, though I do not doubt that the alteration is well supported by
the avant-texte, I question whether the existence of the word’s second version in the
manuscripts ought to permanently remove the first version from the field of
consideration. Consider, for instance, the term’s allusion to the Roman Emperor
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Commodus, which Roland McHugh points out in his annotations.374 If it were the case
that we were deriving this allusion from the textual resemblance alone, then the –ious
spelling the new edition adopts would certainly weaken it. Yet the allusion clearly
remains in the (unchanged) pronunciation of the word, as it does with the term’s wider
context. As we see from the larger line, the “commodi(o)us vicus of recirculation” sends
us “back to Howth Castle and Environs” – an instance of the HCE acronym with which
Joyce identifies the presence of the book’s continually rising and falling patriarch, who
manifests both in this lexical tag and in the appearance of any similar figure (Parnell,
Moses, Napoleon, etc.). Commodus’s identity as an emperor assassinated by
strangulation while taking a bath in CE 192 fits the model fairly well, but what clinches
the association is his appearance later in the Wake, where he provides the acronym’s C:
“Heliogobbleus and Commodus and Enobarbarus” (FW 157. 26-27). Of the several
possible ways to read this section (for brevity’s sake I will not subject every passage of
the Wake I analyze this kind of minute critique) we can see how “Heliogobbleus”
resembles “Heliogabalus,” an alternate name for the Roman emperor Elagabalus, who
ruled between CE 218 and 222. “Enobarbarus” can also refer to Lucius Domitius
Ahenobarbus, more popularly known as the emperor Nero.375 All three emperors died by
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assassination, which suggests that, in the “rise and fall” pattern of the HCE arc, this
particular instance places its emphasis on the latter.
We can already begin to see how these two “words,” when placed under close
scrutiny, take on many of the traits of the Wake’s non-word portmanteaus, particularly in
the way that portmanteaus resist “the impression of a carefully arranged context or of a
successfully engineered verbal coincidence [as in a pun].”376 What is troubling here is
not that these words can be read in multiple ways, or that their meanings split off in
multiple directions, but that their multiple readings seem to oppose each other. We are
tempted in equal measure to resolve “commodius” as “Commodus,” as befitting the
allusion, and as “commodious,” as befitting the textual history, but doing so means
deliberately privileging one layer of signification over the other. A similar problem
occurs with “vicus” – which links up to “Vico” either closely or tenuously depending on
whether we privilege its textual or auditory components, which itself partially depends on
whether we consider it to be a word at all. None of this even gets to the issue of how we
ought to read the words in conjunction. Shall we gloss it as “commodious uīcus” (a
village that is homely and comfortable), “Commodus’s uīcus” (Commodus’s hometown),
“commodious Vico” (reflecting the philosopher’s usefulness to Joyce’s project), or
perhaps as something else entirely? To choose any one reading means deciding to
privilege one set of relations over another, and more importantly means ignoring the
specific form of the terms as we encounter them on the page. The Wake’s “vicus” does

376

Ruben Borg, “Neologizing in Finnegans Wake: Beyond a Topology of the Wakean Portmanteau”

Poetics Today 28.1 (2007): 146.

187

not “really” mean “Vico,” or “uīcus,” or any of the other glosses we may supply it.
Likewise, even my earlier point about “commodius” being an English word ignores its
complex and historically specific usage history, and likewise the fact that, given
Finnegans Wake’s vast historical and linguistic range, we ought to be attentive to the
multiple forms of English that have existed over time.377
The central issue of the word/non-word division thus seems to be that the
wordiness of a Wakeian word dissolves under a sufficient degree of scrutiny. Words in
Finnegans Wake are as withdrawn and inexhaustible as non-words, and for this reason
the division between them is not actually meaningful. In few places do we see this
problem better than in the word “is.” The present tense of the verb “to be” is one of the
most common words in the English language, and it is so small and so simple as to be
seemingly atomic, indivisible, and thus exhaustible by analysis. But the language of the
Wake contains no atoms, as we can see in two related instances of “is,” in “even when
Oldsire is Dead to the World” (FW 105.29) and “the citye of Is is issuant” (FW 601.5). A
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scan of these two lines reveals two odd but still readable phrases, with “Oldsire” and “Is”
functioning as proper nouns operating as normal (and with “Oldsire” – i.e. “old father” –
alluding to the “old father, old artificer” Stephen Dedalus apostrophizes at the end of A
Portrait378). In both of these lines, the “is” functions as it does in standard English, and
one can generate perfectly coherent and interesting readings which treat the “is” at face
value.
The complexity arrives by a similar means as it did with “commodius vicus,” by
way of the same problem, that being how, as Derrida writes, “the distinction between
grapheme and the empirical body of the corresponding graphic sign separates an inside of
phenomenological consciousness and the outside of the world.”379 There is a split
between the “empirical” form of a given sign and its “ideal” – one that we might be
tempted to see as between what a word “looks like” and what it “is.” It is precisely the
same mistake that leads us to say that “vicus” is “supposed to be” “Vico” or “uīcus” or
something else, while at the same time ignoring the specificity of the sign on the page.
Thus, we might also be tempted to read “Oldsire is” and “Is is” as, respectively, the
Egyptian gods “Osiris” and “Isis,” and we would do so with as much ease and
justification as we earlier read “Oldsire” as “old father.” But to do either would be to
reduce the meaning of the “is” to conform to a single network of signification, to choose
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either its graphic form or its audible one and set that particular construction above the
rest. It is in this sense that we can see how the Wake “simultaneously makes both possible
and impossible the search for truth understood as proximal presence in the text.”380
Thus, the phrase “there are no words in Finnegans Wake” is best understood as a
maxim enjoining against the elision of any given sign’s empirical and contextual
specificity. All signs in Finnegans Wake are basically undecidable, in that the act of
reading them causes the condensation of one particular set of relations into a calcified
interpretation that, if one is not careful, may come to masquerade as the true and final
reading of a word. Nowhere is this sort of reading more dangerous than with what we
might commonly take to be words, simply because the obviousness of the reading. These
different readings are not only multiple, but irreconcilable, meaning that a given sign
cannot simply be disintegrated into its component parts, as we see Eco try to do. To
produce a reading is invariably to decide which lines of connection shall take precedence
over the others, a decision that ultimately arises from the act of reading rather than
anything in the text.

4.2 What’s What when Everything is Something Else?
[I]f Being is being-with, then it is, in its being-with, the
“with” that constitutes Being; the with is not simply an
addition.
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— Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural381
A fair question at this point would be what all this discussion of words and non-words is
leading to. After all, am I not dangerously close to the problem articulated (though not
endorsed) by Fritz Senn, in which one “stop[s] at every word and worrie[s] at its
philological justification . . . [so that one can] never even envisage such a thing as
Finnegans Wake, much more than the sum of its mysterious pars”? 382 It is in avoiding
this trap and linking my word-level analysis to broader critical questions of what “such a
thing as Finnegans Wake” amounts to that I will approach what is the key issue of this
chapter, that being to what extent and in what way anything can be said to exist within
the structure of the Wake. The above section should be seen as a necessary prologue to
this deeper analysis. While anyone well-read in Joyce criticism will be aware of how
Finnegans Wake enacts and intensifies the processes of semantic displacement
underlying signification generally, 383 the point that I have been trying to emphasize is
that what we are dealing with is not simply a single layer of relations that, once
sufficiently enumerated, can be “understood,” but rather several contradictory,
intersecting layers that cannot be reconciled with each other. Importantly, these sets of
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relations extend throughout the book, incorporating both larger thematic patterns and
repeated words (as we saw with the allusion to Commodus) as well as the immediate
semantic context of the sign.
This undecidability leads to several problems with even referring to the characters
and events that would form the basis of a more macroscopic reading of the text. Indeed,
as Finn Fordham has written, the Wake’s characters “are carriers of Joyce’s exercises in
style, rather than self-consistent entities.”384 Finnegans Wake’s radical undermining of
character has in this manner largely been understood and articulated as a kind of
dissolution, in which the fixed form of a fictional character disintegrates upon contact
with the text, being pulled along without form or character like so much silt in the Liffey.
I do not necessarily consider this description inaccurate so much as incomplete. While it
acknowledges the breakdown of character as we normally understand it, the dissolution
metaphor does not provide us with direction towards describing what the Wake actually
does – and something similar could be said for our understanding of what Finnegans
Wake does with other basic narratological structures, like plot. I began this chapter with
my analysis of the non-word because it shows the problem in miniature. The basic
problems, in all of these cases, includes the failure to treat the macrocosm and the
microcosm on equal terms, along with the related failure to remain cognizant of the
specificity of a given sign while still attending to the larger patterns of signification in
which it participates.
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How does one approach Finnegans Wake in this way? My point of access comes
in the form of three related figures: Giordano Bruno, Nicholas Cusanus (AKA Nicholas
of Cusa), and Graham Harman. Bruno and Cusanus’s connections to the Wake are
already well-known while Harman’s usefulness here requires explanation, so I will begin
with him. At the very end of Tool-Being, the text in which he introduced his Object
Oriented Ontology, Harman alluded to a problem that could have disastrous effects for
his burgeoning metaphysics: after spending his book describing a world of objects
circumscribed by their own mutual withdrawal, the impoverishment of their interactions
with other entities implied by Harman’s generalization of Heidegger’s tool analysis to all
object relations, Harman reached the conclusion that his system if taken to its logical
conclusions would proscribe any direct inter-object collisions. “The world,” as he writes,
“has been said to contain no relations – nothing other than entities. But entities are always
primarily withdrawn tool-beings, and as such, they are sealed away in a vacuum devoid
of all relation. . . . Any contact between distinct entities would seem impossible.”385 An
object, for Harman, is anything that withdraws. So the human subject and the hammer are
objects, but so is the human-hammer synthesis, as well as the synthesis of the hammer’s
handle and its head. Every relation is, for Harman, actually an object – a definition that
proceeds along an infinite regress. At this point, OOO seems at risk of invoking a kind of
Zeno’s paradox against itself, permanently foreclosing any relations between objects, just
as Zeno foreclosed their motion.
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To remedy this problem, Harman makes a strange gambit, introducing
occasionalism into his system. The use of this term was possibly a mistake, since (as
Harman points out) his is not the theistic occasionalism of Al-Ghazali or Malebranche.
Whereas their occasionalist philosophies posited an omnipotent god whose infinite power
subsumes all causation within itself, so that “the states of bodies and minds are only socalled secondary causes which ‘occasion’ or incite the primary cause, God, to act,” 386
Harman’s occasionalism was far more limited and “local.”387 Tool-Being does not fully
explore the concept, but instead simply drops it in on the final pages to function like a
metaphysical cheat code to nullify a formerly intractable problem. The development
would come later, in Guerilla Metaphysics and in several subsequent essays, at which
point he sensibly adopted the more accurate name “vicarious causation.” Harman’s key
point is that all relations must occur though some form of mediation, that these
mediations themselves constitute objects, and that since objects are supposed to be
inexhaustible these mediations themselves require further mediations, a state that (in the
absence of the je ne sais quoi of vicarious cause) would imply that all relation was
impossible. In the later book, vicarious causation re-appears as OOO’s “most pivotal
issue,”388 not only because it introduces into Harman’s metaphysics a question not unlike
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the one Hume posed in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (the Kantian
aftermath of which,389 fittingly, Harman has long attempted to overcome) but also
because the problem extends to the composition of objects themselves. As Harman
explains in a later essay, “relations never encounter the autonomous reality of their
components,”390 and since all relations, for Harman, themselves create new objects, and
since his system excludes any kind of “atomic” object that would be invisible and fully
apprehensible by others, then all objects are themselves constructed out of smaller objects
whose relations are just as questionable as any other. Objects cannot touch, cannot
combine, cannot form themselves in any coherent way – and yet Harman’s system can
only work if they somehow do.
Harman has never provided a coherent, plausible explanation of what vicarious
cause is, what it does, how it works, or where it comes from – and as much as he denies
it, the deus ex machina quality of the interjection is inescapable. In Guerilla Metaphysics,
he attempts to offer this mystery up as a site for future philosophical speculation and
research, but he has not yet foreclosed the possibility that vicarious cause simply indexes
a fatal contradiction in his system. However, though I have not come here to praise
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Harman, neither have I come to bury him.391 OOO is interesting not because it provides a
fully coherent and exhaustive metaphysical system that one can “apply” to Finnegans
Wake (or any other literary work) but because the contours of its flaws and limitations
open up several fascinating critical and philosophical questions. For example, in an essay
from 2010, Harman explains how vicarious causation might work with the following
comparison:
There needs to be some way for objects to relate without
relating. This might sound impossible, but analogous
situations already exist in other spheres. Consider the case
of language. Here we are not just able to say something
openly or not say it at all – there is also the third option of
alluding to it . . . One can call someone an Olympic victor
without quite saying so, simply by saying that he had been
three times crowned with a wreath.392
The particular allusion to which Harman alludes comes from Aristotle’s Rhetoric, where
it is used to show that familiar propositions do not need to be described in their full
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detail: “to show that Dorieus has been victor in a contest for which the prize is a crown, it
is enough to say ‘For he has been victor in the Olympic games.’” 393
Harman’s purpose in this particular essay is not merely to describe what vicarious
causation is, but also to show that it can be unidirectional – or, as he puts it, “causation is
never reciprocal except by accident.”394 Unfortunately, the nature of the example is such
that it immediately undermines his point. After all, in Aristotle’s day the wreath was the
normal and standard award given to Olympic athletes, but for the modern Olympics gold
medals have been the norm since the 1904 games in St. Louis. Thus, if we look to the
audience of the (as of this writing) most recent games in Pyeongchang, we can be
confident that not a single person among them would have any memory of an Olympic
winner receiving a wreath. Certainly there are many who know the history of the games
well enough to be aware of the old prizes, but the information is by no means widespread
enough today for “she won an Olympic event” to be reliably synonymous with “she
received a wreath.” The example suggests that relations by allusion are symmetrical, in
that the categories of “Olympian” and “has won a wreath” become linked through the
repeated invocation of their overlap, and that this symmetricity only becomes apparent
over time, and is not visible at the level of an instant. This example, first of all, points to
one possible way that OOO could save itself: that being the development of a more
rigorous conception of temporality. Harman’s discussions of time tend to be fairly
schematic, and occur mostly in the context of his attempts to re-consider Heidegger’s
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notion of the fourfold.395 His summaries of inter-object relations, however, all seem to
occur within instants, focusing on the moment of contact to the exclusion of all else.
Since this limitation seems to largely extend from a lack of consideration rather than any
constituent a-temporality within the system, it is possible that further development would
permit OOO to dig itself out of its hole.
The reciprocity of relation, and the absence of purely instantaneous relations, also
points to the manner in which vicarious causation – and in particular its emphasis on
mediation – becomes useful for my analysis of the Wake. So I may explain how, let us
imagine two speeding cars colliding head-on in the middle of an otherwise empty
intersection. It is not merely the case that (if we follow Harman) the two car-objects will
themselves, at the moment of collision, form a larger object from their instantaneous
interaction (however it may be mediated), but rather that they will continue during every
point of time to disassemble and reassemble a vast number of other relational objects as
their internal components shift and change their relations. The back window of Car A
ceases to exist as its components shatter into pieces, which themselves will form a new
object consisting of a set of falling glass shards. Those shards will remain connected
vicariously to both Car A, from which they fell, and Car B, without which the crash
would not have occurred. But – importantly – the object Car A-Car B-shards remains for
Harman completely distinct from, say, the object Car A-Car B-dented bumper, despite
the fact that both of these relational objects themselves form part of the larger object that
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is the car crash. And I say “both” of these objects, despite the overlap between them,
because according to OOO they would still withdraw from each other even though they
share many of the same components. It would seem then that in addition to an infinite
regress, OOO also has to deal with an infinite dispersal, as the sheer vastness of the
relations occurring in any complex physical event would lead to the formation of an
unfathomable number of relational objects, spread out across the full mass the eventobject and incorporating every smaller object within it many times over. This dispersal
would also continuously re-occur over time – with the relational object of the car crash at
T1, T2, and T3396 actually amounting to three completely unique and distinct objects
(whose relation across time would itself constitute another object).
Though Harman is quite clear about his desire to avoid a purely relational
ontology like the one he sees in Latour,397 the centrality of vicarious cause in OOO as, it
seems, the prime unknown of the system, means that thinking with OOO invariably
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becomes a matter of thinking with and through relations. Furthermore, it is not despite,
but because of the closed-off nature of Harman’s objects, that relation takes the form of
interpenetration, where two objects relate by sharing components. While in the example
above Car A is present in both objects, in each relation Car A is apprehended by its coactors in a different manner, withdrawing in a configuration unique to every touch. It is
therefore multiple, taking on a unique relational existence across every larger object in
which it is a part (something that would also be true of each of its components,
downwards to infinity). Since the objects “internal” to a larger object are likewise
independent entities, they too can enter into relations which would themselves form new
objects and that would therefore enter into an interpenetrative relationship with the
above-mentioned larger object.398 What we end up with is an ontological system roughly
(though by no means exactly) comparable to Leibniz’s monadology, but with the location
and nature of the hidden elements externalized. While for Leibniz, all objects are
identical monads whose essential sameness is hidden behind the accidental qualities
visible to our impoverished perception – i.e. the similarities are hidden “within” the
object and are only perceivable by an omniscient God – Harman’s system implies a state
in which every object is continually intersecting with every other through a complex web
of causal relations, most of which is invisible. The individual hammer I hold in my hand
thus appears to be independent, singular, and coherent because of the poverty of my
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perception, and the breaking of the hammer reveals to me the existence of interior
relations that intersect with the surrounding world in ways previously unknown.
It is in this way that the breakdown of vicarious cause into a relational ontology
can allow us to understand how the linguistic and narrative entities of the Wake function.
As we have seen above, the non-words of the Wake likewise interpenetrate each other,
with each one being part of multiple and contradictory sets of relations that permit
mutually-exclusive interpretations. Despite his frequent criticisms of Derrida, when the
implications of Harman’s system are properly teased out, they clearly resemble an
ontologized form of the linguistic play of différance. Whereas for Derrida, “every
concept is inscribed in a chain or in a system within which it refers to the other, to other
concepts, by means of the systemic play of differences,”399 in OOO all objects become
engaged with other objects in a network of inter-object relations that ultimately obscure
the original object’s self-identity. So too in the Wake, where (as I will describe in more
detail below) every entity can only be encountered through mediation with another entity,
in which no particular instance of mediation exhausts the entities involved, and in which
the sum total of the medial relations creates contradictory but internally consistent images
that cannot be resolved to a single essential presence. While Harman is emphatic that he
believes that all objects have an “autonomous essence”400 – one of the many ways in
which his system resembles that of Aristotle – given the problems caused by vicarious
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causation, I fail to see how these essences would actually arise, save for perhaps in a
completely inaccessible (and dare I say “noumenal”?) object-in-itself that Harman’s
ontology explicitly forecloses from relation. Instead, it is more useful and instructive to
understand any given object (like any given non-word) as multiply-present, in that it has
several independently-operating “phenomenal” existences created by the inability of each
interaction to exhaust it – much like how I “perceive” a hammer quite differently than
does the nail it strikes.
Returning now to Finnegans Wake, while this critique of Harman’s ontology does
point to how we might generalize the earlier word-level analysis of the Wake into a
conception of its abstract structure and its treatment of plot and character, it does not
show how we might discern the relationship between different related narrative objects.
A naive OOO reading of, for example, the relationship between Parnell and HCE might
direct us towards metaphors of building blocks and containment. That is, while Parnell
and HCE are, in Finnegans Wake, independent objects just like any other, HCE is
“bigger,” being “made of” not only Parnell, but all the similar figures who populate the
book. Though there is not yet any significant literature on OOO and Joyce, we do see
readings that come to similar conclusions in, for example, Harry Burrell’s Narrative
Design in Finnegans Wake, which holds that “to understand Finnegans Wake readers
must maintain a mindset that what they are apprehending is fundamentally nothing but
the [Biblical] Fall story with all the other levels of meaning and reference grafted onto
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and embellishing it.”401 But metaphors of containment can be misleading, since they risk
the implication that the parts can be determined by the whole, just as metaphors of
construction can result in the equally misleading notion that it is the whole that
determines the parts. While it is perfectly reasonable to see in the
“commodi(o)us”/Commodus relationship (for example) the appearance of an HCE-like
figure, we cannot let this connection blot out the sign’s other relations. We must
understand the relationship between different, interpenetrative levels of signification in
such a way that we can appreciate the wide-scale networks of relations that crisscross the
text while also paying due attention to the specificity and singularity 402 of the individual
sign before our eyes. And it is Bruno who shall show us how this can be done.
Bruno’s place in Joyce scholarship has tended to be spotty and non-committal.
While he appears in Samuel Beckett’s highly influential essay “Dante... Bruno. Vico..
Joyce,”403 he serves as far more of a bit player than his position in the title would suggest
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– most of the essay concerns Joyce’s relationship to Vico, while only a small portion of it
directly discusses Dante and Bruno.404 Joyce scholarship has tended to follow a similar
pattern: of the three writers whose names precede Joyce in the essay’s title, it is Vico by
far whose relationship to the Wake has received the most attention. Likewise, when Joyce
scholarship talks about Nicholas Cusanus at all, it is almost always in relation to Bruno,
with the relationship summarized in terms of a direct line of influence. For example,
Donald Phillip Verene writes that “Bruno’s conception of the infinite as well as his
principle of the coincidence of contraries have their origin in Cusanus’s famous little
treatise, De docta ignorantia [On Learned Ignorance].”405 Similarly, as Ingrid D.
Rowland writes in her biography of Bruno, the Nolan “clearly drew his belief in infinite
worlds, and a good deal else, from . . . Nicholas of Cusa.”406 While neither of these
summaries are, strictly speaking, inaccurate, they gloss over an important way in which
Bruno and Cusanus conceptualized the relationship between infinity and the coincidence
of contraries.
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In On Learned Ignorance, Cusanus articulates a philosophical position that would
later be known as pantheism – one that would receive its most thorough and systematic
articulation in Spinoza’s Ethics (which clearly bears the mark of Bruno’s influence407).
Pantheism is a theology that treats the divine as fully immanent to the natural world.408 It
is a position we see, for example, in Spinoza’s formulation of “God, or Nature,” which
treats the two entities as logically equivalent. 409 But Cusanus’s pantheism is more
fraught, oscillating at times between a pantheism like Spinoza’s, in which there is no real
distinction between nature and the divine, and one in which God can still be conceived as
an independent entity, one that cannot simply be derived from the natural world.410 As
Eugene Thacker writes, Cusanus “is caught between a fully immanent pantheism – a pure
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immanence of supernatural and natural, God and world – and a tempered, transcendental
pantheism . . . in which God, as absolute maximum, transcends the world by its very
encompassing.”411 For Cusanus, as with Bruno, contrary terms can be coincident as a
result of their encompassing within an infinite entity, the “one absolutely maximum”
which “exists in itself as eternally, equally, and unchangeably the same.” 412 For Bruno,
who in following (and advancing beyond) the work of Copernicus was able to imagine
that the universe was itself infinite, no higher transcendence is necessary for this
coincidence within the infinite to be possible.413
Bruno’s more immanent, materialist pantheism is more similar to what we
encounter in Finnegans Wake for quite a few reasons. We of course counter his famous
decentering of the universe, such as the kind we see in The Ash Wednesday Supper,
where Bruno extends Copernicus’s critique of geocentrism to claim not only that the
Earth is not at the center of the universe, but that the universe in fact has no center, and
that there are multiple Earth-like planets besides.414 But, in a manner not unlike what we
see in Harman, this immanence leads to an obsession with mediation. As we see in
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Cause, Principle, and Unity, the argument that an unchanging divinity is present in all
things leads to the question of how change and alteration is possible. Whereas in OOO
the flattening of ontological relations leads to an implied stasis by cutting off all objects
from each other so to make causal connections impossible, the pantheistic flattening that
Bruno embraces instead squashes change by subsuming disparity and difference into an
omnipresent infinity. But Bruno has a solution:
[M]utation is not striving for another being, but for another
mode of being. And this is the difference between the
universe and the things of the universe: for the universe
contains all beings and all modes of being, while each thing
of the universe possesses all being but not all modes of
being. Each thing cannot possess, in all act, all particulars
and accidents . . . outside each one of them there exits an
infinity of other things. . . . Understand, therefore, that each
single thing is one, but not in the same way. 415
That is to say, though every entity is permeated by the infinite, each remains a singular
finite thing that cannot itself express the boundlessness to which it is linked. Thus,
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entities can vary in their particular expressions of being, as seen through their interactions
with other things.416
This relationship between infinite being and finite expression leads Bruno to an
obsession with mediation and interposition. Everything that interacts seems to do so
through an intermediary, and every cause must be multiple, heterogeneous, branching off
into byways of whys and hows and wherefores. We see this medial obsession, for
example, in his essay “On Magic,” where Bruno combines his cosmology with his
interest in occultism, alchemy, and Hermeticism. In the process of arguing that celestial
events are able to influence events on Earth – an argument that rests on the claim that
“there is a descent from God through the world to animals, and an ascent from animals
through the world to God” 417 – Bruno traces a ladder stretching from God through
planets and stars, elements, compounds, the senses, the soul, and finally the body
itself.418 Bruno’s ontology requires this linkage because for him, as with Harman,
causation as we normally understand it is impossible, since (as we saw earlier) the fact
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that objects are “limited and circumscribed by their surface” (i.e. are finite) means that
they cannot act directly on each other, meaning that instead “all action comes from
quality and form and ultimately from soul.”419 Thus, for Bruno (and unlike Cusanus),
God does not take the form of a super-entity that can be conceived of independently of
the world it occupies, but rather “reaches each object through its center” and “governs it
from the inside” without transcending it.420
It is important to emphasize the everydayness of these relations, the fact that
despite involving what might seem like grand, transcendent events, it is ultimately in the
mundane that this ontology manifests. It is this mundanity that we encounter in Bruno’s
dialogue The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast, during a brief dalliance with
occasionalism where we see Mercury executing a command from Jove. An occasionalist
god, Jove must dictate every event down to the most minute, and as befitting a work by
Bruno these commands come through the mediation of a messenger. The list of
Mercury’s tasks – which is quite lengthy – is notable for its mundane details, like the
decree that “Vasta, the wife of Albenzio, while she tries to curl the hair on her temples,
shall burn fifty-seven of them because she overheated her iron,”421 that “two hundred
fifty-two maggots be born out of the dung of Albenzio’s ox; that of these, fourteen be

419

Cause, Principle, and Unity, 115-116.

420

Paul Henri Michel, The Cosmology of Giordano Bruno, trans. R.E.W. Maddison (Ithaca: Cornell

University Press, 1973), 115.
421

Giordano Bruno, The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast, trans. Arthur D. Imerti (Lincoln: University

of Nebraska Press, 2004), 132.

209

trampled upon and killed by Albenzio’s foot; that twenty-six of them die from being
turned upside down; [and] that twenty-two live in a cavern,”422 and that “the cuckoo
should be heard singing from Starza, and that he must ‘cuckoo’ neither more nor less than
twelve times.”423 As the long, humorous, almost Joycean list goes on, we should at no
point forget that each of these events is the manifestation of a singular and infinite divine
will, which arises from “one simple and singular act, [with which Jove] creates all of the
past, present, and future.”424 Thus, mundanity, for Bruno, is not the opposite of the
divine, but rather the surest means of encountering it.
As we turn back to Joyce and to Finnegans Wake, it is this relationship between
interpenetration and the coincidence of the macroscopic with the microscopic that we
should keep in mind. As Donald Phillip Verene sees in his analysis of Bruno’s role in the
Wake, with the opposing brothers Shem and Shaun we see “a dialectic that coincides at
the human level, unlike the opposites of Cusanus that can be reconciled only at the level
of divine being, they are a twone [sic] that is wholly accessible to us.”425 It is the greater
immanence of his philosophy that makes Bruno key to understanding the role of the
coincidence of contraries in the linguistic and ontological structure of Finnegans Wake,
and it is likewise this immanence that makes Bruno an erstwhile predecessor to Harman.
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It is notable that both philosophers posit that objects possess an inaccessible “inside” that
cannot be exhausted by their relations – for Harman because of the implications of
Heidegger’s tool analysis, and for Bruno because each object takes part in the infinity of
the universe despite also being bounded and finite. Likewise, in the work of both
philosophers boundedness and inexhaustibility come paired with multiplication and
interpenetrability. In Harman, the distinctness of each object as it is apprehended by other
nearby objects – an apprehension that leads to the creation of larger objects (which I have
been distinguishing from their components with the term “relational,” though it is not
Harman’s) – means that an object’s role and apprehension will be different in every
larger relational object in which it participates. Likewise, the infinite regress of mediation
that vicarious causation implies means not only that every object has a boundless number
of components, but also (because these components are themselves objects) that each one
of them may enter into relations independently of the object of which they are a part.
Thus, every object, through its components, is criss-crossed by other relational objects
that take part in one or more of its components. For Bruno, the multiplication and
interpenetration is far simpler. Since every entity contains within it the infinity of the
universe, and because this infinity is such that it comprehends all aspects of existence,
including (as with Cusanus) opposing ones, then each entity plays a part in the other’s
existence by way of its role in the universe’s immanent pantheism. It is for this reason
that Bruno takes alchemy and astrology seriously (as he does in “On Magic”), since both
systems depend on a basic linkage between “higher” and “lower” cosmological entities.
It is also for these reasons that, when understanding character in Finnegans Wake,
we avoid the employment of transcendent categories, such as what we encounter in
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readings of the Wake in terms of Biblical typology, 426 in which the particulars of a given
story are subsumed into larger narrative patterns that explain and ultimately supersede the
original specificity. “Howth Castle and Environs” may appear to be a “type” of HCE, but
to read it in that framework ignores the trajectory that the opening line takes us from
Adam and Eve’s church in central Dublin to Howth Castle on its outskirts – indicating
that the “rivverrun” of the tidal river Liffey is at that moment washing outwards to the
sea, bringing full circle the water that had earlier been carried inwards on the previous
tide, and so implying at the first line the “recirculation” that would characterize the entire
book. It is not the case that a Brunonian, interpenetrative reading of this line would
privilege the river over the type, but rather that such a reading would recognize the
intersection of both sets of relations at the sign of “Howth Castle and Environs,” one
which renders them both immanent to that sign and thus on an equal narrative and lexical
footing with smaller-scale relations, such as that between the phrase and the basic syntax
of the sentence.

4.3 Brown, Nolan, and The Nolan
My earlier argument, and my alignment of OOO’s implications with the Brunonian
ontology structuring much of the Wake, implies a complex and difficult relationship
between a phrase or non-word in Finnegans Wake and the larger networks that, like any
word, lend it its meaning and significance. To read Finnegans Wake is to pay attention to
reversals, and nowhere is Bruno’s contribution more misunderstood than in his role in the
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reversal between categories and the elements that make them. Let us consider, for
example, Bruno’s preferred moniker, “The Nolan” (after his birthplace Nola, a city near
Naples). In his early essay “The Day of the Rabblement,” Joyce picked up on this usage,
as indicated by the opening line: “no man, said the Nolan, can be a lover of the true and
the good unless he abhors the multitude.”427 This usage would in Finnegans Wake evolve
into a common pattern of alluding to Bruno of Nola by way of the Dublin bookseller
Brown and Nolan. To list a few instances, we see such variations as “O’Bruin’s
polerpasse at Noolan” (FW 128.25-26), “B. Rohan meets N. Ohlan” (FW 251.33-34), and
“Browne yet Noland” (FW 599.23). The “yet” in the last example points to an important
effect of Joyce deferring “Bruno of Nola” off to “Brown and Nolan” – splitting supposed
unity of Bruno’s identity into two parts, which may then be placed in opposition despite
ostensibly being different elements of the same person. It is an effect we see, for instance,
in III.3, where we encounter the “dearly beloved brethren: Bruno and Nola” – here
playing the parts of Shem and Shaun, who, as the “dearly beloved” implies, may also be
married – who are “equal and opposite brunoipso, id est, eternally provoking alio
opposite equally as provoked as Bruno at being eternally opposed by Nola” (FW 488.411). Bruno, then, is the Nolan, Brown and Nolan, Bruno of Nola, both Shem and Shaun,
and also a huge number of minutely different yet clearly distinguishable manifestations
besides. No wonder Joyce has him at war with himself!
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It is clear then that by adopting Bruno’s use of “The Nolan,” Joyce was able, first,
to grant Bruno a doubled and incomplete presence in the Wake, one which renders the
common signifier “Bruno” incapable of pointing to its usual referent unless
countersigned by its double (and vice versa). Second, this splitting permits Joyce a great
deal of leeway in how he incorporates other characters and identities with the name.428
Splitting Bruno in half and pitting his identities against each other instantly makes them
resemble Shem and Shaun, and by extension all of the variant forms in which Shem and
Shaun appear. It also turns the name of the Italian philosopher into an allusion to a
particular place in Dublin, the center of the Joycean universe but a place that Bruno
himself never visited. These three intersections pose a problem for critics of Finnegans
Wake very much like the one we encountered earlier with “commodius vicus”: each
instance of a Brown and Nolan variant gestures in different ways to multiple larger
categories at once, each of which offers us the potential to explain away and “overmine”
the text. But despite gaining its significance through its relations to other parts of the
book, no particular sign can be exhaustively described simply by summing up its
relations. No matter how hard one squints, “Browne yet Noland” will never magically
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transform into “Brown and Nolan” or “Bruno the Nolan,” any less than “mardred” will
become “murdered” or “shuit” will become “suit.”
This problem of course raises the question of what relation exists between
categories and their elements in Finnegans Wake. Though scholars have long (and
usually for good reasons) read particular textual arrangements consistently in terms of
one of the book’s primary figures – and I confess that the margins of my own copy of the
Wake are well decorated with HCEs, ALPs, and other similar tags – the question of what
it is critics are actually doing when they invoke these meta-characters in their analysis of
a passage has not yet been adequately explored. To approach this problem, I will extend
the above analysis of Bruno’s name, as well as my critique of his and Harman’s
philosophies, to a reading of a story often read as an instance of the Shem/Shaun subplot
– that being the fable of “The Ondt and the Gracehoper” (FW 414.16-419.10).
The story, told to the artistic and free-spirited Shem the Penman by his
conservative and conventional brother Shaun the Post, is in its basic outline a re-telling of
Aesop’s fable of “The Ant and the Grasshopper.” In particular, it is a revision of the 1912
translation by V.S. Vernon Jones, which Joyce owned.429 Since, like all of Aesop’s
fables, it is quite short, I will quote the translation in its entirety:
THE GRASSHOPPER AND THE ANTS
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One fine day in winter some ants were busy drying their
store of corn, which had got rather damp during a long spell
of rain. Presently up came a Grasshopper and begged them
to spare a few grains, “For,” she said, “I’m simply
starving.” The Ants stopped work for a moment, though
this was against their principles. “May we ask,” said they,
“what you were doing with yourself all last summer? Why
didn’t you collect a store of food for the winter?” “The fact
is,” replied the Grasshopper, “I was so busy singing that I
hadn’t the time.” “If you spent the summer singing,”
replied the Ants, “you can’t do better than spend the winter
dancing.” And they chuckled and went on with their
work.430
There are a number of reasons why Joyce would likely have found this particular version
of the story interesting, the first of which being Jones’s decision to make the tale about
multiple ants speaking to a single grasshopper. As far as I have been able to tell this is
Jones’s own invention: though Jones’s edition does not list the specific version of the
fables he bases his translation on, G.K. Chesterton’s introduction to the book suggests
that Jones was translating out of the version collected by Babrius, 431 a Roman poet from
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the third century CE whose surviving work consists of 123 fables (originally 160) written
in Greek. A glance at the Loeb edition of the fable reveals that it is only a single ant
(“μύρμηξ”) who turns the Grasshopper (or in this version, a cicada) away, rather than a
team of them.432
This shift, though subtle, is significant given the manner in which fables often
treat their animals not as characters, but as types. The tendency is reflected in the stories’
titles and their use of proper nouns – it is, after all, “The Fox and the Grapes” as opposed
to “A Fox and Some Grapes.” I do not imagine that we are expected to believe that all of
these stories with foxes in them are about the same fox, who perhaps Aesop had once
spent the day following around, taking note of everything it did. Rather, as Laura Gibbs
writes, “the characters in Aesop’s fables . . . are still basically generic representatives of
their species; they have not yet become specific individuals.” 433 The genericizing of the
animals in Aesop then provides a useful counter-example to the appearance of those same
animals in Joyce’s fables in Finnegans Wake. In both “The Ondt and the Gracehoper”
and the other major fable, “The Mooske and the Gripes” (a re-working of “The Fox and
the Grapes”), Joyce expands on and multiplies the characters, giving them internal
divisions and individuality quite unlike what they have in Aesop. As Margot Norris has
argued in relation to “The Mooske and the Gripes,” Joyce’s re-telling of the fable, in its
anthropomorphization of the fox, grants the animal and its desires a degree of complexity
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not at all found in Aesop, though at the expense of submerging the genre’s interest in
non-human life.434 Likewise, as Sam Slote observes, the Gracehoper’s character is much
more complex than his grasshopper counterpart, in this case as a result of Joyce’s
“detailed account of [his] predilection for excess.”435 As with Bruno and The Nolan, the
addition of this complexity and multiplicity permits an extension of the overlapping
reference structure we saw in Joyce’s non-word portmanteaus to characters and plots.436
To see exactly how this similarity works, we should first turn attention to the
fable’s ethical ambiguity. While readers of the story tend to take the “moral” as an
endorsement of the ant(s), holding that it is an endorsement of industriousness, planning,
and the deferment of gratification (certainly traits that Shaun would encourage), the ants’
callousness towards the Grasshopper’s apparently mortal danger suggests that we ought
to give this position a second look. Indeed, even other fables about the ants suggest that
they are not to be uncritically imitated: one other fable in the Jones translation describes
how the ants “were once men” who, covetous of their neighbors’ crops, stole them
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“whenever they got the chance” and so were transformed into ants by Jupiter as
punishment.437 Another fable, this one not included in Jones, makes the ants the victims:
they save and gather all winter, only to have their stores raided by pigs – the misfortune
leading into a moral against miserliness438 (of which I imagine Shem would approve).
Already, then, the story has begun to lose both the fixity of its moral stance and
the unity of its characters, a loss that Joyce both exploits and intensifies. Shaun, who
begins his tale following Shem’s clamouring for a song, demurs and says instead that “I
would rather spinooze you one from the grimm gests of Jacko and Easup, fable one,
feeble two” (FW 414.16-18). “Spinooze,” among other things, provides the first of
several allusions to insects and arachnids (by way of the German Spinne, or spider). It
also points both to the brothers Grimm and the Biblical story of Jacob and Esau (as well
as their Wakeian manifestations, Jerkoff and Eatsup) – allusions that locate the
proceeding story in the narrative traditions of the fairy tale and the Biblical parable,
forms that, though similar to the fable, nevertheless undermine the genre’s claim to
determining the structure of Shaun’s story. Moving on to the first paragraph of the story
proper, one of its most obvious characteristics is its large number of insect allusions,
which we find scattered through this section as a whole in much the same way that we
see river names dropped into “Anna Livia Plurabelle.” Of particular interest is one set of
allusions in a passage early in the paragraph: “he [the Gracehoper] was always making
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ungraceful overtures to Floh and Luse and Bienie and Vestpatilla to play pupa-pupa and
pulicy-pulicy and langtennas and pushpygyddyum and to commence insects with him,
there mouthparts to him orefice and his gambills to there airy processes” (FW 414.24-28).
McHugh glosses “Floh and Luse and Bienie and Vestpatilla” as, respectively, “flea” (via
German), “louse” (via Dutch), “bee” (via French), and “wasp” (via Latin). 439 The
inclusion of bees and wasps via French and Latin (which are part of the same linguistic
family) is interesting given that the two insects are themselves related, sharing the
taxonomic family formicidae, which also includes ants.440 This family resemblance
foreshadows the more explicit signals of the Ondt and Gracehoper’s similarity that we
encounter later. The four names reappear later in the story, but this time while attached to
the Ondt, who we see “ameising himself hugely at crabround and martpose, chasing Floh
out of charity and tickling Luse, hope too, and tackling Bienie, faith, as well, and jucking
Vestpatillia jukely by the chimiche” (FW 417.28-31). Indeed, the tale seemingly alludes
to this connection earlier in the same paragraph, where it calls the Ondt “that true and
perfect hose, a spiter asipnne” (FW 417.24), another invocation of the German “Spinne”
that we saw Shaun attach to himself earlier with “Spinooze.”
This identification between Ondt and Gracehoper is troubling given Shem’s
apparent rhetorical goals for reciting it, and also the ease by which the two insects can be
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mapped onto the oppositional Shem/Shaun dynamic. It is also interesting given the
suggestions in the earlier passage I quoted of the Gracehoper’s sexual impropriety, with
the four insects having “commence[d] insects with him.” We should recall that the
Grasshopper’s crime in Aesop was to play his music all summer instead of hoarding his
food for the winter – behaviour that is quite clearly in line with the carefree artist Shem.
Shaun’s transposing this error into a sexual transgression would seem to align the
Gracehoper (and perhaps by extension Shem) with HCE, whose un-described voyeurism
in Phoenix Park is a matter of much discussion in the Wake, and whose relationship with
his daughter Issy has itself occasionally been read as incestuous.441 The HCE
identification continues farther down the paragraph, where Shaun has the Gracehoper
“always striking up funny funereels with Besterfarther Zeuts, the Aged One, with all his
wigeared corollas” (FW 414.35-36). There are several HCE connections here: “Zeuts”
alludes to Zeus, and “the Aged One” is a title given to the god Ra in The Egyptian Book
of the Dead442 (with both “Besterfarther” gods playing the part of the patriarch), while
“wigeared” points to earwigs, another insect allusion, and one that is closely associated
with our Mr. Earwicker. Finally, “funny funereels” clearly points to Finnegan’s titular
wake, the “funferall” (FW 13.15) that leads to HCE’s arrival in Dublin during I.1.
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What then is the moral of the story? The allusion to Aesop and what we know
about Shem and Shaun suggests that the Ondt both stands ethically opposed to the
Gracehoper (who, it seems, has found grace hopeless) while also holding the upper hand
in their power relationship as a result of the Gracehoper’s profligacy. But the
Shem/Shaun dyad, though it in some ways gestures towards and secures the allusion to
Aesop, nevertheless prevents the Ondt and the Gracehoper from settling cleanly into their
roles as the ant and the grasshopper. The ant (or ants, in Jones) are independent from the
grasshopper in a way that Shaun simply cannot be from Shem. Shaun the postman, after
all, depends on letter writers like Shem the penman in order for his job to exist. If Shem
ever ceased to go “jigging ajog, hoppy on akkant of his joyicity” (FW 414.22-23) Shaun
would be out of a job and out in the cold. Mapping the fable onto the brothers’
relationship – though it does take advantage of several clear similarities between the
stories – drives the fable’s principal characters into a kind of identification that the source
material simply cannot support. The Ondt, in order to fulfill these roles, must expand the
scope of his character, becoming “a weltall fellow” (FW 416.3) – “weltall” here being the
German word for “universe”443 – who, just like the infinity of Bruno’s universe, can
reconcile even contrary elements. The Gracehoper, meanwhile, becomes an expression of
those contradictions, appearing as “pooveroo quant a churchprince” (FW 416.13) – which
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McHugh renders “as poor as a church mouse,”444 but which could also mean that the
Gracehoper has gotten the grace he hopes for, becoming a Cardinal (or, a “prince of the
church”), which would hardly make him impoverished. Thus, having taken form as the
universe and a reconciled opposite, the Ondt and the Gracehoper appear to us as two of a
kind.
Connected to these problems is Shaun’s use of the fable as a rhetorical tool.
Though today the fable genre is often closely linked to children’s literature, in ancient
Greece and Rome it was instead more common for fables to be recited as Shaun does
here – as a tool of persuasion, or as a way to present or clarify an idea. Aristotle, for
example, invokes Aesop in his Rhetoric while cautioning that the fable’s usefulness is
often limited, especially in cases where one is advising a course of action based on
similarities between actual events and those one finds in the story. “Fables,” he writes,
“are suitable for addresses to popular assemblies; and they have one advantage – they are
comparatively easy to invent, whereas it is hard to find parallels among actual past
events,” but nevertheless it is advisable for the speaker to employ actual historical
parallels whenever possible, since “quoting what actually happened” makes it easier to
argue that acting in line with the story will lead to comparable results.445 The rhetorical
use of the fable therefore creates problems similar to those that we found in Bruno’s
name and in the Wake’s non-words. Shaun’s attempt to posit a neat identity between his
irresponsible brother and the irresponsible Grasshopper is bound to fail because, as
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Aristotle knew, the pre-existing story of the fable cannot relate to the present events as
closely as the speaker would like it to. Each, then, deforms the other, Shem and the
Grasshopper becoming instead the Gracehoper, a new entity that exists completely apart
from them yet which only attains significance in relating to them. And thus we encounter
the rhetorical failure of Shaun’s attempt to link Shem to HCE via sexual innuendo, since
that very same innuendo ends up aligning the Gracehoper closer to the Ondt, who, for the
rhetorical gesture to work, must likewise be identified with Shaun. And all of this
closeness can be seen in Shaun’s decision to even tell the story – which for a brief time
turns him into a “penman” like his brother. As John Bishop observed, “an association is
not an identity” – but what then do we do when associations appear to be all we have?446
Thus, in much the same way that Harman’s attempt to circumscribe objects from
relations and figure each entity as permanently cut off and withdrawn from all other
existing things eventually causes each object to break down into endless independent
branching paths of overlapped relations, so does the appearance of narratological unity of
the Wake’s characters conceal a dispersed and irreconcilable multiplicity. Furthermore,
just as Bruno’s pantheism is not a subsumption of all entities into a supreme infinity, nor
the embrace of dissolved particulars without connection, but rather a reciprocal
interpenetration of larger and smaller entities in relations that relay smoothly between
large and small, so too are the various interconnected characters of the Wake never predetermined by category nor reducible to the particularities of their manifestation. For the
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characters of Finnegans Wake, singularity is multiple: Bruno, the Nolan, and Brown and
Nolan all maintain their relations with each other in terms of the historical person
Giordano Bruno of Nola, but likewise are their particular textual manifestations
inescapably singular and unique,447 permitting the overlapping of relations in a manner
that permanently restrict generalized abstraction.448 To put it another way, while we can
never claim that “the Gracehoper is the grasshopper” or “the Gracehoper is Shem”
without problem and without remainder, we can also never really understand the
Gracehoper unless we let Shem and the grasshopper in on the conversation. While, as
Aristotle cautions us, such mapping cannot help but remove us from the thing under
discussion, without bringing these relations into play the non-word in question simply
cannot be discussed at all.

4.4 There Goes Everybody
As Federico Sabatini writes, Bruno’s “poetics of the enlarging style,” in which narrative
and dialogue endlessly expand in size and complexity (and which, it goes without saying,
makes him and Joyce quite stylistically alike), mirrors the “cosmological expansion” we
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find in his scientific writings.449 Joyce pursued this maximalist open-ended
expansiveness elsewhere in his work – in Ulysses most obviously – but its appearance in
Finnegans Wake is both more intense and more fundamental to the work’s structure than
previously. We have already seen how the text’s collapsing of the macrocosm and the
microcosm leads to a simultaneous destabilization and multiplication of character, how,
just as with words, it is the singularity of a given Wakeian signifier that leads to it taking
on multiple irreconcilable identities.
It would thus be misleading to say that a character in Finnegans Wake can
“contain multitudes” a la Whitman. Though they are indeed multitudinous, these
characters cannot really be said to “contain” anything, since much (perhaps all) of their
identities are implicated in textual and narrative objects that at the same time exist
autonomously from their connection to the name in question. For instance, one could
imagine a study of Spinoza’s influence on Finnegans Wake which incorporates the
above-cited “Spinooze” while never mentioning that it also points towards the German
word for “spider” – a fact that is crucial to my entomological reading of how the Ondt
and Gracehoper become implicated with each other (one that, similarly, never mentions
Spinoza, despite how obvious the connection seems). Yet it would likewise be inaccurate
to say that a given non-word “contains nothing,” that it is an empty signifier, if only
because no intersection would be possible if the relevant sign had never existed. The
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relationship I pointed to earlier between “commodi(o)us,” Commodus, and HCE, would
become illegible if that sign was ever to disappear. Non-words, non-characters, nonstories – despite their figuration in the negative, in relation to the “non-,” they are crucial
to the act of reading, even as they fail to be determinate or to resolve into a “clear” and
non-contradictory set of relationships.
This multiplication continues even as we scale up to the levels of plots and
stories. As we have seen already, it is common for Joyce to have one character
ventriloquize through another – a process that, as we saw with Shaun and the Ondt,
eventually implicates the ventriloquist in the personality and structure of the mouthpiece.
This ventriloquism also occurs at the narrative level, like in the multiple uses that Joyce
gets out of the story of Tim Finnegan’s rise and fall, which is eventually so
interpenetrated with the stories of Parnell, Adam and Eve, Moses, Noah, Napoleon, and
the like that it becomes impossible, in the end, to determine who is the speaker and who
the dummy. This pattern is itself connected to Joyce’s common expansion and
multiplication of his plots. We can look, for example, to the story of how Buckley shot
the Russian general, a story in the Wake based on a brief tale originally told to Joyce by
his father. Richard Ellmann provides the following summary:
Buckley . . . was an Irish soldier in the Crimean War who
drew a bead on a Russian general, but when he observed
his splendid epaulets and decorations, he could not bring
himself to shoot. After a moment, alive to his duty, he
raised his rifle again, but just then the general led down his
pants to defecate. The sight of his enemy in so helpless and
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human a plight was too much for Buckley, who again
lowered his gun. But when the general prepared to finish
the operation with a piece of grassy turf, Buckley lost all
respect for him and fired.450
As Ellmann goes on to describe, Joyce ran into a great deal of trouble finding a way to
incorporate the story into the Wake, much as he wanted to. This remained the case until
he came to tell the story to a young Samuel Beckett, who upon hearing the part about the
general wiping himself with the grass “remarked, ‘Another insult to Ireland.’” 451 Ellmann
recognizes how this connection (between Ireland’s national colour and the colour of the
grass) permitted Joyce to incorporate the story into his larger commentary on the colonial
domination of Ireland and its subjugation to British goals (such as the fighting of the
Crimean war, which Ireland, absent England, would have had no stake in). But what I
find much more interesting is how this linkage came about.
Without Beckett’s interjection, Buckley’s revocation of his pity appears rather
inexplicable. The general, after all, would appear no less human while wiping himself
than he did while defecating, and certainly he was no less vulnerable. In both the original
story and the version Joyce adopted in the Wake, Buckley shoots the Russian general
after watching the general wipe himself with the grass. What Beckett’s addition supplies
is the because: Buckley shoots the Russian general because the grass reminded him of
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Ireland, and it reminded Buckley of Ireland because it was green. The importance of
“because” should already indicate how this narrative expansion connects the story to my
earlier analysis. “Because,” after all, indicates a causal relation between the events. Or,
to speak in Harman’s terms, “because” indicates the presence of a mediating object – in
this case, the grass’s chromatic relation to Ireland. But, as we saw with OOO, a causality
that rests solely on mediation cannot help but spiral into an infinite regress of more and
more granular objects, each one failing to connect by tinier and tinier margins.
Joyce’s dependence on causality as a catalyst for integrating the Buckley story
with Finnegans Wake opens the story up to the same kinds of divisions and
interconnections that we have already encountered with (non-)characters and (non)words. And the mediations do not stop, for while we have from Beckett the “because” of
why it was the turf, of all things, that drew out Buckley’s bloodlust, it is now Joyce who
supplies the “because” of why that was enough to overcome his earlier pity. In the Wake,
the story is (as with the Ondt and the Gracehoper) ventriloquized through the opposition
between Shem and Shaun, now in the form of Butt (playing Buckley) and Taff. Butt, as
in the story, hesitates, and it is Taff who eggs him on, encouraging him to shoot by
layering invective on the general, who of course has been linked with HCE – a patriarch
who must be killed and replaced by his sons. As Taff shouts, “the fourscore sloculums
are watchyoumaycodding to cooll the skoopgoods bloof. Harkabuddy, feign! Thingman
placeyear howed wholst somwom shimwhit winkledinkledelled Shinfine deed in the
myrtle of the bog tway fainmain stod op to slog, ffree bond men lay lurkin on” (FW
346.25-29). To provide a cursory gloss of this section, “sloculums” can refer to the
General Slocum, a steamboat that caught fire in New York in 1904, killing about a
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thousand people. Since it occurred on June 15, the day before Ulysses takes place, Bloom
reads about it in the newspaper and is quite affected by the tragedy (U 8.1146-7). The
ship’s name also points to the Russian general. Taff has spotted his target, and the story
already contains the what seem like sufficient causal mechanisms for him to take his shot,
yet he hesitates. The line “somwom shimwhit winkledinkledelled” suggests the reason in
its resemblance to the phrase “someone had blundered,”452 repeated throughout
Tennyson’s “The Charge of the Light Brigade.”453 The clear chain of causation, then, has
been replaced with a vacillation: then invocation of Irish turf that explains Buckley’s
decision to shoot, and which opens the story up to comparisons to other historical
instances of Ireland’s mistreatment in the name of British interests, brings also into view
questions of other such mis-deeds, particularly those also committed during the Crimean
War. But the “someone” is dangerous, misleading, in that it posits a definite cause of the
blunder while obscuring what that cause may be.
As Jean-Michel Rabaté writes, Beckett’s intervention in the Buckley tale “gave
Joyce a convenient relay . . . Not only does Joyce fully ‘nationalize’ the story, but he also
universalizes the national problem.”454 But this integration also mean segmentation, and
the severing into parts what had once proceeded smoothly as a whole. Beckett’s
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suggestion, then, did not aid Joyce so much because it filled in a vexing plot hole, but
rather because in pointing out how the seemingly rounded-off story was full of access
points and imperfections that implicated it synchronically with other narratives, Beckett
put the unity and integrity of the entire plot in question. Once cannot chase backwards the
myriad branches of causality and explanation unto their exhaustion: as one finds so often
in the Wake, there is simply too much. At some point, one must stop reading.
And by no means is this OOO-like fragmentation and interpenetration unique to
the Buckley story. We see it as well in Joyce’s use of the Norwegian captain story, which
like many of the tales in the wake Joyce first heard from his father.455 As Ellmann
summarizes, the tale involves “a hunchbacked Norwegian captain who ordered a suit
from a Dublin tailor . . . the finished suit did not fit him, and the captain berated the tailor
for being unable to sew, whereupon the irate tailor denounced him for being impossible
to fit.”456 In Finnegans Wake, Joyce expands this brief story until it runs about twenty
pages (FW 311-332), with much of the expansion happening in a manner similar to
before. Perhaps it is because of its brevity that the original Norwegian captain story
proved so porous, given that it contains so few details (we do not even know why the
captain was in Dublin, or what he was planning to use the suit for). As David Hayman
observes in his analysis of the episode’s genetic history, “the structure of the ‘Norwegian
Captain’ segment echoes that of the chapter as a whole in that the narrative sequences
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include longer paragraphs and contain references to the pub audience’s response. . . .
Both developments become increasingly longer and more complex as the tale
evolves.”457 The expansion, then, not only involves the narrative itself, but also the
nature of its telling and, as Alison Lacivita describes, its geography and landscape.458
This narration – which as Thomas Hofheinz remarks depicts a mode of expression that is
both “compulsive [and] essential” and an “inadequate expression of human desire” 459 –
grasps towards a the consummation of the causal link, the filling out of the story-object of
the Norwegian captain tale, and yet from the very start has failed to do so.

4.5 Learning How Not to Read
I have so far made much of the singularity and uniqueness of the Wakeian non-word, the
way its hidden multitudes (both external and internal) causes it to resist reduction into its
component parts, and how this structure extends upwards to characterization and plotting,
eventually filling out the whole of the Wake. It ought not to be a surprise then when we
encounter our old friend HCE lost in eternal extensions and expansions of his basic point,
in which whenever he says one thing “he quickly qualifies it, adds whatever associated
information occurs to him as he goes along, and wanders farther and farther from where
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he began.”460 It is a pattern very much like the narration we find in the “Eumaeus”
episode of Ulysses, with its twisty drunken meanderings that conspicuously fail to ever
arrive at a point. Non-words can be called “pointless” in two ways. First, in the sense that
they lack a definite location, which is to say that they cannot be pinned into a coordinate
structure with neat and knowable values on the X and Y axes. They are instead dispersed
across the text’s narrative landscape, and penetrated by relations that both define them
and undermine them at once. The second sense follows from the first: non-words are
pointless because they are unbounded, lacking clear outlines that define where they begin
and end. It is impossible to say, for instance, whether “Is is” is one sign or two, for the act
of combination we perform whenever we gloss it as “Isis” is an act of multiplication as
well. Thus, what “Is is” is is variable.
Given this singularity, I think it is vital to at least address the question of
iterability as it pertains to language, and in particular how that iterability relates to the
system of Finnegans Wake. Though Joyce scholars so often reach for the obvious
nonsense words and portmanteaus when they focus on a single sign as a way to make a
point or punctuate an argument, it is often the signs that, outside the Wake, exist as
perfectly normal words which are the most interesting. It is a kind of citation when Joyce
writes “vicus” or “is.” As Derrida observes in “Signature Event Context,” it is a basic
trait of linguistic signs that they can be taken from their context, repeated, cited, put in
quotation marks. Indeed, for nonsense phrases (Derrida cites Husserl’s “green is or”) it is
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only through citation that they can have any semantic meaning at all.461 But Joyce
characteristically invades this citation, most directly with his portmanteaus, which often
possess a “clear” or “obvious” meaning due to their close resemblance (perhaps only one
character off) to a “real word,” often to the point of obscuring other interpretations from
view. But what of non-words that are visibly identical to something one would find in a
dictionary?
Part of the problem here is that Joyce’s use of these words removes the vital
distinction between citation and allusion. Citation, as Derrida rightly points out, has the
power to capture any set of symbols regardless of their agrammaticality, whereas allusion
must be vicarious, but not so distant as to lack any obvious relation to the text alluded to.
This is why Aristotle’s wreath no longer works very well as an allusion to the Olympics:
the old context is no longer present as a mediator between sign and referent. And just as
one can allude without citing so too can one cite without alluding. For instance, I can cite
the phrase “he looked at them” (U 4.250) – which I have taken from Ulysses, but which is
so innocuous and common a phrase that it would not be legible as a reference to the novel
had I not explicitly said it was so. For a citation to also function as an allusion, then, it
needs to also possess a metonymic, vicarious connection to some larger aspect of the text
in question, and in particular to aspects of the text that have themselves been culturally
recontextualized. If a novelist has their character say “errors are portals of discovery,”
they are (partially) citing Stephen Dedalus’s line, “a man of genius makes no mistakes.
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His errors are volitional and are the portals of discovery” (U 9.228-229), but also alluding
the wider uses that the phrase has been put to. (The line, in all its mis-quotations, has
taken on a life of its own as blanket statement on the nature of creativity, shorn of the
complexities contained in the scene where it appears.) Ironically, it is by removing the
sign one or more steps from its origin that a citation may become also an allusion: the
most effective allusions are those that employ signs that have taken on significance
beyond what they possess in their first appearance.
But when Joyce reconfigures some word or phrase for use in the Wake, he reveals
the messiness behind this clear distinction. One can, as we saw above, allude with a
citation, but it is another thing entirely to cite with an allusion – since citation (as it
appears in Derrida) clearly takes the form of a reproduction of the signs in question.
Indeed, it is because signifiers have an autonomous existence beyond their semantic
meaning that nonsense phrases can still be cited and incorporated into a linguistic system.
Yet when we argue that “vicus” is an allusion to Vico, and in so doing rob it of the U
sound that its Latinate nature demands – we are, in effect, “citing” the Latin word
allusively, reaching it through the medium of Vico and his hard V. This is but the earlier
problem of the “obvious” reading overwriting the alternate ones, but in reverse. Much
like in Pound’s parable of the sunfish, the Wake extols the reader to treasure what is
clearly and obviously in front of their nose, taking in it in all of its particularity. It is,
contra Harman, precisely because the beings of the Wake fail to stand up as closed
autonomous objects that the text is able to retain its flatness, its ability to hold up both the
individual sign and the text-spanning monomyth and grant them equal value.
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What then do we make of all these connections, of these repetitions without
repetitions, of these citations that do not cite? It should be clear by now how closely
implicated the reader is with their interpretation when it comes to Finnegans Wake – but I
am hardly the first person to say so. What is much more interesting, and what I have been
trying to emphasize since the beginning of this chapter, is the extent to which any
interpretation of any word or passage in the Wake relies on a readerly act of demediation, or the extraction of a particular set of relations from their medial position.
When, for example, I earlier glossed “spinooze” as an allusion to the German word for
“spider” while ignoring its connection to Spinoza I inserted a regrettable, but necessary,
omission. As Harman argues – citing Book Zeta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics – if every
object were implicated in every other, then there would no longer be distinctions, but
rather an extended grey ooze of total sameness.462 In systems like Leibniz’s monadology,
the explanation for why the monads look different despite all being metaphysically the
same is that human perception is limited in such a way that their sameness remains
hidden. Finnegans Wake does not offer that luxury: though readers are in no sense
omniscient, they can be (and often are) aware of the several overlapping connections
condensed into any given word. We cannot see everything, but we can see enough –
which is to say, too much.
To de-mediate, then, is essentially to ignore – or it might be better to say, to
“bracket off” – the myriad connections so that the non-word may provisionally take on a
definite shape. It is, in a sense, a voluntary apprehension such as what Harman describes
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all objects engaging in, by which I mean that the act of reading a given passage of
Finnegans Wake requires that part of that passage’s “content” be allowed to withdraw so
that another part may rise to the surface. One must translate the non-words into words in
order to read them, a process that, as with all translation, always leaves something
behind. This is as true for Eco’s reading of “sansglorians” as it is for my reading of
“commodius vicus,” and indeed there is nothing about Eco’s gloss that is incorrect, since
every word that he derives from “sansglorians” intersects with it in some way. The
problem arises when one fails to see the reading – any reading – as a willful deformation
of the singularity of the text, and instead registers it as a successful disassembling of a
non-word into its obvious component parts. But as the God of Cusanus, Finnegans Wake
cannot be bounded by perception, so that to seek knowledge in its shadow is to recognize
our criticism as the plaything of our ignorance. If a word is a painting, then ignorance is
its canvas, subtending it, lending it shape, making the image possible even as it fades
from view. One gropes through Finnegans Wake as one might through a darkened room –
not because the book, like some mystery cult, has hidden its form from view, but because
Finnegans Wake is not the room, but the darkness, a book of the night as much as Ulysses
was a book of the day.

237

Conclusion
On Knowing What We do not Know
A text presents itself as the simulacrum of a forward, a
discontinuous series, an archipelago of aphorisms: an
intolerable composition in this place, a rhetorical and
architectural monster. Demonstrate it. Then read this book.
You will perhaps begin to have your doubts.
— Jacques Derrida, “Fifty-two Aphorisms for a Forward” 463
As I began, so I will end – with a foray into science fiction, that great factory of ideas. In
2005 the American author Ted Chiang published the flash-fiction story “What’s Expected
of Us” in the journal Nature (it is one of several Chiang stories the science journal has
published). The story describes the release of a new novelty toy called a “Predictor” – “a
small device, like a remote for opening your car door. Its only features are a button and a
big green LED. The light flashes if you press the button. Specifically, the light flashes
one second before you press the button.”464 As the story explains, there is no way to
“trick” the light by, for instance, pretending to press the button and then moving away, or
by clearing one’s mind of all intent to press the button and then pressing it anyway. The
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device is not precognitive, it does not “see” the future, but is instead under the future’s
direct and mechanical influence: pressing the button activates a “negative time delay”
which sends a signal one second back in time, activating the light.
Predictors are not mere party tricks, for each one is effectively empirical proof of
the inexistence of free will. If you see the light flash then you know with absolute
certainty that the button is about to be pressed in one second’s time, since it is the
pressing of the button that causes the light to turn on. The widespread dispersion of these
Predictors results in what we might call an epistemological disaster (as opposed to a
natural disaster): for a large portion of the population, the sudden realization that they
lack free will, unclouded by the feeling of possessing it, is such a shock that it inflicts a
state of near-catatonia. As Chiang writes:
Some people, realizing that their choices don't matter,
refuse to make any choices at all. Like a legion of Bartleby
the Scriveners, they no longer engage in spontaneous
action. Eventually, a third of those who play with a
Predictor must be hospitalized because they won't feed
themselves. The end state is akinetic mutism, a kind of
waking coma. They'll track motion with their eyes, and
change position occasionally, but nothing more. The ability
to move remains, but the motivation is gone.
I imagine that everyone who has studied the topic has entertained the possibility that
there is no free will, whether or not they find the arguments for determinism convincing.
But even the most emphatic determinists must face the position’s key weakness: the
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dearth of practical repercussions. As I have observed already, the hypothetical scenario of
a super-intelligence encompassing all of the universe who is able to make perfect
predictions is a pure thought experiment – no entity will ever know enough to be able to
actualize determinism’s key postulate. Chiang’s story imagines a solution to this
problem, bringing the issue down from omniscience and reducing it to its key elements. It
is not actually necessary to predict all of the things that could happen; one need merely
predict one thing over and over again with absolute certainty in order to resolve the
question once and for all. The force of the blow, which sends the Predictor’s victims to
the hospital, is purely epistemological – Chiang is, in effect, a rationalist Lovecraftian,
whose characters have gone mad from an encounter with that which we were never meant
to know.
But for my purposes the more interesting question here is what was going on
before these people pressed the button. What makes Chiang’s story interesting in the
context of this study is the manner in which it demonstrates the active effects of
ignorance, or the manner in which an unawareness of some aspect of the world (in this
case the inexistence of free will) forms a part of the general worldview within which the
people of his story operate. Their ignorance is as much a component of their world of
their perception as their knowledge, it takes on a presence, it acts, and when the
ignorance is removed so too is the force of that action. The mutism of Chiang’s story is
but an extreme and distilled version of the kinds of effects I have been discussing
throughout this study, and is indeed a good excuse to clarify a potential
misunderstanding. As I discussed in the introduction, ignorance, when taken up as a topic
of academic study, is often treated as necessarily a problem, necessarily a disease in need
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of a cure – and certainly for good and understandable reasons. The topics studied in the
Agnotology collection from which I took my key-term (climate change denial, antivaccination, tobacco industry disinformation, etc.) indicate the dangers of a cultivated,
willful ignorance, the manner in which an unwillingness to pursue new knowledge and
integrate new information can lead to irreparable harm. And yet, as ought to be clear by
now, the automatic equation of “ignorance” in general with its most extreme and
damaging forms ignores the (perhaps unsettling) fact that we will never not be ignorant,
both in terms of a generalized “we” (i.e. “we know how to split the atom,” though I
personally do not know how to split an atom) which will never arrive at a perfect
rationalized description of the universe’s physical laws, and also in terms of a localized
“we” of individual subjects who always tread above an ocean of unknowns. When I say
that we must cease treating ignorance in general as a problem, I mean simply that we
must recognize its mundanity, its inescapability, and the manner in which it constructs
our daily lives.465
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Which returns us to Chiang’s story. When I wrote earlier in the introduction of
agnotological processes producing ontological entities – “black boxes” – out of
epistemological gaps, the easiest examples to point to were things like vitalism (c.f.
chapter one) or nature (c.f. chapter three). Part of the problem with treating these
instances as the poster-children for agnotology is that they have, to a certain extent, been
“overcome,” both among scientists (who no longer speak of vital energies that divide the
living from the dead) and theorists of ecology (who are often loathe to talk of “nature” as
a unified entity). But I do not wish to create the impression that agnotological entities lie
along some positivist teleology with each passing era refining their theories en route
(though asymptotically) towards a perfect state of scientific enlightenment. Agnotological
entities are not problems, they are not overcome, though they may be swapped out for
others as the landscape of ignorance changes, and for this reason the question of the
nature of ignorance must in many cases be asked in isolation from questions of the
history of science. Chiang’s story provides an instructive example: within the world of
the narrative, the people’s belief in free will is clearly and empirically incorrect, an
artifact of their ignorance as to the existence of retroactive causality. Yet the revelation of
the Predictors is nevertheless a catastrophe, robbing untold numbers of their will to live.
The story in a sense studies the agnotology of free will in the way that one might study
the structure of a Roman archway by removing its keystone – the importance of which
becomes manifest in the structure’s collapse.

subjects perhaps a means of coping with this otherwise unsolvable problem. The study itself provides a
highly detailed description of several process that I have only been able to speak of in the abstract.
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My desire for a non-antagonistic study of ignorance in part explains the structure
of this study. As I have said earlier, each chapter approaches its central author in terms of
a particular black box: Lewis and vitalist life, Woolf and panpsychist life, Pound and
nature, Joyce and words. It is not for nothing that the Joyce chapter is at the end, for
while it has been most convenient to explain agnotology with reference to the other
chapters it is the agnotological structure of Finnegans Wake which I consider the best
expression of what wanted the study of agnotology to look like. For the ignorance one
encounters in Finnegans Wake is impossible to overcome, being structured not in terms
of concealment but rather undecidability. Indeed, even a novice reader will often find in
certain passages of the wake an overwhelming abundance of information, and will
remark, much like Freud remarks in The Interpretation of Dreams, that though the text
under analysis “may perhaps fill half a page” its explication “may occupy six, eight, or a
dozen times as much space.”466 The problem here is not a lack of information, as one
could possibly say of the vitalists, or even of a defect in the managing and arranging of
information (as one might see in Pound) – for as I demonstrate, the potential readings of a
given passage are not merely multiplicities, but are instead irreconcilable. Thus,
ignorance appears to the reader of Finnegans Wake as a basic constituent fact of any
productive engagement with the text, a kernel of it present in any act of reading. In a
sense, then, the agnotology of Finnegans Wake manifests an extreme naturalism, for by
constructing within itself an irreducible ignorance Joyce’s final work forces us to engage
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with the necessity of agnotology as a pre-condition for reading the text at all – an
“invincible ignorance” (to pilfer an old phrase) well in keeping with the mundane
ignorance of daily life.
The difficulties with Joyce can point us towards a non-teleological model for
understanding agnotology. As one shifts from one network of signification to the other,
selectively attending to and ignoring different textual relations, one encounters an effect
much like the duck-rabbit of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, which is
always perceived as either a duck or a rabbit despite being both (and neither).467 To say
that a given sign in the Wake is this in one reading and then that in another is not to move
from an early, imperfect reading towards a better one, or even to recognize and correct a
previous mistake. Which is to say, the relationship between hermeneutics and ignorance
in the Wake does not at all resemble the teleological model of scientific progress (even to
the extent that anything does). In science, the ignorance underlying an old, discarded
theory is treated like a flaw – one says, for instance, that while Copernicus’s
contributions to astronomy were great, he was nevertheless hampered by his belief in a
finite universe, an error that Bruno would overcome and thereby “advance” science even
further. In this case, one recognizes, as one should, that Copernicus’s ignorance of the
universe’s unboundedness is a constituent element of his cosmology, an essential fact of
its configuration. But one also treats that ignorance as a flaw to be expunged, and the
destruction of the Copernican universe in favour of a Brunoian (or Newtonian, or
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Einsteinian) replacement as an uncomplicated good – and perhaps, if one’s interests are
strictly scientific and ahistorical, it is. However, a drawback of this ranking is that it
implicitly treats ignorance as fully expungable, and thus binds our thinking to a
counterfactual assumption, impairing our capacity to study the role and function of
ignorance as such.
The shifting ignorance of Finnegans Wake provides a much more felicitous
framework, one that permits us to ask not what ignorance is present and how it might be
eliminated (for the study of agnotology must begin with an acknowledgement of
ignorance’s omnipresence) but rather what role or function it plays within its particular
conceptual framework. The issue, then, is how one frames the question of what ignorance
is and what it does, and how that framing limits and conditions one’s investigations. And
once we recognize that ignorance is productive because it has to be, because its
omnipresence makes it inevitable that it will ground and modify our perceptions, then the
decision to see ignorance as always and in all places a flaw waiting to be repaired seems
like utter folly, as it places needless restrictions on the manner in which we may study
and discuss the topic. It would be as though we discussed the human lung only in terms
of its susceptibility to drowning, discussing at length its inability to extract oxygen from
liquids, the tendency of the breathing reflex to fill the lung with water when the person
breathing is submerged, their tendency to fill with fluid under the influence of certain
diseases (“they even drown themselves on dry land!”). Would it not be great, given that
the earth’s surface is covered in water, for humans to instead sprout gills? Or better,
develop some hybrid, amphibious arrangement permitting us to breathe wherever we may
be? In a strictly literal sense these observations are all correct, but they also drastically
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limit the field of discussion – imagine attempting to study pulmonology under such
ridiculous conditions! It would mean allowing the problems inherent in the subject to
overwhelm the discussing of the subject itself, never permitting scholars to take it on as
an object of analysis on its own terms.
I thus placed my Wake chapter at the end so that it may function as a short-circuit
on this problematic way of thinking. Criticism of Finnegans Wake can often treat the
book as a kind of scavenger hunt, a repository of blank spaces that can be filled by any
intrepid scholar willing to hunt through Joyce’s notebooks and the eleventh edition of the
Britannica. But as I have argued, the manner in which different lines of meaning overlap
and intersect with each other means that even in a hypothetical ideal reading condition in
which one “got” all of the puns and allusions contained in the text, no singular complete
reading would be possible. One cannot exhaust the Wake – not because it is infinite
(though it might be) but because one can never see all sides of it at once. Indeed, as much
as I criticize Graham Harman in that chapter, there is a certain compatibility between
Finnegans Wake and his infinitely deep, withdrawn objects, in the shared impression of a
cyclopean eternity beneath the manifold of our perceptions. But whether or not
Finnegans Wake is inexhaustible in the same way that, for instance, the digits of pi are
inexhaustible – by going on forever so that no element in the set is ever final – what is
important for my purposes is that it is inexhaustible in the same way that the duck-rabbit
is inexhaustible, through a constant oscillation that makes impossible any final meaning,
regardless of the finitude of the object itself. Thus, since perfect knowledge of the Wake
is impossible, one has no choice but to accept ignorance as a constant traveler through the
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text, an acceptance that begs us to treat that ignorance itself as a neutral object of
analysis. The old excuses simply will not fly.
From this standpoint, it is useful to return to my initial chapter to see how this
short-circuiting plays out. I can imagine that, despite my frequent mention of vitalism as
the key term of the chapter and the black box of Bergson and Lewis’s thinking, it is
monism that takes the chief position in the chapter’s title and indeed through much of the
text. In large part my purpose there was to begin the work that I would complete in the
Joyce chapter, i.e. the decentring of the ignorance-as-problem position from my
agnotological readings. As I have said, a black box is essentially the ontological
projection of one’s own ignorance, as kind of phenomenological machine that permits
one’s world-picture to function despite the gaps embedded in it. “Monism” is, in a sense,
the name we give to the gap that Lewis was trying to fill with vitalism, just as in Joyce
the notion of a “word” fills in the gap created by the non-word’s undecidability. It is for
this reason that Ravaisson’s attempt to rehabilitate habit leads to a system that is
strikingly homologous to Bergson’s, since the two essentially perform the same feat: they
see the gap between living and non-living matter and attempt to place a black box in the
middle. Bergson’s box treats the gap as essential and offers an explanatory mechanism
for how the gap comes about and where the line is drawn (a line that Lewis fights to redraw). Ravaisson’s box treats the gap as inessential and offers an explanatory mechanism
for how an entity might move from one side to another. For Bergson “monism” is a nullhypothesis that must be avoided while for Ravaisson it is a fact of existence that needs to
be explained – and, importantly, neither of them actually knows what the “real” answer to
the question of monism is, which is to say that neither provides a complete and correct
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answer to what, if anything, separates living and non-living things. As Bergson’s critics
(like Bertrand Russell) were fond of pointing out, élan vital does not actually explain all
that much (a fact that Bergson himself acknowledges), but then again Herbert Spencer
and the Behaviourists were hardly correct in their belief that all human thought could be
explained mechanistically, or at the very least they grossly underestimated the difficulty
of actually pulling that off. But what Bergson, Lewis, and Ravaisson have over people
like Spencer is that the black boxes of their systems draw in their elucidation the outlines
of the problem they were attempting to solve, enabling a productive engagement with our
ignorance of the “true” answer in a way that Spencer’s dogmatism simply does not. Thus
it is monism which takes center stage in the chapter, because it is ultimately monism to
which all of the questions in the chapter point.
The etiology of the black box is likewise the key issue in my Woolf chapter. Once
again it is not so much the box itself at issue – not a matter of identifying panpsychism as
an element in Woolf’s writing and then listing its instances – but of using that box as a
means of accessing the void in which it fits. Whereas for Lewis the notion of “life” fills a
void of – for lack of a better term – taxonomy, explaining a split between two categories
of existence, for Woolf it arrives as a means of overcoming discontinuity. The chief value
of introducing Richard Bucke’s ideas to Woolf criticism is not that they explain the origin
her panpsychism – for one because a connection between them, though in my opinion
very likely, is not definite enough for one to argue for a direct line of influence. Bucke is
also, furthermore, not strictly necessary as a perquisite for a reading of panpsychism in
Woolf, since panpsychism has a history independent from him, one which Woolf could
conceivably have drawn. Bucke is valuable here primarily because he provides a clear
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origin for cosmic consciousness, a process by which one achieves this awareness of the
inter-connectedness of all things which (as I show in the chapter) closely parallels the
origins of both traumatic experience and scientific discovery. With Bucke, then, we are
able to see that Woolf develops her agnotology as a response to perceptual discontinuity,
and in particular the historical shock of the Great War. In To the Lighthouse, it is not
merely the case that the sudden tragedy of the war was traumatic (though certainly it was)
but also that it demanded a fundamentally new mode of thinking – not only in terms of
how one thought about the war itself, but also everything peripheral to the war, up to and
including all of one’s perceptions generally. Thus, while among the texts I analyze it is
only Septimus Smith who provides a definite example of cosmic consciousness (with
Clarissa Dalloway seeming to stand on the threshold) the basic logic of Bucke’s system,
and its relation to the “cotton wool” of everyday life, pervades Woolf’s writing, and
particularly the mature works upon which her literary reputation rests. Panpsychism thus
becomes not an argument, but an epistemology – and thereby also appears to us as an
access to the world behind the box.
What, then, does “nature” hide for Pound? The matter is somewhat more
complicated, in part because of the disconnected nature of his non-fiction. While Woolf
and Lewis produced sustained and focused expositions of their philosophical ideas (most
notably for my work Time and Western Man and “A Sketch of the Past”) Pound’s
writing, though voluminous, are highly discordant and scatter-brained. For sure, this
erraticism is part of the joy of reading Pound, part of what gives his works their vibrancy,
but it nevertheless makes him difficult to write about. It is in part for this reason that I
had to triangulate from his work the notion of an imperative logic – to give a name to a
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pattern of thinking that I found manifest throughout his works but never fully articulated.
As I concluded in the chapter, this logic is Pound’s answer to a question implicit in his
political and artistic theories: how does one integrate certain kinds of human action with
the natural world while excluding others? Or, put more crudely: why is agriculture good
and usury bad? Indeed, the double-bind for Pound was that his many suggestions of an
ultimate cohesion beneath our perceptions – one that in some cases gives his work a
resemblance to Woolf’s – seems to imply no distinction between different kinds of
human action. But for Pound, an opposition to usury was axiomatic, part of the system
from its inception and therefore impossible to exclude. Pound’s problem can therefore
seem to resemble Lewis’s, in that he saw a suggestion of a perfect contiguity and so
formulated a principle by which he could assert a distinction. But we must avoid too
much haste in our comparisons. For while in Lewis the enemy is never only
Behaviourism or Bergsonism, but rather monism and flat ontology generally, for Pound
the flatness of a continuous relationship between humans and nature (what Morton calls
“ecological thought”) is in many ways desirable. We should not forget that imperative
thinking begins with an assertion that what is ethically right is that which proceeds as
though it were a natural law – even when (as Bergson and Lewis both argue) that kind of
mechanistic behaviour is inherently humorous and worth mocking. Indeed, if we follow
the argument of Bergson’s Laughter to its extremes we can say that Kant’s categorical
imperative might be the greatest joke ever played by a philosopher. As the ending of his
Cantos suggests, Pound never managed to resolve these problems – but in the death of
Herakles we can see what form that resolution might have taken.
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What, then, does all this tell us about modernism? In a sense an agnotology of
modernism re-assert’s Deleuze’s observation that “the effort of invention consists most
often in raising the problem, in creating the terms in which it will be stated.”468 The study
of agnotology is not the study of black boxes, but rather the study of ignorance. The
boxes are interesting most often as the tags of ignorance, as puzzle pieces that suggest the
shapes of the holes they fit. Research, then, often resembles a game of Jeopardy!, where
you are given the answer and then have to guess the question it aligns with. Scholars of
modernism often speak of its questions – the dissolutions of Victorianism and history and
the unified subject which make up the boilerplate summation of the period – but then
spend their research focusing on the answers: montage, religion, monomyth, anxiety. We
have treated these answers as though springing from a virgin birth, standing on their own
with neither origins nor pasts – never asking from what questions they have sprung, what
eternal need gave birth to them, what void they represent. These are not matters of
explanation, or of teleologies of development, but rather of origins, pathways, histories
instead of historicisms. I mean to say that we must not think of these answers as
solutions, because the baseline problem is never solved, but rather as responses or,
perhaps better, as coping mechanisms. A true awareness of one’s ignorance does not
mean a compulsion to remove it, but rather demand to cope with it and live with it, to
accept that opening the black box never lets inside the light but rather, like Pandora’s
box, permits the darkness to creep out, pervading all. The shocks of modernism, the
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historical schisms of which scholars so often speak, were such an opening, and the story
which followed is not one of resolution but rather of the end of resolutions all together.
To study modernist agnotology is to take this observation not only as a fact, but as a
method, to see in the work of modernist studies precisely the same questions from which
modernism sprang.
To a certain extent, then, the problems of modernism are the problems of
epistemology. When reading accounts of how knowledge is created, collated,
disseminated, arranged, often (and for good reasons) the focus is academic. We speak of
knowledge as it relates to research – analyzing the epistemologies of the sciences, social
sciences, and humanities, their different and multivalent relationships to doubt and
ambiguity, their various modes of argument and standards of evidence. But we forget that
while a physicist and an art historian have very different relationships to knowledge and
knowledge production, the fact that they are both engaged in a scholarly enterprise means
that they have a very similar relationship to ignorance. The presumption that ignorance is
bad and must be eradicated is built into the whole scholarly enterprise, within which it is
self-evident that, for instance, the fact that we have no theory of quantum gravity is a
problem, and that its solution is worth a considerable expenditure of time, money, and
expertise.
My point here, I should state directly, is not that ignorance of science and of
natural laws is a non-problem, but simply that it isn’t the only type of ignorance we
should be concerned with. For example, what do we make of the fact that if you asked a
random person to draw a blueprint for a flushing toilet, or an inkjet printer, or a
microwave oven, or a wrist-watch, they would probably be incapable of doing so? And
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that even if they could describe one – say they happened to be a trained watch-maker –
the odds are clearly against them being able to describe the others? Yet people use these
objects every day, despite being entirely unaware of how they work. Certainly this
simple, everyday ignorance, by simple virtue of its commonality and the impossibility of
ever eradicating it, is worthy of greater attention by philosophers, historians, and literary
critics, yet precious few conceptual tools exist for pursuing this end. Creating these tools,
and establishing their importance, was an overriding goal of this study. What I tried to,
and what I hope I have done, is establish the conceptual importance of ignorance, while
also sketching the outlines of how we might go on to understand its place in our various
modes of knowing the world. Ignorance is not the enemy of knowledge, but its older
sibling – preceding it, guiding it, and introducing it to the world. And truly, if we wish to
understand this world, we must learn as well the nature and the limits of our
understanding.
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“‘An Engine in a Cloud’: The East River and the Progress Poem in Crane and Whitman.”
Northeast Modern Languages Association Conference (2015). Winner of
NeMLA’s Graduate Student Essay Prize.
"Your Gaelic is all Greek to Me: Translation as Censorship and Colonization in Joyce
and Friel.” ACCUTE Congress (2014).
“Stephen’s Carnival: Joyce’s early Maximalism.” The UCD James Joyce Research
Colloquium (2014).
“Disauthoritative Joyce: Reading Finnegan(’)s Wake(s).” The International James Joyce
Symposium (2014).
“The Animal that therefore You Are: Jefferson’s Dehumanizing Critique of Phillis
Wheatley.” Canadian Association for American Studies Conference (2013).
“Ulysses and the Poetics of Doubt.” The Eighteenth Irregular Miami J’yce Birthday
Conference (2013).

Teaching Assistantships
2018
2017
2016-2017
2015-2016
2014-2015
2013-2014
2013
2012

English 1028G: The Storyteller’s Art II (UWO)
Biology 1001A/1201A: Introduction to Biology (UWO)
English 1020E: Understanding Literature Today (UWO)
English 2307E: Major British Authors (UWO)
English 3554E: Modern British and Irish Literature (UWO)
English 3227E: Shakespeare (UWO)
English 3667: Literatures of Blues and Jazz (UWO)
English 2074F: Mystery and Detective Fiction (UWO)

Academic Honours and Awards
2016

2015

2014
2013
2012

Graduate Student Essay Prize (NeMLA Graduate Caucus)
International James Joyce Symposium Graduate Scholarship (International James
Joyce Foundation)
The Mary Routledge Fellowship (UWO)
SSHRC Doctoral Fellowship (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council),
renewable for three years
Ontario Graduate Scholarship (The government of Ontario) (Declined)
Ontario Graduate Scholarship (The government of Ontario)
The Mary Routledge Fellowship (UWO)
Ontario Graduate Scholarship (The government of Ontario)
The Provost’s Entrance Scholarship (UWO)
The Joseph-Armand Bombardier CGS Master's Scholarship (Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council)
The Dean’s Entrance Scholarship (UWO)

Comprehensive Examinations
Twentieth Century British and Irish Literature (Primary)
American Literature (Secondary)

